

# Religious Alienation in the Poetry of Arthur Hugh Clough

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**Abstract – Dr. Arnold was a man widely known and respected in the England of the 1830's, but his forte was rather his capacity for leadership, for teaching and to some degree for polemics rather than for profound or original thought. The ideas and principles he handed down to Clough came to some extent from Noetics, a group at oxford to which Arnold had belonged during the second decade of the century. Noetics were intellectuals, holding high position in Oxford University, with an elevation of character which claimed the respect even of their opponents. Newman (himself a former pupil of Richard Whatley) founded his antipathy to the party on the grounds that they were rationalists. Newman in 1841 published Tract 90. He justified his attempt to make Anglicanism as identical as possible with Roman Catholicism by saying that whatever his work led, the position of his opponents led to theism. He held rationalism to be the great evil of the day.**

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The Noetics always denied the charge of rationalism and overtly championed the cause of reform on many fronts. Their primary intellectual and moral principle was to rely less on tradition than on conscience guided by reason and on scripture itself rather than church authority. They followed 18<sup>th</sup> century divine, Bishop Joseph Butler whom Newman himself revered and whose works, specially his Analogies, were popular in the 19<sup>th</sup> century with all theological students. The divine Bishop expressed his faith in reason. The Noetics in turn found this a sanction for following free enquiry wherever it might lead. Dr. Arnold always defended its members of the charge of unorthodoxy or rationality. He said in a famous phrase that the scholarship Pusey abused as 'rationalism' was simply the moral reason acting under God and using, so to speak, the telescope of faith for objects too distant for the naked eye to discover.

Arnold was at one with his fellow Noetics on all these issues. Later on, he became more involved in matters of social reforms outside the University and parted company with Whately on the issue of Church State.

This theory of his regarded reform identical with Christianity. When the revolution of 1830 broke out in France he called it the most blessed in history but he came to fear similar one in England. In this Christian societies, rich and poor, would be brought into communion within the church rather than having their distinctions reinforced by their separate religious structures. The suffering from the poor should be mitigated. The new poor laws (necessary in themselves) humanized the soul, destroying ugliness

of the new jerry-built urban housing. As per the justification offered by laissez-faire, the ministers of the church should not only visit the urban poor, but should be trained in the principles of political economy that they might explain to the working class the true causes of their misery.

Although Arnold met attacks with energy yet seeming contradictions mark his thinking throughout. Arch –Bishop Whatley summed it up best when he wrote to a mutual friend in an unpublished letter dated 1833 that Arnold for all his 'enormous energies' in his principles of Church Reform was as indolent, as anyone in accurate reasoning but he has not the advantage of free inquiry when he desired to establish a Church State. He had little respect for the manners and morals of the Catholic countries, but he wanted to erect roadside shrines in England (on idea Newman found an easy target for satire in loss and gain). He urged the tolerations of Dissent, but he would have excluded Unitarians and Roman Catholics from his societies as well Jews. To the later, he would have denied citizenship and he joined the governing body of the only University in England that admitted them with the purpose of making study of Christian theology a pre-requisite for the degree. When his notion failed and the Old Testament in Hebrew was made an alternative to the Gospels, he resigned. He insisted that they ought to preserve social distinctions while merely removing the abuses of wealth and authority. He taught his students that American notions of individual liberty were barbarous and he regarded the democratic reputation of the Clergyman Horne

Tooke with horror. Human vice was a sanctioned target but the English social structure was not.

F. J. Woodward has discussed the confusion in Head Master's thought between truth and goodness-values which sometimes appear to be identical and sometimes distinct. His tendency to see history as both a path and a locus of truth, had a bearing on Clough's writings and was a confusion from which Clough had gradually to disentangle himself in a process that weakened his own grounds for faith. Clough wrote of Arnold in a much quoted passage:

*There are men, too practical to be literally,  
Accurately, consistently theoretical; too eager to  
Be observant, too royal to be philosophical.....  
Born to do they know what they do.1*

Arnold's thought ultimately evolved a system in which truth, history, progress and Christianity demonstrated each other and the existence of each was ultimately contingent on the existence of one or more of the others. Abstract truth like the knowledge of goodness or God, was known intuitively through the conscience. But history was of immense importance; its study was simply a search after truth and this and progress also were revealed when history was read aright. In that historical search by becoming daily more familiar with a truth seems forever more within your grasp. To Arnold history not only made truth graspable but pointed the way to that higher realm in which she herself is not permitted to enter. In certain sense, Arnold agreed with the common notion that history is philosophy teaching by examples. Thus, "truth should be sought in history, but history would always reveal it, being the story of progress, reform and Christianity. Not only did history have some laws, but these contain no single paradox, and all were in accord with Christian and Biblical ethics."2

Clough came to doubt that history revealed the truth in any coherent way. When Clough began to realize the contradictions history yielded, Arnold's logic collapsed and with it, all metaphysical certainty that aspired to base itself on rigorous logic.

"Had Arnold not presumed to cite a locus of truth, Had he not, more importantly, felt the need so to locate it Clough would have been less disturbed."3

He was left at twenty with the feeling that to attempt to discuss a certain class of ideas was both foolish and dangerous.

In studying Clough's undergraduate essays, one thing should be kept in mind that Balliol College and its master Dr. Richard Jenkyns, were different in almost every way from Rugby and Dr. Arnold.

Clough entered the college with a long tradition as a strong hold of most reactionary Toryism and a seat of conservative religious views. Positively or negatively his college could not but have a strong effect on this young man. Clough, with special privileges and notice given as a scholar, lived closer to his teachers than he had done at school. The contact between Clough and his Balliol teachers was prolonged, profound and came at a time when his mind was ready to be formed.

The Tory and the Royalist ties at Balliol kept up by the Master, Dr. Jenkyns, were old ones. And Jenkyns, who was conservative, a 'high and dry Churchman', and a snob, mentally associated the Arnolians with heresy. He didn't agree with W.G.Ward, a tutor who had a close friendship with Clough. Jenkyns didn't hesitate to join the other Heads of House in 1841 in condoning Newman's Tract 90, or to agree in deposing Ward from his tutorship when the opportunity arose.

Jenkyns supervised approximately two-thirds of Clough's compositions. He appointed four fellows to share in the supervision of others. John Corr, E. C. Woolcombe, P. S. H. Payne and Archibald Tait. All of them were sound scholars and, at least, not quite so orthodox as the Master.

Tait and Woolcombe were conservative and acceptable to all parties. Of Tait's soundness his subsequent career is testimony enough for he went on to become Headmaster of Rugby and eventually Archbishop of Canterbury, England's highest ecclesiastical post. He was while at Balliol, Ward's major opponent in the Balliol senior common room and instrumental in the official sanction later taken against both him and Newman. He also assigned on the formidable topic, the prevalence under different circumstances of different system of philosophy, considered as an index of the character of any age or nation.

