

Dialectal Comparison between Oriental and Occidental Cultures

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Abstract – Moving toward the strain among Orient and Occident that so agitates us today, we experience an unpredictable blend of various types of conflicts, alongside their separate cases of proof: economic interests, sociological contrasts among elites, and spiritual hostilities. Every field reinforces and exasperates the other(s). In any case, this association of economic, sociological, and spiritual pressures has consistently manifested itself in all the incredible wars over humanity. The disposition of the present conflict comprises in this pressure having gotten worldwide, including the whole Planet. It is accordingly even more critical for us to understand in severe terms the genuine historical structure of this pressure. We talk about a conflict among East and West. We are clearly alluding here not to geographic resistance essentially. Later in the course of our discussion we will take up the contrast between a (worldwide) pressures communicated in bipolar terms versus historical dialectical ones. However the conflict among Orient and Occident is definitely not a bipolar one. Earth has a North and South Pole, yet not an East and West one. Geographically, in our earthly globe the East/West resistance is liquid and vague; it only represents "the rhythmic movement of a little night and a little day". This Article is Dialectal comparison Between Oriental and Occidental Cultures.

Keywords: Dialectal Comparison, Oriental and Occidental Cultures, History etc.

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I. INTRODUCTION

In geographical connection to America, for instance, China and Russia are the Occident. In connection to China and Russia, Europe represents in its turn the Occident. From a simply geographical perspective, there is nothing of the sort as a polar tension, considerably less a sensible explanation for world conflict communicated in worldwide terms, which renders unsettled the probability of understanding its specific structure.

One may embrace a historical, cultural, and moral inventory of the Orient and Occident today, and in this manner land at a progression of antitheses that would without a doubt be critical. I would present now the idea of "regional iconography," by the geographer Jean Gottmann in his splendid work, *La politique des États et leur Géographie* [The Politics of States With Regard to their Geography]. [For Gottmann,] The various pictures and representations of the world, which emerge from distinct traditions of the historical past and its types of social association, carry request to their own spaces or environments. In this regard, while pictures and plastic works have a place with the iconography of a given space, so too do all the noticeable types of public and private life. In his book *El rapto de Europa* [The Rape of Europe], Luis Díaz del Corral has indicated us the basic significance of workmanship. This book likely could

be considered the reference book of European iconography.

A word like iconography, comprehended as we have portrayed it (i.e., in the largest sense conceivable), enables us to keep away from such rearrangements. There is no solid historical localization without a comparing type of perceivability. Along these lines there are symbols all over the place and iconography all over the place, and as an outcome there exists (additionally all over) the plausibility of iconoclasm or iconoplasty. Such reactions are not restricted at all to the Byzantine Empire or Islam. The Occident has likewise experienced different and exceptional expressions and types of abhorrence for pictures, iconoclasm. Wycliffites or Lollards and Hussites, Baptists and Puritans, organizations, religious reformers, and pragmatist reductionists wherever have acted in an iconoclastic manner in the West/Occident. An incredible world battle that detonated in the age of disclosures and conquest of the New World—the main worldwide contention in world history—can be clarified as a question among confessional dogmas: a battle between Roman Catholicism and Nordic Protestantism, (among) Jesuitism and Calvinism. The iconographical part of this conflict drives us to bits of knowledge into history that are more profound than anything we may quickly show with a couple

of words here. The fact that the Reconquest of Spain was a conquest battled for the benefit of the cults of the Virgin isn't hard to understand. Yet, my very own perception – that the pioneers and heroes of the New World carried with them the holy picture of their historical deeds through the picture of the Immaculate Virgin and mother of God Mary – doesn't appear to have been comprehended. Regardless, a German, Catholic writer, has not abstained from characterizing [my argument] as overemphasizing "each class of Christian ornament...that may beguile many perusers". Be that as it may, for me, the picture of Mary isn't some "class of Christian ornament"; and my previous explanation concerning the word and idea of iconography will maybe outline better my argument about the historical significance of the Marian picture. I would venture to such an extreme as to additionally attest that the common wars around confessional dogmas in Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth hundreds of years, including the Thirty Years War (the war of mediation over German soil between 1618-1648) were as a general rule struggles possibly in support of the picture of the Virgin Mary. Can one, for instance, analyze the threatening vibe of the British Puritans towards pictures as an "Eastern" attitude when contrasted and the cults of pictures among Bavarian Catholics, the Spaniards, or the Polish? The argument about pictures in Byzantium was as a matter of first importance theological, addressed to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity: in spiritual terms, to the profound iconographical contrast between an inseparable solidarity and the perfect Trinity. One can't state that the authoritative opinion of the Trinity was a basically Western question and abstract monotheism a basically Eastern one, anyway it may immediately appear that route in explicit historical moments. The French priests forced on the West's Christian statement of faith an equation as per which the Holy Spirit continues from the Father as well as the Son; the opposition of the Greek patriarchs in Constantinople to this filioque prompted the Great Schism between the Eastern (Oriental) and Western (Occidental) Churches. The immediate outcome was having the filioque principle fill in as a pennant for setting the Occident against the Orient. Be that as it may, because of this issue the Syrian church pushed for the conventions of the Trinity and Immaculate Conception: such a reaction renders the East/West dichotomy lacking. On the other hand, it was accurately the Germanic, Aryan peoples, who dismissed completely the godlikeness of Christ. In the two cases the proposal progressed in regards to the regulation of the Trinity, astounding in so many viewpoints, likewise compares to an iconographic separation among Orient and Occident. One can't deny that mechanical technification has prompted genuine alterations in traditional iconography. Current analysis, as well, can be considered as an iconoclastic burst. We as a whole owe on account of the instructor of psychosomatic science Juan José López Ibor, for having proceeded with his brilliant examinations on the subject of analysis from the

