

British Policy Towards Hindus

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Abstract – The British approach against Hindus was guided by the reality that the majority of Hindus may be a strong force, whether as a friend or an enemy.¹ This is brought out by the general alarm displayed at the end of the nineteenth century by officials as the unrest of cow safety spread. In comparison, Hindus were regarded as separated by caste and sect and, accordingly, not as dangerous as the more unified Muslims as a 'group.' They would be absorbed into a 'culture' by promoting Hindu communalism and would thus serve a function contrary to that of separation and law. Consequently, the British used the Muslim League as their principal instrument against the National Congress and not the Hindu Mahasabha. Similarly, parts of Sikh communalism appeared to be anti-imperialist owing to the legacy of the Akali Movement and were hence granted little protection. Fair support for Hindu communalism was therefore incompatible with active support for Muslim communalism and the total exercise of the strategy of separation and law. Similarly, during the second decade of the twentieth century, the government moved against the younger Muslim representatives because their democratic ideals were no different from those of the Congress, even though they appeared to be collective. In other terms, it was only because it was very compliant that communalism had to be sponsored. While one of the main Muslim community demands would have been fulfilled by immediately ensuring that the bulk of the voters would be Muslims in Bengal and Panjab, the government also refused to expand the franchise to all adults; but that would also have forced the communal leaders to win mass support and strengthened the mass base of the Congress in all, particularly the H And in the late nineteenth century and the twentieth century, a schizophrenic stance against pan-Islamism was adopted by colonial authorities and statesmen. On the one side, they decided to use it as part of India's divide and rule scheme and their changing tactic of winning over West Asian and North African regimes by pretending to be Islam 's friends; on the other side, they were mortally afraid of their future mass base and their anti-imperialist inclination. This all placed their Hindus agenda into practice.

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INTRODUCTION

Another justification for being vigilant and prudent in the matter was that British rule may have been very dangerous for a very transparent, active and all-out support for Muslim communalism because it would have gained the animosity of Hindu communalism, driven it and its followers into the Congress camp and tended to incite 70 percent of the population of India toward imperialism. In other terms, Hindus should not be unnecessarily antagonized as Hindus, which was obviously shown by many of the colonial administrators. For starters, in February 1928, Viceroy Irwin wrote to John Simon: "I do not wish, if I can help it, to see the lines of opposition irrevocably formed between the Government and the Hindu political intelligentsia. "2 Earlier, in 1927, while explaining to the Secretary of State why Hailey, the Governor of the Panjab, had named the Hindu Mahasabhite Manohar Lal as minister in place of the Unionist Chhotu Ram, I did so.

Concerning the opposition 3 In the 1926 polls, the powers of Hindu communalism broke from the

Swarajist nationalists, delivered a drubbing to them, and offered them a drubbing.

In order to 'secure Hindu interests' by 'weaning' it from a 'pro-Muslim' policy, a policy of offering responsive cooperation to the government was then adopted. "Hailey feared that if the government ignored these men and focused instead on Muslims and Unionists, they would be forced back into the arms of the" extremists. "4 Morley had previously cautioned Minto in January 1909 that" we must take note that we do not lose our Hindu parcels in picking up the Mussulman; "it was, however, obvious, he said, that the administration had to go into" the Moslem parcels

FACTS

In specific locales, communalism was additionally monitored in view of the specific political position they involved in the Indian domain and the idea of option political procedure followed to control them. Panjab was one such region, where an alternate rendition of partition and rule was followed. It was a key fringe territory. It was additionally the blade

arm of the domain. Its Muslim, Sikh and Hindu Jat and Rajput populace gave almost a large portion of the men to the Indian armed force. Uncontrolled mutual interests and confusion would have separated the open country, influenced the satisfaction of the military and in any case imperiled the security of the outskirts area. In Panjab, along these lines, open and awful types of communalism were held under check for all intents and purposes till 1945, and not the Muslim League but rather the Unionist Party was broadened official support. The Panjabis were tried to be partitioned not along lines of religion but rather along the as of late made separation of agriculturists and non-agriculturists, which pitted the proprietor drove laborer standings against the 'metropolitan' Hindu vendors and cash loan specialists. The fascination of this gap was that it didn't influence the warriors contrarily; rather, it would in general keep them just as the main part of different Panjabis out of any sort of patriot legislative issues. Any support to the mutual division would likewise have compromised the Unionist governmental issues of agriculturist versus non-agriculturist by advancing intercaste Hindu solidarity. The British directors accordingly restricted the merger of the Muslim League with the Unionist Party or the development of direct Muslim League impact in Panjab even after the Muslim individuals from the Unionist Party had joined the All-India Muslim League. Backing from the Unionist Party was pulled back for stripped communalism possibly close to the end when the exchange of intensity was on the plan and the elective system of utilizing a free Pakistan against an autonomous India was being worked out. Maybe a minor factor in the adjustment in the British position was the disappointed indignation of the British authorities against 'Hindus' for having 'denied' them of the realm.