There is no reason to suppose that the other three tutors were more liberal than Tait, who himself, after being converted to Anglicanism, began as an Arnolodian, but in his years at Balliol moved further and further to the right in his opinions.

All of them however joined in creating an intellectual and social atmosphere that could hardly have been more different from that of Rugby. In place of Arnold's dictum that the principles of advance and reform in their most perfect state were identical with Christianity. Balliols were ready to quote Johnson's saying that the first Whig was the devil. Clearly, what was expected of Clough under such circumstances was not expression of political or religious liberalism or indeed of any opinions on topical questions. The real battles that were going on in the University were well expected to come to the surface in Clough's essays and it is to his credit that he found in his time's worn topics

the material for his thoughtful and often deeply felt compositions.

Moreover Jenkyn' record shows why Clough failed to win any of the several prizes for which he was eligible. Clough's writing, Jenkyns thought suffered from a lack of facility, a want of ease and elegance, good, full of thought, but sometimes rough and unpolished in style.

Clough as a youth was deeply concerned with the existence of truth and that his loss of belief in its immanence under the attacks of his tutor W.G.Ward was a serious blow to him. His early essays exhibit strikingly both Clough's early assumptions about truth's immanence and his later disillusion with those assumptions. They also give us new insight what were probably Ward's own arguments which seem to have had a significant and permanent effect on Clough's thoughts.

Clough's views on truth showed Arnold's influence most clearly during his first year at oxford. The first three of the four essays he wrote that year (1837-38) deal with confident assertions about truth's existence but with specifically Arnoldian formulations, as he argues from the physical to the metaphysical world, identifies material and spiritual progress with Christianity, treats history primarily as a pedagogical or theological means of reinforcing religious faith and easily identifies himself with those who confidently perceive comforting truths and looks forward to seeing truth higher and greater state. At the same time he is full of strictures against sin, he saw almost everywhere in the boys of Rugby.

As for utilitarianism, Clough held that "it is great matter to have spirit of utilitarianism and of love for gain and to suppress this there is no better engine than taste."<sup>4</sup> Men should learn that there are better things even in this world than railroads steam engines. The better things of course were paths to the higher truth: "it is a truth and a most comforting one that the use and cultivation of those faculties, which God has given us for the perception of beauty and of truth not only can be sanctified to his glory but moreover are of themselves conducive to the health and well-being of our spiritual nature."<sup>5</sup>

In his second essay, Clough held that progress was good but the mechanization all ending it had an evil side, for it has led to an overweening and unworthy attention to physics and a habit of asking in every study, 'what is the use of it', as if the knowledge of truth and the possession of the power of attaining it were not in itself its own exceeding great reward " and as if God could not be glorified in the cultivation of the faculties he has given unless they were put to some practical operation."<sup>6</sup>

For Clough at this period to attain truth meant, in effect, to attain spiritual insight into such matters as moral action, beauty and providence.

At the first stage of his essay writing, Clough assured in clause after clause that by "(Christianity) alone could man set aright the relations between man and man, between man and God, and learn to strive to widen the division between good and evil"<sup>7</sup>, (No 4) but a new change occurred in his tone in 1838 when he felt alien to the first stage of his opinions about truth and religion so to say. The change made itself felt in two stages; first in a new sense of personal uncertainty of the intellectual level.

Clough never defined the truth of which he spoke so confidently, but it is evident that as which Arnold, it meant seeing in the world around him God's providential scheme, the continued triumph of progress, reform, and moral virtue. Technological change was providently inspired if its results were humane; if not, reform was needed.

The opposite of truth was utilitarian which based itself not on God's will but on material fact, and he inveighed against it and also against physics, law of gain, frivolity and drunkenness. Art of course was servant of morality.

The experiences of the self and self-doubts which had hitherto been marked or repressed began to be spoken of first in the fall of 1838. When Clough refers to the difficulties in real life, "in the rough unyielding material of action duly to set forth the expression of the lofty ideals within itself so easily forgotten"<sup>8</sup> (No.9).

In a passage unconsciously revealing his own inner conflicts and doubts which initially forced him to lapse in to the state of alienation, he writes, "man do not err usually from any excess of caution but from an evil habit of mind which is confident in deciding and timid in action, we yield ourselves up to our imaginations and which it is yet in our power to decide for or against, we yield ourselves to the contemplations of the hopeful view..... a reaction at once takes place and we again obey slavishly those gloomy and desponding views with which our imagination now presents us"<sup>9</sup> (No. 9).

The tone of introversion and sense of helplessness evident here does not be-speak a will ready to hold only the impression of the good and reject that of the bad. Yet it is just this new note of alienation which he treated with increasingly awareness that shaped objectivity in his prose and poetry alike.

Clough was brought up in the line of Arnold and Ward's intense involvement with and love for Clough was a negative influence for Clough's faith and to Arnold's training. Though Clough seems to have tried with kindness both to keep Ward at arm's length and to help him in some fashion latter to understand and control his conduct. The emotional burden was certainly too great and to it must be added his worries about his father's

imminent failure hanging over him, concerns which become articulate in the fall of 1839.

Ward was formulating against Arnold and his view of history as capable of revealing truths to mankind. This issue was a central one, for not only history was believed to be a bulwark to faith, but the methods that attacked it could also be turned against the Bible itself. Scripture was in a vulnerable position and in fact B.G. Niebuler, the great German historian whom Arnold revered, had already cancelled his Biblical researches, carried out by historical methods in part because the findings seemed to promise a threat to religious faith. Ward, however, secure in Tractarianism did not hesitate to point out the weakness of hoping to find truth from the study of history.

Ward resolved his own epistemological dilemma by acts of faith, his desire obediently to submit to church Authority and ultimately by his conversion to Roman Catholicism. What he could not discover for himself he would accept on the authority of men and institutions more divinely guided than he.

Passionate acts of faith, the longing to swallow the camel as well as gnats which characterizes Ward's mode of belief, were out of character for Clough, such a condition was painful and he was to know its full extent, but he would not attempt to deny or minimize it falsely by winning to know what his conscience should of its own accord tell him. The institutions; idealities, etc., with which he resisted Newmanism were in fact anything but stable. Nothing in Ward had power over their integrity and while logic could move him, anxiety or inability to tolerate philosophical ambiguity could not.

But Ward could not probably did give him new questions. Clough no longer regards history as an instrument of his teleology meant to teach man. On the contrary history was now to be studied not to discover God but men.

Clough was also familiar with Schlegel's philosophy of History, which had been available in English in the parallelism with the German's interpretations of classical history.

