

Changes in Indian Foreign Policy in Last Decade

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Abstract – From 1947 up to today, this paper offers a study of India's foreign policy. It is split into three separate parts of the past. It would also help to clarify why these initiatives have been followed, India's original direction and the adjustments that have taken place over time. The first portion includes the years from 1947 and 1962, the second segment from 1962 and 1991 and the third section from 1991 and today. These three industries are not random to pick from. The first step of the Indian foreign policy under Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru reflected the maximum degree of idealism. The second started in the 1962 Sino-Indian boundary war with the catastrophic loss of India. During that time, the early idealism characterizing the foreign policy of the country and the implementation of an approach to foreign policy that was gradually "self-help" retained elements of nehruvian rhetorical. The third period started with the end of the Cold War and a more realistic economic strategy, strongly related to realism.

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INTRODUCTION

Provided that India has an relevance to the approach to the international community, more analysis should be made of its foreign policy and its ties with the world. Any country's foreign policy had a extremely multi-faceted component, which was recognised as an sovereign nation from the 1947 Decolonial Era. Policies are implemented according to the requirement of circumstances that differ, which have a solid, global, conventional and customary basis. — The interaction between domestic and foreign policy is an important part of the entire country's affairs [1]. The flux of ideas apart of some or static foreign policy formulations continues to hold them alive and the foundation of international policy is persuaded that foreign relations has value-driven formulae with which modern diplomacy will react appropriately. On the other side, the external dimension was of great significance to the practical solution on the international scene. Similarly, in the past we had some good proof that "a win for the Labor Party in UK polls and the transition in Moscow was accompanied by China's nuclear explosion on the next day"[2]. In 1964, there was a political base on the world level. India has been handled and has the impression that the multidimensional mission we have sought requires to be taken into the strategic environment of our diplomatic immunity. The Golden Sparrow has conveyed itself to the globe as a satellite of the great monarchies, and a return to the end of the Cold War time begins to come to an end, allowing various nations as well as India to consider as an sovereign country within other systems of foreign matters or policies. The scream of a suddenly

evolving intellectual foe has unleashed the jubilantness of the Cold War invasion "[3]. There are kinds of evolving problems in Indian foreign policy in certain systemic decade in the 1970s. And the communist trend and creation of the nation had become witnesses. In India, the growth and influence of science production technology through Pokhran I was noteworthy by becoming a socialist republic. "A country entering tunnels in public strategy cannot survive global political instability" [4]. [3]. As an exemplary democracy in all fields of the third world, India is one of the main forces confronting the second and first world nations. Whereas Deng Xiaoping witnessed drastic shifts in Chinese foreign policy in the later 1970s. India has experienced some categorical shift for outsiders before the 1970s. Outsiders have not. In the late 80s and early 90s, the economic structure under liberal government worldwide shifted dramatically. An open / free market system appears as a key component in earthly socio-liberal societies. The French economic revolution saw the maximum degree of speech and the consumer-focused economies pursued a modern world direction that was accompanied by authoritarian foreign policies. In the 1990s, the economic growth of India did not hit that level compared with other Asian countries and particularly China. The modern world-market system has encouraged several countries as well as the Indian diplomacy to allow the regulation of foreign relations simpler. Indian's old active position in policy transformations, and its higher priority in fostering global foreign relations and, ultimately, public diplomacy, has basically been abandoned[5]. Indian investment and entry to the

developing world's markets is accessible to foreign direct investment. The country's capacity has been unlocked by sluggish yet effective economic reforms. Respondents to Pakistan and China and the region as a whole produced swift economic growth provided a foundation for transforming their ties with the great power. In Indian foreign policy, another shift entails the Shi'a from becoming a big force in the Third World to realizing that India will emerge as the biggest strength even though a so-called power journey that makes sense on its own. Economically, India as a pre-colonial country is one of historical major powers and shows one of the multiple facets of foreign policy to be the leader with its own democratic reforms in 1990. An embrace of innovative governance frameworks and colors around the board. As the world's biggest society, a combination of idealism and reality is reflected by practical strategies against international government. India shows itself to be in control of the world in Nehruvian rational neighbourliness in terms of strategic foreign ties in western and EU world tendering in its own neighbourhood. Nehru suggested to the Indians that they connect with the local society and have a more optimistic approach to their adopted countries' democratic aspirations. He encouraged them not to demand specific rights at the expense of fair opportunities for battle "in economic matters[6]. "The basis of breaking the colonial structure had been established during the Nehru years of India's strategy" [7]. Any factors may be rendered accountable for transitions, such as the end of cold war, method globalization and the West phalian form of Governance, are now picturesque today.

KEY RELATIONSHIPS

India's course can be better viewed through the prism of core relations: United States, China, South Asia.

INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES

India-U.S. antagonistic element. Before 1991, ties are one of both US and Indian diplomats' lifelong mysteries, which led an ex U.S. diplomat in this time in which they identified the two states as "independent democracies." Indeed, as India became independent in 1947, on paper, both countries had every excuse to become partners and allies. In terms of the liberal democracy and common viewpoints toward imperialism and national self-determination in foreign relations, both the U.S. and India had geopolitical interests in balance the Chinese influence in Asia America attempted, though India stayed cautious of its broad and influential neighbor's ambitions, to curb the rise of communist force in East Asia. However, America's staunchly anti-communist foreign policy was not in accordance with India's foreign strategy of the non-alignment that resolutely defied relations with any superpower bloc