In any case, while not using common division as a significant political instrument in Panjab, the British supported it as an auxiliary subject insofar as it could be obliged inside the edge work of the agriculturist versus non-agriculturist system. The Unionist Party and its decision alliance depended on the semicomunal governmental issues of Fazl-I-Husain and Sikandar Hayat Khan in West Panjab, Sunder Singh Majithia in Central Panjab, Raja Narendra Nath and Gokul Chand Narang among working class Hindus, and Jat casteism in South-East Panjab (Haryana).

A comparative non-collective methodology was attempted now and again in UP where the talukdars and zamindars were viewed as the most grounded social power contradicting patriotism and supporting British standard. Communalism would have debilitated it by isolating Hindu zamindars from

Muslim zamindars. Accordingly, the principal open resistance to the National Congress was tried to be implicit the last part of the 1880s on this non-collective zamindari base; Syed Ahmed Khan and

Raja Shiva Prasad were the joint heads of the counter Congress United India Patriotic Association. Just when this resistance neglected to get off the ground did the authorities and Syed Ahmed Khan choose to activate Muslim zamindars as Muslim rivals of the Congress.

By and by, during the 1920s and 1930s, in meeting the test of the non-collaboration developments and discretionary legislative issues, the UP authorities set out to fabricate an intercommunal political collusion of all zamindars as a counterpoise to the Congress, which was securing an expanding impact over the inhabitants, and, therefore, to keep the Hindu Mahasabha and the Muslim League out of state governmental issues. Consequently, in the 1937 races, the main rival of the Congress was the National Agriculturist Party, and the authorities utilized their impact to turn the Muslim talukdars and zamindars away from the Muslim League into the overlap of the NAP.⁷ This exertion fizzled. The NAP was riven with common questions and in-battling and it flopped hopelessly at the surveys in 1937. Both the zamindars and the British at that point moved to common governmental issues.

There was another purpose behind the British reluctance to face open collective savagery. The obligation, as leaders of the nation, to keep up peace and social dependability was an aspect of the perspective and the pioneer ethic in which the heads were prepared and which gave the inward good support to their action in the provinces. No humanized rulers could transparently empower mutual uproars or even face them and remain absolutely detached in their face without breaking their own spirit or cracking and fragmenting their perspective. The British authorities could follow such an aloof strategy notwithstanding boorishness just during 1945-46 when they not, at this point felt answerable for what hapened in India and could even legitimize their detachment as a quid pro quo for Indians having driven them out. Likewise, the breakdown of lawfulness would eliminate, from the public psyche, one of the most significant avocations for the acknowledgment and lenience of British standard, specifically, its capacity to keep up peace.

Due to a portion of the contemplations dicussed above, till 1937, the British supported controlled communalism with some push to hold the harmony between various communalisms and to check its unhampered development. Hence Fuller, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, was made to leave in 1906 when he made the impression of being against Hindu and of being a vivacious ally of Muslim communalism. Furthermore, as late as 1940, Zetland, the ex-Secretary of State could keep in touch with the Viceroy in regards to the Pakistan request: "Taking a long view, I should myself question without a doubt if a cleavage between the Muslims and the Hindus as crucial as

that thought about by the current heads of the All-India Muslim League would end up being to our advantage.[8]

It is imperative to note in this regard that, in the first place, the Muslim communalists were supported by the authorities not with the end goal of invigorating collective legislative issues, association or fomentation yet to forestall the development of current governmental issues and political tumult of any sort among Muslims. Pioneer strategy at that stage was to forestall the politicization of the Indian public, a cycle which any type of political association, including shared, would have supported. The goal consequently was not exclusively to keep the Muslims from joining the public development yet in addition to keep them reserved from legislative issues and to demoralize any move toward even common political unsettling and association. Hence, one motivation behind why Syed Ahmed Khan could get huge authority uphold all through his career was his arrangement of getting privileged Muslims far from any sort of present day strategy of getting high society Muslims far from any sort of current governmental issues and political fomentation and of depending upon legitimate support instead.⁹ The early neighborhood social orders established by him during the 1860s examined numerous themes from training and reasoning to science and literature yet evaded legislative issues. The Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental Defense Association established by him and others under authentic motivation in 1893, chose to restrict the National Congress and guard "Muslim" interests; however it additionally set out that it would "dishearten mainstream political disturbance among Mahomedans". It would hold no political gatherings nor member other Muslim affiliations. One of its points was to control the inclination towards politicization among more youthful Muslim intellectuals.[10]