Dissatisfied with the course of German religion, which he saw tending towards either pantheism or rationalism and perhaps disturbed by his own findings in comparative religious studies, Schlegel made it his mission to produce a philosophical system which would restore the last image of God to man by reconciling historical, metaphysical and scientific truths under one truth inductively perceived. He believed in the revelation of God in ancient culture i.e. Indian and China's. He revered Brahma of Hindu Vedas as truth. He too, going further than Arnold, viewed history not merely as a source of God's revelation of truth to man but specifically

sensed it to the level of scripture, conscience, and science (or nature) as sources of truth.

Clough's doubt shows Ward's heritage. He recognized the dilemma that Arnold and Schlegel faced before but chose a different solution determining to put his faith not in enticing perception that might become invalid within the year but in facts cold half-realized assertions that may be less satisfying than genuine insights but also less ephemeral and more reliable. The day on which he hopes to know the whole and perfect truth would not be a day in ordinary time. He likes that Wordsworth could not help hoping. The primeval truth divine, he dwelt on there, now gleamed only faintly.

In later years he speaks in an optative good and not in declarative. He still believes in the ultimate intelligibility of all things in accordance with God's will but not in his or for all practical purposes any man's capacity to perceive it. When he does speak of truth it is most often in a negative context, as something ignored by the majority of men or else a superior kind of fact, a generalized concept relating facts or giving insight into them. Thus, in a late essay written in the autumn of 1840 he distinguishes between mere facts and real truths but these truths are now insights not into God's providence but into underlying psychological and moral motivations in human behavior and he finds it to be superior in a limited way to biography not because it teaches man to remove tradition but because it conceptualizes human action and makes it comprehensive.

In a work from the same period on 'The Art of Rhetoric' Clough makes man's fallen state and his failure to follow the truth, the reason for the degradation of rhetoric itself. In the same vein, writing in May 1840, he holds that it would require a mind super humanly strong to live incorruptly in the corrupt world. Here he finds the contradiction between Plato's ideal of the philosopher king and the actually of Plato's own retirement from the world to be entirely reasonable. Clough writes of Plato "that was enough for him..... if in the general tempest he could find some little Greek or heaven in which to shelter his bark and look on in sorrowful contemplation. Madness it would be and worse than madness were he to leave his hard grained harborage to join in unequal conflict with the Medea's winds and waves"10 (No. 28).

This description of Plato's condition evidences two concomitant developments : Clough's sense of the immanence of truth begins to fade and the pragmatism which has been noted in Clough's thought and the seeming contradictory but actually complementary depressiveness and genuine amongst evident also in such verse as Black misgiving of a creature moving about in world's not realized. The two tendency exist side by side and

in dialectic with each other. Their synthesis is in his poetry.

Clough's pragmatism is based on a newly humanistic attitude, seeking to understand man's purpose and proper sphere to action not on the basis of theological assumptions but through the study of man himself and the recognition that man's ground of being must be known through experience rather than through contemplation of the light within. It is a world in which patterns of development in human affairs require purely human study of man himself and the recognition that man's ground of being must be known through experience rather than through contemplation of the light within. It is a world in which patterns of development in human affairs require purely human study. The study of man in society is as important as moral philosophy. We become aware that a year at oxford Clough has begun to substitute for the negativity which had censured classical frippery and hinted as his own more pure and refined appreciation of the ideal and enthusiasm for the real and for learning of all kinds.

Now he recognizes that theoretical knowledge of the great machine of man's social system without a practical experience of its working is useless. The very perception of truth itself now seems to him in some degree a cultural phenomenon. The age points out influences even on those very individuals who betray great pleasures and complacency in any real or imagined liberation from its effects.

Clough has been compared, by inference to Oedipus; but he can be compared, in another way, to a man who by his desire to know the truth and save his city, brought destruction upon himself. for, like Oedipus, he saw around him a city which he dearly loved slowly dying, and like him too, he could neither give up his desire to know if things are bad, nor to cease asking those obsessive questions even when he knows that their answers would bring him into exile.

Till 1848 Clough wrestled with his conscience, attempting first to ignore the question of subscription and then to find another form of faith before finally announcing to his friend that Christianity was no longer his actuating religion punning to Froude that he was a healthier man and a (Re) publican telling Hawkins that he deeply repented of ever having subscribed at all.

The problem of subscription is a fascinating one that comes up again and again in Victorian studies. In Clough's days, oaths and subscription in Victorian Oxford were abhorrent to various intellectual groups, the dissenters, the radicals and the evangelicals. As per the Oxford oaths and subscriptions all ministers of the Anglican church and persons taking their degrees at the two ancient Universities had been required by law since 1572 to sign an oath attending their belief in the Thirty Nine Articles of the Church.

These articles, approved by Luther himself, were one of a number of sixteen century confessions. The first five articles of the thirty nine affirmed the basis of the Catholic doctrines of the faith but most of these confessions as well as the Anglican document were essentially negative.

At least ten of the articles were directed against the growing power of Calvinism with its extreme doctrines of predestination, election and so on; eighteen more were primarily attacks on the usurpation of Rome and its claims to authority on the question of tradition, the Pope, a celibate clergy, proprietary masses and other familiar points of disagreement.

Subscription meant in effect that Clough promised to accept as his own this ancient formula with all the *prima facie* marks of sectarian warfare preserved in its precise restrictions and condemnations. Dissenters or non-conformists were burdened by handicaps imposed by the establishment. They were excluded from taking university degrees at Oxford or Cambridge, which impoverished them culturally, economically and politically.

The alternatives to the old universities were meager. London and Scotland universities could give them admission but they had their own strong religious ambience. The dissenters were taxed to support the established church, and their own Churches were consequently short; changed to the working classes. The established church seemed to be actually an instrument of class suppression. Even many Anglicans in the nineteenth century found the articles objectionable. Arnold, hesitated almost a year before he could bring himself to subscribe, while Newman composed Tract 90, to show that the articles were not anti- Roman after all. Ward was charged for interpreting the Articles in a non-natural sense and he lost his M.A. degree at Oxford. Dislike of subscription was wide spread among Clough's friends. Shairp and Joyett doubted some of the articles and there was scarcely a member of their circle whether Puseyite or Arnolidian who could have signed the articles without some quiver of conscience. Yet not to sign, unless one had a private fortune meant that any man not destined for trade was likely to blight his fortune and render himself, however talented, ineffectual particularly ineffectual in reforming the very system he disliked.

Clough's resistance to subscription had two major phases. The first occurred in 1843 when Hawkins offered him the position of tutor and he faced the fact that if he did not take his M.A. which involved renewed subscription, the promising career which had only just begun would come to a halt.

The problem of subscription became as much as a stumbling block for the Tractarians who at first had made as it had long been for liberals. Part of it

interest lies in the fact that it was involved in the gradual but hard fought establishment of two modern principles; the separation of religion and education and academic freedom which removed from its religious connotations is only another aspect of that right of free inquiry for which the notice and later the liberals at Oxford fought. Clough understood these principles and knew what was at stake. Nevertheless, he signed the Thirty Articles in October 1843. The first phase of his struggle was over.