perspective of iconography as we have utilized it here. At last, current painting, be it totally abstract or as yet manifesting a few leftovers of authenticity, additionally infers the pulverization of an Old World tradition of pictures, alongside the search for a new creation. These three breaks—mechanical technification, therapy, and present day painting—are clearly associated. This association would be a shocking point of examination considering the present world duality among East and West. However it doesn't appear to me conceivable to recognize attitudes for and against pictures in an abstract manner, to the point of regionally distinguishing one [attitude] with the East and the other with the West. We should, at that point, start with another hypothesis to understand the structural nucleus of this conflict.

Without a doubt, the word iconography strikes me as a progressively complete, and for our present needs more sufficient word than the abused term ideology. Iconography in word and idea is, as we would like to think, especially helpful and productive in light of the fact that it forces us to recognize the resistance among Orient and Occident at its center as comprising in the Orient's threatening vibe toward plastic representation, from one perspective, and (on the other) the Occident as a bulwark to the religion of (plastic) structure. At the point when one talks about iconoclasm, the informed European peruser will immediately bring to mind those occasions of Byzantine history: the disagreement regarding pictures under Emperor Leon (717-741), and the compared acknowledgment of the faction of pictures under Charlemagne. Be that as it may, we may likewise review the forbiddance of pictures in the Old Testament and in Islam. A few researchers have ventured to such an extreme as to perceive here an antiquated conflict among word and picture, one that boils down to a general conflict among hearing and sight, the acoustic and the visual, to the point of attributing word and sound to the Orient; and picture and sight to the Occident.

Goethe was in favor of Napoleon. For him, this implied agreeing with the request for territory, of Land. Be that as it may, Napoleon additionally represented the West [Occidente]. Now, the West still alluded to the request for Land and not Sea. The German artist trusted that the West would keep meaning the request for Land and that Napoleon, similar to a new Alexander, would progress similar to the coast. In this manner would rise "Land firme, with every one of its privileges".

Along these lines, Goethe — a run of the mill representative of the West throughout the late spring of 1812, pushed for the request for Land and against that of the Sea. In congruity with his spiritual position, he consider the restriction among land and sea as far as a polarity and not as a dialectical tension realized by an irreversible

historical procedure. The contrast between a polar tension and a dialectical one is, in any event for us today, unequivocal.

Goethe thought as far as polarities. Be that as it may, the tension between polarities is not quite the same as the tension considered along the lines of dialectical tension. Tension between polarities suggests an atemporal structure, in which polar resistances keep existing all things considered, concurrent and equivalent in structure; and that they unendingly return as structures that are immediately in every case new and consistently the equivalent — a sort of everlasting return. By differentiate, historical hypothesis seeks after a progression of solid questions and concerns, which call for solid answers. This question-answer process actualizes the dialectic of history in solid terms; it decides the structure of historical circumstances and epochs. This historical dialectic need not pursue the rationale of Hegelian ideas; it very well may be comprehended as the general enactment of nature in its temporal unfolding. The dialectical structure of history as a question-answer acknowledged in solid terms, which we have invested some energy talking about here so as to explain our way to deal with history, neither trade offs or discredits the uniqueness of the historical occasion; rather, it builds its uniqueness, insofar as a historical occasion is possibly considered in that capacity when we have imagined it as a remarkable, solid reaction, to the call for such a reaction by a one of a kind and solid circumstance.

The word dialectic communicates a question-answer structure in every single historical situation and events. Any historical situation is limitless up to one doesn't understand it as a call made by men, just as man's reaction to this call. The historical action of each man represents a response to a question presented by history. Each human word is an answer; each answer secures its essentialness from the question to which it reacts; and all that which doesn't straightforwardly address this question is trivial. The significance of the question, thus, emerges from the concrete situation where it was (first) presented.