This strategy was thoroughly implemented when the new century rolled over when the UP Government's Nagri goal rankled UP Muslims and created a lively disturbance with regards to Urdu, which, preservationists like Mohsin-ul-Mulk, the Secretary of the Aligarh College, joined. The Lieutenant-Governor of UP went down to Aligarh, compromised Mohsin-ul-Mulk with withdrawal of the award to the College and in this way constrained him and others to surrender all enemy of government disturbances, drop the Urdu Defense Association and stop the arrangement of a Muslim political association.[11]

This provincial political system must be changed after 1905 when the Indian public development entered the new phase of dynamic political battle. New available resources must be found to check the cycle of the country really taking shape and to block the developing joined battle against dominion. The current divisions inside Indian culture must be effectively cultivated. Most importantly, the political Indians must be part into rival public camps. Be that as it may, non-political communalism had outlived its

convenience. Just composed political communalism could perform this assignment. The British at that stage advanced the political communalism of the Muslim League against the Congress.

Additionally, the younger age of Muslim erudite people were anxious and were starting to veer towards patriotism, Hindu-Muslim solidarity and political fomentation and were taking steps to join the Congress. (As brought up in a previous section, the more youthful Muslim educated people were capably pulled in by left-wing patriotism till around 1942.) Even the follower, privileged Muslims were being pushed by the more youthful men into taking to some type of unsettling. In spite of the fact that the inclination was stifled, it couldn't be kept restrained for a really long time. This was carried out with incredible clearness by Mohsin-ul-Mulk in two letters written in August 1906 to Archibold, the Aligarh College head. In the main, he cautioned that Morley's declaration of sacred changes "will deliver a more noteworthy propensity in them [the youthful taught Muslims] to join the 'Congress'." In the subsequent letter, he said that he had gotten letters from everywhere India disclosing to him that "Mohammedan inclination is a lot of changed... Individuals for the most part say that the strategy of Sir Syed and that of mine has done horrible to Mohammedans that Government has demonstrated by its activities that without unsettling there is no trust in any network, and that in the event that we can fail to help them we should not want to get any assistance for the college....." He cautioned that "On the off chance that we remain silent.... individuals will leave us to head out in a different direction "[12]

In this manner, some political association and current legislative issues, aside from additional political concessions by the legislature to the customary follower collective components, were unavoidable if segments of Muslims were not to be lost to the Congress. These needed to take non-agitational and collective structures. The supporter components had now to be urged to take to legislative issues, yet just to sacred, parliamentary and subordinate governmental issues. Appropriately, the prepared acknowledgment by the British experts in 1906 of Muslim mutual requests and of the case of the high society public heads of being the agents of all Muslims had, to a limited extent, the goal of keeping Muslims from taking to political tumult and joining the Congress. Clearly, it isn't right to depict this arrangement as 'favorable to Muslim'. Or maybe, its point was to keep upper and working class Muslims favorable to British.

The arrangement of supporting parliamentary and ward collective legislative issues was followed from 1906. At whatever point communalism would in general get assailant or to come nearer to the patriot compels, it was cold-carried or even restricted. Accordingly, the more youthful, semi-

collective scholarly people were disapproved of from 1906 onwards. Jinnah was rarely the official most loved and was dealt with for all intents and purposes comparable to the Congress chiefs from 1930 to 1934. Remnants of legitimate hostility to him were to be found even in 1936-37. Nor was communalism given full scale uphold till 1939, despite the fact that it was made a significant issue and carefully sustained through compassion, thought and concessions during the sacred conversations of 1930-34. It was additionally as of now observed as the most significant political weapon against the blossoming public development.

After 1937, the British moved from adjusted to uncontrolled communalism, energized all out mutual division, gave essentially open help to the Muslim League particularly in its enemy of Congress job and endured its endeavors to procure a mass character. In the period after 1937, communalism progressively turned into the main plan of action of pioneer specialists and their arrangement of partition and rule.