He entered now on a period of what he later called his very great force. The development of Clough's political and religious ideas suggests that it had been the struggle of a man tied by a rope on two sides: the more he freed himself in one area of conventional thought, the looser his bonds seemed to become in the other. He plunged in the politics.

The debacle following Ward's degradation and the conversion of Ward, conversion Newman and others to Rome made notable changes in the tone at Oxford. The historic truth of Christianity was an open question. Clough was among this group. It is not generally recognized that Clough's doubt had taken fairly clear shape by 1845, but his sister Anne's journals suggest that Clough made himself familiar with the critical arguments of Strauss and with the German's attacks on dogma. At any rate, the Gospels sacraments and liturgy were now being criticized by Clough.

Arthur had criticized liturgy: he spoke too of the bad arrangement of the Sunday lessons from The Old Testament and the little advantage people in general derived from going to the church, and the need there was for a thorough alternation in the church services.

Arthur had further told his sister that the first three Gospels were not to altogether depended on. Most upsetting of all to Anne was the Straussian reinterpretation of the doctrine of the Atonement in which even at fourth hand Kant views are discernible.

About the doctrine of the atonement He said, "What Christ said to Nicodemus of John was the right doctrine viz that a change was effected in us by the knowledge of Christ and by spirit of Christ in us. That the good in us was made strong and overcome evil – and this is our redemption. Christ comes to show fourth the perfecting of his father to show us what we ought to be and his power works in us to effect a change in our lives. Truth surely must mean an understanding and a realizing of these truths and a living by them."<sup>11</sup>

Both Strauss and Kant believed in the ideal of moral perfection deposited in the reason and to obtain moral strength by the contemplation of this ideal. Such moral faith alone man is bound to exercise and not historical faith.

It is however, possible that Clough had absorbed some of his more radical religious ideas from the reading of the Life of Blanco White which he described as "strong meat and very striking production."<sup>12</sup> White's history which caused a considerable stir at the time of its publication, must have seemed strong meat to Clough not only in its revelations about the still surviving Spanish Inquisition but also because it showed how a sincerely religious man adhering to conscience could be led, step by step, further and further from orthodox Christianity. Bred up a Roman Catholic priest, Whately had become successively on Anglican in reverse, the slang of a spiritual pilgrimage whose grail had been intimately connected with Noetics. He was made an honorary member of Oriel common room and lived for some times with Whately as a tutor of his son. Later on he became a Unitarian.

Clough's connections with Unitarians played a major role thereafter in his life. For it was through them directly or indirectly that he met his wife, secured the principalship of the University Hall, met Emerson and migrated to the United States.

Yet inspite of his connections with Unitarians Clough never joined them under the influence of Emerson, the transcendentalist, Clough's objection to Uniform doctrines had already begun. Martineau had discussed in the Prospective Review the case of Theodore Parker, the American transcendentalist who had been virtually excommunicated by orthodox Bostonian Unitarians for proceeding that belief in Christ miracles was not essential to Christian faith, which must rest on man's own divinely implanted knowledge of God.

Clough took transcendentalist position even created by Emerson, that if human nature were divine then Christ had no historic value. God is, not was as Emerson put it, Biography was morally invalid, Martineau's veneration of Him and of all Biblical history must be misplaced. Adam and Christ could be seen as a mere time effigurations of the untemporal truth: "--is there anything in the notion of a Fall and a Redemption which is not conveyed in the common philos expression? So Atonement and Grace perhaps the historical element in Christianity (which Emerson rejected, was irrelevant) And secondly if so? (If Atonement and Grace could be reduced merely to philosophical concepts) is it essential to connect these truths of human nature (its capacity to conquer evil) with the historical phenomena of Christ and his life?"<sup>13</sup>

In short, the doctrines of Unitarian appeared to Clough to satisfy neither his reason nor his faith and it is evident that after his researches in 1845 he was never again drawn to it. Clough committed,

"I do not doubt that the protestant has excluded himself (necessary perhaps it was that he should so do) from the large religious experience which the Roman Catholic preserves, I am convinced again that the Unitarian is morally and religiously only half educated compared with the Episcopalian. Modern Unitarianism is I conceive, unfortunate on the one hand in refusing to allow its legitimate force to the exercise of reason and criticism, on the other hand, in having by its post exercise of reason and criticism thrown aside because of their dogmatic exterior treasures of pure religious tradition."

For more deep and lasting an influence on Clough then White or Strauss however was Ralf Waldo Emerson, a man whom Clough and his friends had been reading for years and to whom the young poet made the unique avowal that he had largely learnt from him. Townsend Sendler had written of Emerson influence on some of the young man in his audiences that they turned their faces towards him as though he were a Messiah. His words aroused ideas and emotions so compelling as to hinder them from sleep. He gave them the strength to believe in themselves. Worshipfully they followed him, repeating his phrases as though they were revelations sent from the skies.

Like Strauss, Emerson had been shaken by recognizing the fallibility of miracles as proofs of religions and at Clough's age resigned from his Unitarian University. He preserved a sense of the immanence of God and when he insisted that man was divine and that therefore, 'God is, not was' and found his presence first in nature and later, more and more in the 'over soul' of which all men partook, his evidence felt that they have heard not a destructive, negative, voice, like Strauss's but one expressing a faith that rested on eternal and not merely sensual things. His doctrine put an immense on the self and self-reliance. He advocated the rejection by each man of the claim of society and the connection for the all-important facts of men's divinity was to be made real only by acts of individual assertion. He spoke for a kind of permanent revolution of the spirit. He dismissed Biblical history, although valuing history itself highly and called the story of Christ's life mere 'biography' –edifying but less important than the individual soul and that existed for each man written himself and through his self-defined actions.

Emerson's attraction of these young men did not fundamentally rest on his being an original thinker. He had learned much from Coleridge and Carlyle. But he did not claim originality for himself that was not true beside of his appeal. Part of it undoubtedly lay in the force of his personality, simplicity, honesty, high mindedness and special reserves of kindness and insight. But part of Emerson's significance for man like Clough rested also in his personal history: in resigning his ministry and in cutting himself adrift from his livelihood and much of established society. Emerson could speak of the morals of intellect

because his life suggested to his audience that he knew what the words meant.

Clough and Emerson became close friends to the extent that they were willing to share their personal journal. For Emerson wrote in 1845 that he had looked into (Clough's) (Journal) on his Paris trip and later invited Clough to help edit his own English one. Clough made of characteristics not to be in the usual sense any man's disciple, the might acknowledge guidance to make it his own by living it out. Thus they were friends perhaps precisely because Clough no longer needed to be such a disciple.