Arnold Toynbee has raised the Question-Answer Logic to a Challenge-Response structure in the history of culture. The Question turns into an act of resistance, a Challenge [English in original – trans.], with a going with Response. This is a significant development in catching the historical sense; it enables one to perceive dialectical tension, past polarities, in this way abandoning the psychologico-focused, maverick a-historicism of naturalist thought. From this Toynbee determines his higher cultures or civilizations, more than twenty taking all things together, which are characterized by a concrete, historical test [desafío], by the call of history and the similarly concrete reaction or answer given by the men of the time. On account of Egyptian culture, for instance, the situation of the Nile Valley and that culture's reliance on it, alongside the permanent

danger of outside adversaries, mean the test. The guideline and association of the Nile Valley, its protection against foreign, savage attacks, and the Egyptian civilization that rose up out of these measures — its divine cults, dynasties, pyramids, and craftsmanship — represent the concrete reaction to that challenge.

What is increased through along these lines of moving toward things is unprecedented, in light of the fact that it addresses the dialectical structure of each historical situation. Yet, even Toynbee can't get away from the common peril that immediately undermines his particularly historical method of reasoning. By setting in succession his twenty-odd higher cultures or civilizations, in a steady progression, he deletes the center uniqueness of the historical event; and with it goes the best possible structure of the historical. General laws of world history are of no significance. At last, this adds up to the accommodation of history to laws or likelihood in a functionalist vein. What makes a difference to us is the remarkable and concrete situation, or, in other words, our own present epoch wherein a world dualism among Orient and Occident, one that is worldwide in character, has emerged. On the off chance that we talk here of a dialectical tension it isn't to say that we look for a general law or likelihood, significantly less the general rationale of a dialectical goals among ideas in some efficient manner.

Our emphasis on this point bears rehashing. Today, any individual who discusses the dialectic uncovered himself/herself to the threat of being classified and refuted as a Hegelian in a summary and automatic fashion. Of course, Hegel's dialectic of history incorporates enough potential outcomes to land at the valid uniqueness of the historical event. One may induce as much from his dispute that the incarnation of God in the Son is the hub of general world history. One may likewise reason from this that historical information for Hegel isn't just a judgment [of the past] yet additionally and all the while an act of progress however in its deliberate character [the dialectic] effectively loses its hold on the uniqueness and the historical happening gets changed into an unadulterated discerning procedure. One would do well to remember this risk of utilizing this word "dialectic" in our presentation, in case our utilization of the word slip by into a sort of automatism, bringing about the consideration of our technologized present as a logical achievement. Indeed, even past staying away from the Hegelian misstep of setting a general dialectic of ideas we should monitor ourselves against the legalist illusion of the nineteenth century, to which the best sociologists and existing students of history of the West have fallen prey (except for Alexis de Tocqueville).

II. CONCLUSION

Technologization [La tecnificación] and industrialization establish the destiny of our earth today. Give us at that point search a chance to out the one of a kind historical question, the incomparable "Challenge" (English in original) and concrete response out of all that the technological insurgency has induced during the last not many hundreds of years. Give us a chance to repudiate the easy potential outcomes proffered to us by the anticipated results of theoretical conditions. Dialectical tension, which we have set contrary to polarity, must not lead us to speculations of a Hegelian character, nor to natural logical or even normativist ones. Neither should Toynbee's "Challenge-Response" equation fill in as in excess of a handle for accurately getting a handle on the question of a particular and present truth of the present world dualism among Orient and Occident. A 1953 work of Arnold Toynbee's immediately strikes a chord here: it bears the provocative title, *The World and the West*. This work has blended a fierce evaluate and questioning against its creator, one in which we have shunned taking an interest since we are increasingly keen regarding our matter, the land/sea restriction. Toynbee discusses our present epoch and offers up a concrete estimate. He talks intentionally and with premonition about the "Occident", comparing it with the remainder of the world. For him, the Occident is the assailant, outfitted with mechanical advancements that have gotten the Orient unawares, starting four and a half hundreds of years earlier and unfolding in the West's four experiences with the outside: Russia, Islam, India, and Eastern Asia. The basic thing for Toynbee is that the Occident has propelled its forceful desire with the guide of a technology freed from Christianity. Therefore, it isn't that some "technological splinter" chipped off Europe towards the finish of the seventeenth century, as Arnold Toynbee thought: rather it was an European island that liberated itself from the European landmass; and a new maritime world, with the island as its base, situated itself before the mainland one. It made a stabilizer to the earthbound world, holding in its hands the harmony of the world and with it world peace to be decided. Such was the consequence of a concrete response to the call presented by the open sea(s). Upon this island of England, which had addressed the call and had achieved the entry to a maritime existence, there rose right then and there the first machines.

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