This was on the grounds that practically all different divisions, enmities and troublesome gadgets advanced and cultivated before by the colonial specialists had lost political power and had gotten politically nonviable from their perspective. The adjusts of 'classes and interests' painstakingly encouraged since the times of Minto and Morley were fizzling. The patriot development had slowly prevailing in either conquering them or decreasing their political weight. The Non-Brahmin challenge in Maharashtra and South India had burnt out. The Scheduled Castes and other in reverse stations could never again be assembled against the Congress aside from in stray pockets. Laborers and workers were increasingly prepared behind extremist enemy of imperialism. The industrialists were at that point favorable to Congress. The push to pit the zamindars and proprietors against the Congress in the 1937 decisions had bombed as had likewise the strategy of reinforcing constitutionalist powers outside the Congress. The privilege and left wings of the Congress could likewise not be part. The Lucknow meeting of 1936 and the choice to battle decisions and structure governments in the areas in 1937 covered all affectionate any desires for the authorities in this regard. The conservative would not part from the left and the last was after at the time a 'joined front' approach. The Liberal Federation was not, at this point a significant political power. The protected and non-established wings of the Congress likewise stayed joined together. The moderate card had been played out. Moderate patriot components could be isolated from the revolutionaries just by surrendering political force as was done in 1947. Rulers were still in the field as props of the Raj, however they were as a rule hard-squeezed by famous states' people groups' developments. Dependence on the rulers, on which the three-legged race of the Federation was

arranged, was probably going to demonstrate purposeless from the beginning. Interprovincial and interlingual competitions had depleted themselves a lot before.

Consequently, exactly when the appointment of 1937, wherein the Congress came out triumphant in huge pieces of the nation, and the away from of the Congress as a domineering power in Indian legislative issues had made a disturbing circumstance for the pioneer rulers, a significant number of their significant props lay broke. The common card alone was available for playing against the public development and the rulers chose to utilize it as far as possible. They were additionally pushed to do as such by the way that the Muslim intellectuals and masses were by and large progressively pulled in to the public development, particularly its left wing.

The power of a few contemplations which had before directed a strategy of careful and restricted help to communalism was presently particularly debilitated. Widespread communalism and public viciousness could in any case make lawfulness issues. Yet, the last withered into irrelevance when the very presence of pioneer rule was in question. So also, the loss of the help of Hindus was a sorry obstacle, for it was at that point pretty much lost. Then again, the Hindu Mahasabha was at that point a spent power.

There was likewise not sufficient opportunity or political space for the association of a new political procedure to address the patriot difficulty which had gotten more quick and hazardous, particularly with regards to a universal war approaching not too far off and the developing left-wing quality in the public development. The rulers were, then again, acquainted with communalism and had procured a specific adroitness in controlling it. Additionally, Muslim communalism was, as has been brought out before, for its own reasons, a solid political wonder at that point.

Hence, progressively after 1937, communalism or the division among Hindus and Muslims turned into the boss political or 'common' prop of royal power and presence in India. The British chose to stake all on it.¹³ The Secretary of State in 1938, Zetland, composed later that around then he "was unable to oppose a consistently developing conviction that the ruling element in deciding the future type of Government in India would end up being the All-India Muslim League".^[14]

The flare-up of the Second World War on 1 September 1939 further fortified the dependence on the mutual card. All arrangement was currently outfitted to the fruitful pursuing of the war and to the most extreme preparation of Indian assets for the war exertion. A few endeavors were made to get the Congress collaboration for the war,

however they fizzled. The Congress pulled back its services and requested that the British make a statement that India would get total opportunity after the war. They took steps to compose an incredible mass battle to accomplish their point. Subsequently, the British confronted a daily existence and-demise battle both for the upkeep of pioneer rule in India and for the utilization of Indian assets in the overall clash. They were happy to support all else to a triumph on this double front. Both for countering the Congress request and separating Indian sentiment and reaction and for keeping up ordinary organization in however many areas as could be allowed, dependence was put on the Muslim League whose legislative issues and requests were counterposed to the patriot governmental issues and requests. The League was, as will be appeared, perceived as the sole representative for Muslims and enabled to reject any political settlement and its interest for Pakistan was basically surrendered on a basic level. India couldn't be given opportunity, it was stated, insofar as Hindus and Muslims didn't join together. Be that as it may, such solidarity was made unimaginable by the wholesale official sponsorship to Muslim communalism. Accordingly, with empty talk to solidarity, division was advanced and guaranteed.