Neither Emerson's mysticism nor the pantheism of his 'Nature' applied to Clough's mentally, but the American idealism and his stress on intuition as a mode of epistemology found fertile soil. On the question of the importance of philosophy and history Clough held: "what is it to me to know the fact of the battle of Marathon or the fact of the distance of Cromwell? I have it all within me."<sup>15</sup> Merely the knowledge the historical facts have no importance. What matters was as Emerson's 'History' suggests was men's knowledge of the meaning of moral courage in defiance of the many: only by his innate knowledge did those facts about Cromwell or Athens assume importance and unless he had it all within (Him) the facts were nothing. To understand facts properly, man must look inward and assert the immense possibilities within the self: "if the man is true to his better instincts..... and refuses the dominion of facts..... as one that comes of a higher race ..... then the facts fall aptly and supple into their places."<sup>16</sup>

It was a valuable approach for it freed him to look without prejudice on other cultures and other values: "How easily these old worships of Moses, of Zoroaster, of Menu, of Socrates's domesticate themselves in the mind. I cannot find any antiquity in them. They are mine as much as theirs".<sup>17</sup>

Within a few years Clough was to call just such a role of names as these to indicate the multiplicity of religious truths: of both Arnold and Schlegel had failed to make historical facts true teachers Emerson, at least, had shown Clough how to make himself their master.

In 1847 Hawkins appointed him sub-dean, but the dialogue between himself and his conscience reached a climax. His objection to the Thirty- Nine Articles had been what he called his Puseyite position. He was not a Puseyite but helped Puseyite position, he had written. He meant by this that without accepting the emphasis on church authority and doctrine, he objected like Pusey, to the state of anarchy within the church of England that let her give over the administration of Church discipline to men who were appointed by the

government as Bishops and Archibishops and whose attitudes would be questionably secular.

In 1845 Clough had tried for a professorship at one of the proposed new Irish Colleges, no doubt feeling that service in one of these secular bodies would be more honest than continued residence in Oxford.

Nothing came of these colleges at the time and, in 1846, Clough turned his attention to political economy beginning to gather the material for the 'Retrenchment' pamphlet. This pamphlet strongly expressed his dissatisfaction with Oxford. Unconsciously he was beginning to push himself by stages away from the city he loved so well.

His doubts were now more than questions. Belief in the ethical teachings of Christianity – the Commandments and God's justice and love survived but the doubts he had formed earlier about the authenticity of scripture and origin of religious authority remained and had now been joined by more profound questions. Clough now was aware that he did not understand to his own satisfaction the meaning of Grace, Free Will or 'Atonement by a crucified savior.'

"..... the Evangelicals gabble it, as the papist do their Ave Mary's – and yet say they know; while Newman falls down and worship because he does not know and knows he does not know. I think others are more right, who say boldly we don't understand it, and therefore we can't fall down and worship it..... Until I know, I will wait; and if I am not born with the power to discover. I will..... trust to God's justice; and neither pretend to know, nor without knowing, pretend to embrace.'18

Emerson had written: "God has no answer for them' 'work and live, work and live'. The present is infinite the future finite".19

Clough was approaching that view and his subsequent statement on religion must all be understood to have been made on the basis of this agnosticism.

Thus troubled by religious doubts and his own dilemma Clough turned to writing poetry and giving expression to his doubts and his writing. His major poems exhibit his frustration, despair, doubts and over all the sense of alienation. It will be in fitness of things to say that his poems are a true expression of the dilemma he retained over the years. A brief survey of his poems will help in understanding of his state of mind.

When Clough published The Bothie of Tobernavaulich in November 1848, his friends were astonished partly because they expected a defense of his resignation (whether a theological pamphlet or an Edam and Eve) but the reticent man who had been struggling with religious doubts had produced a

comedy of Oxford undergraduates. At first reading Clough seems to have released his boyish spirit so long suppressed, but the poem had some deeper meaning to convey. It throws light on the disillusionment and frustration of the poet. To be precise and clear the religious storm in Oxford and Clough's hopelessness due to the failure of the liberal's efforts to bring out reforms (Christianity out of the clutches of Orthodox Church) threw Clough in state of alienation. The Bothie is a sort of escape from Oxford and a secular revolt against narrow standards of religion. Having quitted Oxford Clough was in state of "What shall I do?", "who am I?" Clough was left a lost case. The Bothie is an escape from Oxford society with its religious and political as well as expression to the hope of survival of the religious views he carried with him. It was an effort of a poet who was in search of a philosophy, even in search of his own identity.

It is not denying the fact that The Bothie a modern epic (as most of the critics agree) reflects on Clough's ideas on society, politics, labour and women. But these aspects will be dealt with in succeeding chapters. Here the main endeavour is to deal with religious undertone of the poem. The central theme of the poem is, of course, love. Philip Hewson, the young radical is attracted by the simplicity and labour of the working girl.

*Never believe me, I know of the feelings between men and women,*

*Till in some village field in holidays now getting stupid,*

*One day sauntering 'long listless', as Tennyson has it,*

*Long and listless strolling, ungainly in hobbadiboyhood ,*

*Changed it may eye fell aside on a capless bonnetless maiden,*

*Bending with three-pronged fork in a garden uprooting potatoes.*

*What it the air? Who can say? or herself, or the charm of the labour?*

*But a new thing was in me ; and longing delicious possessed me,*

*Longing to take her and lift her, and put her away from her slaving.*

*Was it embracing or aiding was most in my mind hard question;*

*But a new thing was in me, I, too, was a youth among maidens :*

*Was it the air? Who can say? But in part it was the charm of the labour.*

(The Bothie, II, 39-50)

The tutor, the grave man, nicknamed Adam attempts to separate the sense of the exaggeration in his pupil's passionate outburst. He warns him against the merely attractive, he urges Hewson to search out the good. Now Hewson is in search of truth and good. He consummates with a ferry-girl, and then with a servant at an inn and has been charmed by the golden haired Katie. He had been observed by Lindsay.

*..... in the ingle beside her*

*Kneeling, picking the peats from her apron blowing together*

*Both between laughing with lips distended to kindle the ambess;*

*Lips were so near to lips, one living check to another,*

(The Bothie, III, 205-8)

Hewson is in the painfully ambivalent grip of guilt and longing, for he has dissented Katie and the farm house girl at Rannock. The mode of Hewson's sexual guilt is so close to the outdated Victorian version of the prostitute as sinned maid. Adam's lecture is too much a lecture from Clough himself.

In the section V Hewson recalls from his adventure with Katie and has turned to the aristocratic loveliness of Lady Maria. Newson's command to the Lady Maria of society is impregnated with the same ambiguousness. He finds it to be the inspiration of God or of Evil as he concludes in his letter to the tutor.

In section VI he meets Elspie, the end of his quest. In Elspie, he finds the good and not merely the attractive. Elspie sees her love for Philip clearly as a platonic one. It brings with it (entirely appropriately in view of the spiritual reality of Elspie's love) ideas of the New Testament stone which the builder rejected. The ambivalence of sexual response are further explored by Elspie in another image, which recreates perfectly the physical terror of imminent experience, the fear and the fascination of the overwhelming compulsion, the despair of identity:

*You are too strong, you see, Mr. Philip just like the sea there, which will come, through the straits and all between the mountains. Forcing its great strong tide into every nook and inlet, Getting far in, up the quite stream of sweet inland water, Sucking it up, and stopping it, turning it driving it backward, Quite*

*preventing its own quite running; and then, soon after, Back it goes off, leaving weeds on the shore, and wrack and uncleanness. And the poor burn in the gain tries again its peaceful running, But it is brackish and trained, and all its bank in disorder. That is what I dreamt all last night, I was the barnie. Trying to get along through the tyrannous brine ad could not, I was confined and squeezed in the coils of the great salt tide, that would mix-in itself with me and change me, I felt myself changing ; And I struggled and screamed, I believe, in my dream. It was dreadful. You are too strong, Mr. Philip :*

(The Bothie, VII, 120-34)

Hewson is stung with remorse but when he promises to leave the next day Elspie's feelings undergo a reversal. Forgetting her fears and shyness, she surrenders to her emotions boldly taking his hand and kissing his fingers. Now they decide to enter their future as husband and wife.

In section VII, Hewson prepares for marriage. He inevitably extracts a philosophy, a philosophy somewhat altered, still radical but now tempered by experience. In the end they along with their children set out in hope for the Antipades, where from moral, intellectual and political complexities they will subdue to earth by their labour and build another Bothie of Tober-na-Vaulich.

Thus the poem is an escape from Oxford's social, political and religious standards with a hope for the survival of the man tormented by the religious doubts.

Amours De Voyage was written in 1849-1850. The period when Clough said 'he could have gone cracked at times'. Clough's resignation of his fellowship must be connected finally with the religious problem, but that connection acquires its real fullness of significance only when it is seen as establishing itself through a whole range of new values and understandings new way of looking at the world, created out of a broad, interlinked process of development. He had come to breathe an intellectual and spiritual air very different from that of traditional Oxford. He rejected Oxford's theology and its religious beliefs, he disagreed which its politics, questioned its conception of society and its interpretation of morality. But Clough could not reform the society and he left Oxford in disgust.

Amorus De Voyage reflects his troubled spirit and intellectual atmosphere of his age. Cloude, the hero of the poem is young intellectual of the time who has all the complexities of awareness -- inner and outer, that come of extreme sensibility. Cloude, the inveterate doubter inhabits a particular historical landscape, a middle ground of the spirit where the traditional unities of experiences and meaning have begun to disintegrate, where even

the Romantic assertion had lost its potency as a principle of order and were the escaping – not escaped – fragment mock both memory and desire. Cloude anticipates Prufrock; he is also the descendant of Werther and Manfred and Childe Harold of Rome and Obermann. He inherits from these ancestors his absurdly inflated, rather fashionable ego which is evident from, the statement, 'Rome disappoints me; still but I shrink and adopt myself to it', but he also carries with him a radically subversive suspiciousness which makes any real faith in that ego impossible. His particular moment in history is that in which Evangelical introspection, secularized into intellectual liberalism, first faces a central dilemma. In the starting we find his disappointment from religion in Canto I when Cloude says to Eustace:

*Rome disappoints me such; I hardly as yet understand,*

*But Rubbisy seems – the word that most exactly would suit it,*

*All the foolish destruction, and all the sillier savings,*

*All the incongruous things of past incompatible ages,*

*Seems to be treasured up here to make feels of present and future.*

*Would to Heaven the old Goths had made a cleaner sweep of it?*

*Would to Heaven some new one would come and destroy*

*these Churches;*

(Amours De Voyage, Canti I, 13-15, 19-24)

Clough was depressed. The his frustration, disappointment bordering on alienation was born of the breakdown in traditional ideas and values which followed industrial political revolution of the eighteen century and the development of critical mind. He was living in an age of 'criticism and negation'. It became unable for him to follow the pattern of life without question. It was very difficult for him to choose between a score of new, or new-old, philosophies of religion. Certain of nothing driven inward on an endless search for belief, he was frustrated of action and self-consciousness. Cloude doubted not only ideas but also the great ideals of life – Beauty, Friendship, Heroism, and even Love.

Clough said that Amours De Voyage had been floating about many years in the brains of 'feeble and restless youth'. For in the poem and in the age, the critical spirit strikes at most of the Romantic Capitals

– at God and Heroes, at Beauty and art and Liberty as well as at Love – paralyzing the will to act, and yet the great assertions are hardly injured. They keep on being repeated with something of the old order by the very man who has struck them down with fact and reason; and this skeptical tension is expressed in Canto I on Roman Art and Beauty; in Canto II, on Patriotism and the Hero; in the remaining Cantos, on Love and Marriage.

The Canto concludes with an epilogue on Rome which reads like a dialogue of believing heart with the critical head, each rephrasing the other's question.

*Is it religion? I ask me; or is it a vain superstition?*

*Slavery object and gross? Service, too feeble, of truth?*

*Is it an idol I bow to, or it a god that I worship?*

*Do I sink back on the old, or do I soar from the mean?*

*So through the city I wonder and question, unsatisfied ever,*

*Reverent so I accept, doubtful because I revere.*

(Amours De Voyage, I, 279-84)

The final words are unexpected and precise. He is not only doubtful of revering that may not be true, but doubtful because he revers – that is, because he finds himself adopting a "believing" attitude which both Oxford modes and modern intelligence have taught him to suspect.

As Clough was influenced by Dr. Arnold but he could not agree with his views, as we see that Arnold set up his own standard of goodness and did not care whether truth contradicted it or not. His tendency was to see history both a path to and a locus of truth. This had a bearing on Clough's writing and was a confusion from which Clough had gradually disentangled himself in a process that weakened his own ground for faith in Amours De Voyage.

He says:

*No, the Christian faith, as at any rate I understand it,*

*With its humiliations and exaltations combining,*

*Exaltations sublime, and yet diviner abasements,*

*Aspirations from something most shameful here upon earth and,*

*In our poor selves to something most perfect above in the heaven,*

*No, the Christian faith, as I, at least, understood it,*

*Is not here, O Rome, in any of these thy Churches;*

(Amours De Voyage IV, 65-70)

Again he says:

*Bring back theology once yet again in a flood upon Europe :*

*Lo you, for forty days from the windows of heaven it fell;*

*The water prevail on the earth yet more for a hundred and fifty;*

*Are they obtaining at least? The doves that are sent to explore are*

*Wearily fain to return, as they went to the wandering wave tost vessel-*

*Fain to re-enter the roof which covers the clean and unclean-*

*Luther, they say was unwise, he did not see how things were going;*

*Luther was foolish, but o great God, what call you ? Ignatius?*

*O my tolerant soul, be still, but you talk of barbarian.*

(Amours De Voyage IV, 95-104)

Thus the poem ends with the note of despair and hopelessness. There is no possibility of reform which can be brought about the theology or so. In the last line of the passage quoted above he pounces upon the orthodox, rigid society which is not ready to accept any change or reform.