Be that as it may, while giving hard and fast help to communalism, a few endeavors to keep up common harmony were put forth in light of a legitimate concern for the war attempt. This check vanished after 1945 and individuals had a full taste of the harsh products of the harmful tree during 1946-47.

The political settlement of 1947 uncovered the British responsibility was neither to the guideline of the security of minorities nor to Muslims nor even to Muslim communalism. Their approach towards communalism was outfitted to serving their own political finishes. All guarantees and vows to ensure the privileges of the minorities were at that stage overlooked. No shields were accommodated the large number of Hindus in Pakistan and Muslims in India. In the event that Muslims in post-freedom India had the option to live as equivalent residents it was on the grounds that the almost exceptionally old common and British publicity that the Congress was a Hindu body whose point was to overwhelm and 'destory' Muslims was bogus. What is much all the more intriguing in that once the British couldn't longer keep up their standard in the subcontinent and had consequently no superseding interest left in utilizing or supporting Muslim communalism against the natinalist development, they unhesitatingly discarded it. In this regard, the segment of India had shrouded a significant aspect of the truth. Since the patriots fizzled in keeping India joined together, it is expected that the Muslim League got what it needed. However, the Pakistan that at long last appeared in 1947 was totally different from its 1940 origination; it was after every one of the a 'shortened' or 'month eaten' Pakistan. The inability to convey though the first idea of Pakistan without a doubt spoke to a double-crossing of the Muslim League by the frontier

rulers, While the segment spoke to an incomplete destruction for Indian nagtionalism and the two Hindus and Muslims lost by it, history is probably going to record that as between the Congress and the League, or as among patriotism and Muslim communalism, the last was the greater failure as far as the accomplishment of their destinations, the emergence of their ideas and the drawn out suitability of their benefits. In this way, when the British found that they were not equipped for battling for the continuation of their standard, they had no craving or reason-left to battle for the League's requests or for the security of the privileges of the minorities.[15]

With what instruments was the strategy of partition and rule through communalism actualized? What were the various manners by which the British empowered and upheld communalism?

This was done, above all else, by regarding Muslims as a different network or political substance in India and, by and large, by following up on the suppositions that India comprised most importantly of organized regligious networks, that religion replaced nationalisty in India and that religion was the most significant divisions among Indians.

Most British strategy creators, executives and authors emphasized the basic disunity of India, particularly due to strict majority or variety. The idea that India was a country or was turning into a country or a people was dismissed without a second thought. Additionally, in contrast to the West, India was not held as comprising of people either. It comprised, it was stated, of interests and communities,¹⁶ and the most significant interests were those of strict networks which were totally unrelated and antagonistic.[17]

In the political field, not gatherings and people however strict networks wre seen as acting, arranging, and so forth. The job assinged to parties and factional groupings or intrigue bunches in contemporary political composing was, in India, allocated to networks. In any event, when gatherings existed, it was said that they simply spoke to the wills of strict networks, however frequently the Congress was denied the option to talk for most Indians as well as for most Hindus. Therefore, the legislature demanded moving toward all inquiries of governmental issues, organization, instruction, and so forth , on a shared premise and urged others to do likewise.

This public perspective on Indian culture and governmental issues was kept up and proliferated from the earliest starting point of current legislative issues in India to the furthest limit of the British principle. Dufferin was one of the main Viceroys to cncourage Muslims to view themselves as a particular political substance in India.¹⁸ Colonial

directors progressively considered India to be "a nation of unintegrated communities".¹⁹ Similarly, in his answer to the 'Muslim' assignment in 1906, Minto alluded to "the convictions and conventions of the networks making the populace out of this mainland". He likewise communicated endorsement of the perspectives that in bodies, for example, authoritative boards "the Mohammendan people group be spoken to as a community", and that a Muslim chosen with Hindu votes would forfeit his perspectives "to those of a lion's share contradicted to his community".²⁰ Here, one gets full support of the whole range of common philosophy as it was creating in India.