A brief analysis of Clough's poems makes it clear that he lost faith in Christianity or any other religion. No dogma or sect seemed to satisfy him. He came to the conclusion that there is no answer to his bewilderment, his doubts. These impulses and convictions moved him in writing his poems. The first was the conviction of the impossibility of finding answers to the questions, the soul lusts to ask. The

second was annoyance at those who presumed to have found such answers, and the third was deliberate adoption in the face of alienation he felt of a posture that would be sufficient to contain within himself that very longing for answers; a posture which would transcend that annoyance.

In his 'Notes on Religious Traditions' he expresses his alienated state of mind but desperate longing for some religious tradition:

*Where then shall we seek for the Religious Traditions?*

*Everywhere; but above all in our own work; in life, in action, in submission, so far as action goes in service in experience, in patience and in confidence. I would scarcely have any man dare to say that he has found it.*<sup>20</sup>

It is not accurate say of Clough's religious position that it amounted to nothing but quietism unless one is willing to tar Emerson and Carlyle with the same brush.

Like Emerson he would go seeking for guidance in Bishop Butler, in the past and the present, in discarded precepts, in the Bhagwad Geeta and the cows of the Persian in the Qaran and Homer in Lucretius and Socrates : Every rule of conduct, every maxim, every usage of life and society must be admitted, like Ecclesiastes of old in the Old Testament so in each new Age to each new Age's Bible.

But ultimately, man will never find the truth. "when we have tried all things, that we hold fast is not the entire truth, when we have seen all we can there is still more that we cannot do". <sup>21</sup>

Adam and Eve is a fragmentary poem and it remained untitled up to his death. For the first publication of this poem in 1869 Mr. Clough decided to call it "fragments of the Mystery of the Fall". Although Clough titled two notebooks which contained the main drafts . 'Adam and Eve Notebook I', and 'Adam and Eve Notebook II', The Oxford editors called the poem simply 'The Mystery of the Fall' (Poems 410).

Adam and Eve being a crucial and psychological poem deals with the psychological and intellectual process of an intellectual. It represents the religious and ethical speculations which Clough's experiences at Oxford released. It celebrates intellectual as hero, not merely an intellectual but as artist victim of self-consciousness. The intellectual creates an intensely private and persistent reality, a non-attached self justified world which repudiates time, space and human limitations and lies beyond ordinary formulas of good and evil.

The title draws attention on the fall of man, on the mastery surrounding its meaning. The central conflict is between Adam and Eve, between his liberal ethical philosophy and her Christian Orthodoxy. The conflict between Adam and Eve is in another way between Clough and Edward Hawkins, the Provost of Oriel and the symbol of traditional Oxford. Moreover, the focus is as much on their contrasting views of Cain as of the fall.

It is quite true that Clough left Oxford for reasons unconnected with religion, but his letters of 1847-48 to his personal friends as well as to the Provost, show that subscription to the Thirty – Nine Articles and back of that, belief in the historical truth of the Old and New Testament stories as well as in great dogmas of faith, were under skeptical review. By the summer of 1848, Christianity itself was no longer his 'actuating religion'. By the following March, he was closing the debate with Hawkins by asking –

"Is tianity really so much better then Mohometanism, Budhism (a more extensive faith) or the old heathen philosophy? Are these virtues and graces, which our religious and moral traditions really altogether Christian? Is there not a good deal of Homer and Virgil in them? Nay. If the loftiest of them belong to Christianity. Are they exclusively Christian in matter of fact, or necessarily Christian in matter of philosophy".<sup>22</sup>

A month earlier Prichard was warning Clough that it was unsafe to throw off submission to Xn law and belief and explaining that those who felt the ingrained evil of their hearts most deeply would object to "your moral philosophy".<sup>23</sup>

Without any shadow of doubt, Adam and Eve is a result of the long religious debate that culminated in 1840, when Christianity was replaced by an ethical religious philosophy that came from many sources, but especially from Thomas Arnold and Goethe.

As far as the form of the poem is concerned, Clough was directly indebted to Byron's Cain, a poetic drama and one not only exploring the theme of Christian revolt but also pleading for the moral sense as a substitute for ritual and dogma. The parallels are so close that one cannot forget Cain in reading Adam and Eve. In comparison to Byron, Clough is less vivid and dramatic; Byron more philosophical and didactic. Clough's Rugby and Balliol essays as well as lectures show his inclination to the Victorian Prophet philosophic observation or psychological probing. He strove to play slowly the ponderous foundations of pillars to sustain men's moral fabric to fix a center around which the Chaotic elements of human impulse and desire might move in their ordered ellipse to originate a spiritual vitality. How the poem was different from Byron's model? Clough makes clear while explaining the purpose of it. He asked in 1853, "cannot the divine song..... inform us and prove to us that though we are what we are,

we may yet, in some way, even in our abasement, even by and throughout daily work, be related to the purer existence".

The portrayal of Adam is the projection of Clough's own frustration and alienation from traditional Christian religion. Adam is more complex in degree than Eve. In opening the cry of Eve is answered by his rational vindication.

*Be comforted; muddle not your soul with doubt.*

*It is done; it was to be done;*

*If indeed other way than this there was,*

*I cannot say this was one way and a way was needed to be found.*

Adam says further:

*That which were, we could no more remain*

*Then in the most provocative vernal mould.*

*A seed its suckers close, and rest a seed.*

*..... Come my wife;*

*We were to grow and grow. I think we may,*

*And yet bear goodly fruit.*

The opening scene presents Adam's dipsychian nature, rejecting and yet attached to Christian guilt. Adam does not deny a fall. It is on the question of whether it is a fall or a fall that he differs from his wife or it is an inevitable access of self-consciousness resulting from unavoidable process of growth, or is it as Eve would have it, a religious alienation resulting from a punishable act of disobedience? In May 1847 Clough wrote to his sister,

"The thing which, men must work at ..... (are) ..... Philosophical problem of Grace and Free Will and of redemption as an idea not as an historical event. Adam's conception of fall is an attempt to extricate the notion of a fall from historical Christianity (with its machinery of religiously legislated (guilt, punishment, atonement), and to establish it as an eternal metaphysical face generative of metaphysical shame and guilt. The appetite, the enjoyment, the after void, the thinking of it; the process of the fall are perpetual, inherent in human condition not necessarily attached to the transcendental consequences formulated in Christian eschatology".<sup>24</sup>

He explains the whole myth of the servant, the apple, and the curse as a .....fantastic dream of Eve's, on the authority of the living moral within his breast. That is the supreme word against which biblical tradition and human action are to be judged.

A soliloque in scene II makes it clear:

*E'en in my utmost importance I find  
A fount of strange persistence in my soul  
.....  
I or a something that is I indeed.  
A living central and more inmost I  
Within scales of more exterior me's  
I seem eternal O thou God, as then.  
Have knowledge of the Evil and Good,  
Superior in a higher Good to both.*

(II, 31-45)

Even at the moment of utmost weakness struggling with problem of the fall, in the very straits of anguish and of doubts this inmost self has a sense of eternity and acknowledgement of Good and Evil. In a passage which shows skepticism that swept over Arnold and Clough at Oxford, Stopford Brooks concludes – "They ..... at least fall back their own souls alone, on the unchangeable sense of right they felt there in on the imperative of duty and on resolution to obey it. Nothing else was left". For Adam, however little truth there was in the Christian myth the imperative was divine – though it might be hard to distinguish between different imperatives.

*God's voice is of the heart; I do not say  
All voices, therefore, of the heart are God's.  
And to discern the voice amidst the voices  
Is that hard task, my love that we are born to.*

Adam includes himself in the 'we' for by moments the voice he hears and thinks it is God's voice, but it is that of Eve's crying guilt and disobedience. In scene I, he confesses and identifies his dreams with that of Eve's and finds dreams of both no dream but dread reality and Scene I, opens with his own conflicting voice, speaking, the opening lines of scene II show Adam's dipsychian nature. He is not a man of dual personality. He is a rationalist, alienated, seeking a religious philosophy that will satisfy both his intelligence, and his moral sense. But since he is human being, he can be swept momentarily by old patterns of thought. He hears the voice and thinks

that it is the voice that tells him to curse himself and die, or to think Eve's dream is dread reality which is followed by another often far and stronger and more searching bidding :

*On; on; it is the folly of the child  
To choose his path and straightway think it wrong  
And turn right back, or lie on the ground to weep.  
Forward go, conquer work and live withal  
A word comes, half-command, half prophecy  
Forgetting things behind thee, onward press  
Unto the mark of your high calling. Yea,  
And voices, too, in woods and flowery fields  
Speak confidence from budding banks and boughs.  
And tell me, live and grow, and say, "Look still  
Upward, spread outward. Trust, be patient, live."*

(Adam and Eve, I, 108-18)

In this way the poem is also a study of different voices as the agent of alienation.

In Scene IV, there is again an act of disobedience. murder of Abel, the son of Eve. Scene centers on the figure of Abel, in whom the religious voice of Eve has developed into an obsessed preoccupation which differentiate him from his father and brother Cain, who is 'over bearing, proud and hard'. Cain is here introduced as an enemy of both and the admirer of his father, but he is different from his father. He is not moral but passionate. He kills Abel and coolly says:

*Dead is it then ? O wonderful o strong  
(Adam and Eve: Scene IX, 5)*

In the dramatic passage Clough satires on the voice of the justified Saint:

*They think not of the fall even less they think  
Of the Redemption, which God said should be*

Which, for we apprehend it by our faith,  
 Already is come for her and me,  
 Yea, though I sin, my sin is not to death  
 In my repents I have joy, such joy  
 That almost I could sin to seek for it.  
 Yea, though the whole earth lies in  
 wickedness?  
 Am with thee, with thee, with thee evermore  
 Ah, yet am I not satisfied with this.  
 Am I not feeding spiritual pride?  
 Rejoicing over sinner, in elect?  
 And admitted to the fellowship  
 Which I, unworthy, most unworthy, share?  
 What can I do – how can I help it then  
 O God, remove it from my heart – pluck out  
 Whatever pain, whatever (wrench) to me,  
 These sinful roots and remnants which,  
 whatever  
 I do, how high so ever I soar from earth,  
 Still, undestroyed, still germinate within.  
 Take them away in Thy good time, O God.

(Adam and Eve, VI, 10-16, 25-38)

Scene X-XIII show Adam and Eve's reaction after Abel's murder and shows the development of Cain's conscience and leads a new problem, his agony of guilt. What Cain should do? Eve urges rites and holy means of grace, she compels him to beg pardon for the atonement from God but he refuses and says:

Atonement – no – no that but punishment  
 The punishment of his conscience  
 He is too much tensed and has  
 Hearer of guilt:  
 My God: it will not be at peace – My God  
 It flames, it bursts to fury in my soul  
 What is it I have done?

.....  
 I see it, I behold it as it is  
 As it will be in all the times to come  
 Slaughter on slaughter, blood for blood and  
 death  
 For ever, ever, ever more:  
 And all for what?  
 O Abel, brother mine  
 Wherever thou art, more happy for than  
 me?

(Adam and Eve, IX, 41-43, 45-50)

This passage is the reflection of Clough's own doubts. In 1847, he had asked his sister Anne the meaning of 'Atonement by a crucified Savior: it might have a meaning 'consistent with God's justice – that is, with the voice of our conscience' and might even be the one true expression of our relation to God, but do the Anglo Catholics know what that meaning is? The Evangelicals? the Papist?' Clough's objection must have been Cain's that no one else can pay debt, you must pay it yourself, that is why Cain begs for Adam's curse, "yours curse will make me not forget". Adam shares this view and feels that he cannot refuse the revelation of soul.

The last scene is a kind of epilogue, in elegiac tone rather than dramatic. Adam sees his two sons reunited in final realization. The figure of Abel is saying to Cain

.....Forgive me, Cain  
 Oh me my brother, sad has been thy life  
 For my sake, all through me how thy  
 foolishly  
 Because we know not both of us were  
 right.

(Adam and Eve: XIV, 9-12)

In the end Adam steps out from a vision and speaks final fourteen lines that brings to a close this first long poem of Clough's. He is weary and longs for rest, but in spite of all sorrow and darkness of life has been worthwhile.

Yes, in despite of all disquietude  
 For Eve, for you, for Abel which indeed

*Impelled in me that gaiety of soul –  
Without your fears I had listened my own-  
In spite of doubt, despondency – and death  
Though lacking knowledge always, lacking  
faith  
Sometimes and hope with no sure trust in  
outrage*

19. "Over Soul" Works, II, pp. 266-267
20. "Notes on the Religious Tradition" Bodleian, M.S. p, 59.
21. Ibid
22. Correspondence, I, p. 248-9.
23. Correspondence, I, p. 218.
24. Correspondence , I, p.182.

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