In 1926, Irwin alluded to Hindus and Muslims as "two old and profoundly composed societies".²¹ In 1930, the report of the Simon Commission alluded to the connection among Hindus and Muslims as that of "an essential resistance showing itself every step of the way in social custom and financial rivalry, just as in common strict antipathy". One outcome was that "portrayal of adversary networks and various interests is the main guideline whereupon it has been discovered conceivable to comprise, by the technique for direct political race, the administrative collections of India....."[²²] The Joint Select Committee Indian Constitutional Reforms went further: Hindus and Muslims "might be said undoubtedly to speak to two and particular separate civilizations".[²³] On 18 October 1939, Linlithgow talked about the British Government's eagerness "to go into interview with agents of the few networks , gatherings and interests in India "[²⁴]

CONCLUSION

Jinnah and the League kept on practicing a rejection over the post-war protected conversations for quite a while, for instance, at the Simla Conference, inasmuch as the British actually would have liked to keep up a type of quality in the subcontinent. When it turned out to be certain that that was impractical, the British from one perspective transparently yielded the interest for Pakistan and on the other pulled back the denial. The parcel of India was currently an aspect of the arrangement of requested withdrawal from India as opposed to the strategy of partition and rule. Henceforth, Prime Minister Attlee's declaration on 15 March 1946 said that he was mindful of the rights of Muslims against Hindu majority.

REFERENCES:

1. Thus, the British officials were highly critical of the Arya Samaj because, though it tended to foster communalism, it was suspected of also being anti-British.
2. Quoted in G.R. Thursby, op. cit., p. 173
3. Quoted in Prem Choudhry, " Role of Sir Chhotu Ram in Punjab Politics", p. 228
4. For a detailed discussion of this aspect, see *ibid.*, pp. 227ff.
5. Quoted in M.N.Das, *India under Morley and Minto*, p. 237
6. Quoted in Francis Robinson, op. cit., p. 245
7. The Raja of Mahmudabad narrates how in an interview in 1936 the UP Governor ordered him to withdraw support to the Muslim League and to join the NAP, hinting that the British had the authority to withdraw the grant of his lands."Some Memories", p. 384.
8. Zetland, *Essays: Memorials of Lawrence, Second Marquess of Zetland*, p. 292.
9. This is also one reason why the official approach to him differed so completely from that towards the moderate nationalists who also professed loyalty to the Raj. But the latter were, apart from being critics of colonialism, also propagators of modern politics and political agitation.
10. Francis Robinson, op. cit., pp. 86, 121-26
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 136-41.
12. M.N.Das, op. cit., pp. 164-65, 167-68; and B.L. Grover, *A Documentary Study of British Policy towards Indian Nationalism 1885-1909*, pp. 255, 259-60.
13. Political prop, because administratively one other was available and was freely used, that is, naked suppression or 'leonine violence' including bombing of the unarmed civilian population from the air. But the nature of British society at home and British rule in India and the huge size of the Indian population made it impossible to rely entirely on this prop over a long period. It is also to be noted that the nationalist agitation from the 1870s had already gradually destroyed the elements of civil hegemony of colonialism, such as faith in British benevolence, over the minds of the Indian people.
14. Zetland, op. cit., p. 247
15. When, in 1944, C. Rajagopalachari had, with the backing of Gandhi, presented a scheme for Pakistan similar to the one accepted in 1947, that is, self-determination on the basis of the

contiguous Muslim majority districts of the Muslim majority provinces, Jinnah had rejected it on the ground that "it was a shadow and a husk, a maimed, mutilated and moth-eaten Pakistan".

16. The Economist of 27 February 1909 wrote: "Whatever may be the political atom in India, it is certainly not the individual of Western democratic theory, but the community of some sort." Quoted in K.K.Aziz, op. cit., pp. 171-72.
17. Nor was it a case of misapplication of Western political theory. A new principle of political organization not provided for in contemporary Western political theory was being applied here.
18. S.Gopal, op. cit., p. 158
19. D.A. Low, Soundings in Modern South Asian History, p.19
20. Reproduced in Ram Gopal, Indian Muslims: A Political History (1858-1947), p. 338; and B.L. Grover, op. cit., p. 272.
21. Lord Irwin, Indian Problems, p. 238
22. Report of Indian Statutory Commission, Vol. I, Paras 36 and 152. For similar views in the earlier Report of Indian Constitutional Reform, 1918, see pp. 84-85, 91, 99.
23. Report of the 1933-34 session, Vol. I, Para 1.
24. Indian Annual Register, 1939, Vol. II, p. 387; and M.Gwyer and A.Appadorai, Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution 1921-47, Vol.II, p. 491. For similar language in the Wavell Plan in 1945, see *ibid.*, p. 559.

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