during the cold war. Relationships thus "characterized by Indian resentment and Washington's fears." A U.S.-Pakistan partnership started in the 1950s and is still present today (though changed considerably by the years that have passed) aggravated the feeling of reciprocal isolation. However, the United States immediately supported Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru with military protection when China went to war with India in 1962. However, as Pakistan was supported in the 1971 East Pakistan war, India discarded its non-alignment stance and signed a security treaty with the Soviet Union, which was affected by India's early leaders, especially Nehru's socialist connection as well. In exchange, the Soviet Union used its veto in the United Nations Center to stamp out three decisions opposing the involvement of India in the so called Bangladesh Conflict. In most matters from India's atomic bomb to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s up to the Cold War, India and the US will be in conflict with this. North-America. Extraordinary developments continued to deteriorate at the conclusion of the Cold War, if only because of conflicts in both nations. In the face of India's economic collapse and increasingly weakening regimes, it was South Asia (with the end of the proxy war in Afghanistan) which was lost by the US and its attention on expanding its role and power worldwide. But away from government focus, both countries' private sectors started to create stronger relations, primarily because of India's aggressive economic liberalization policy and its chances for US companies. In the period 1991 to 2006, trade between the two nations soared six times to 32 billion dollars, leading one American official to say that "the major development in the ties between the USA and India was initially made by the private sector."

The biggest accomplishment of Indian foreign policy with respect to the United States is that ties between the United States and India and the United States and Pakistan are on separate lines in the new millennium. Indeed, as one analyst pointed out, India is part of the "latest [strategic] triangle" between China and the U.S. India and the United States today work together on a number of topics including scientific and technical problems, nutrition, electricity, protection, disaster relief, maritime protection and investment. The partnership was neither wider or stronger, but there were no problems. Among the difficulties is a disparity between the views of India and of India in the geopolitical view of America: as one scholar claimed, the US has been faced since World War II with partners, rivals, and subordinate States (for example, Britain, the Soviet Union and Pakistan). As a consequence, India's own foreign policy priorities (legitimately), frequently frustrate America's need for greater alignment for its own objectives.

INDIA AND CHINA

Asian, ethnic, anti-imperialist, pro-Third World — India and China exchanged a number when, in the late 1940s, they joined the international community during the Second World War. However, their domain has become too limited to accommodate their respective geopolitical weights and desires. First gaps arose in the Third World leadership, with Nehru and Zhou Enlai putting their respective countries at the top of the ranks. In 1950 China invaded Tibet, a territory closely culturally related to India and the two Asian giant buffer zone. Delhi's response to Beijing seemed replicate and embraced the Chinese tactic, whereas the U.S. CIA had been able to train Tibetan rebels in Indian soil. In 1959 the relations between India and China with Tibet deteriorated, when India provided shelter to a fleeing Dalai Lama. Owing to the conflicting viewpoints on the legitimacy of their respective imperial territorial history, a disagreement on the borders erupted between both countries. This conflict broke out in a month-long military conflict in 1962, leading to a definitive win for China and a crushing loss for India, which posed profound concerns about the strategy and readiness of India for its military operation. [9]China conducted its first nuclear test in 1964, which prompted the US, and the Soviet Union, to engage Delhi in vigorous dialogue in India on the need for a nuclear arms programme, including strategic protection against the Chinese challenge to superpowers. In the following year, by providing military assistance to Pakistan in its dispute with India in Kashmir, China formed a long and fruitful alliance with Pakistan. China's military exports to Pakistan were more than four times higher than the previous year during the Bangladesh War in 1971 (SIPRI 2008). In the early 1970s, the U.S.–China rapprochement actually ended any hope that India might respond credibly to the so-called challenge from China, particularly because the Indian Ally of the Soviet Union was not eager to get both the USA and China engaged in a possible Sino-Indian war. In the early 1980s India and China started a timely dialog to settle their boundary conflict, as Sino-Soviet relations seemed to be better. By 1986 the negotiation, although both nations were able to prevent full-blowing conflict by a last minute backpedal, had become a diplomatic impasse. Premier Rajiv Gandhi visited Beijing in 1988, which was the launch of a new period of Sino-Indian ties that divided boundaries from a larger bilateral partnership. A number of high profile diplomatic visits between the two nations have characterized the time since then. Though India named China the "number one challenge" to its 1998 nuclear test (Express News Service, 1998), China's Indian ties have been comparatively peaceful since the end of the Cold War in contrast with earlier decades. But its policy on Indian and Pakistan problems has increasingly changed from participation to a nationalist, putting questions like Kashmir in two-way terms (i.e. India-Pakistan) rather than terms asking for intervention by third parties. China remained the largest donor of

weapons to Pakistan. The general trend in Chinese-Indian ties remains strong, but there are potentials. The situation at the border is uncompromising. In 2010, on a visit to India Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao clearly said that the problem "would not be simple to fix ... It takes flexibility." The possibility of success in dialog was overlooked by Delhi. This declaration inspired a recent community of leading Indian strategists and public intellectuals to advise the Indian Government to modernize its frontier infrastructure to keep China from striking. Another source of possible conflict is Tibet. China remains highly vulnerable with nearly 100,000 Tibetan refugees residing in India to the leadership of the Dalai Lama in exile in India. In a fight to counter China's efforts to intervene in its successors selection, in 2011 the Dalai Lama took a remarkable measure in renouncing the Tibetan diaspora's political leadership and handing the mantle over to an independent Prime Minister, Lobsang Sangay, in the Indian city of Dharamsala. This action meant that the political leader of the Tibetans will stay in Indian while the Chinese Government would claim to have identified the religious successor of the Dalai Lama in China. The tendency for Sangay to hold more extreme views of the Chinese than of the Dalai Lama is more worrying for Delhi. If so, India could inadvertently become a conflict between Tibetans in exile and the Chinese Government.

INDIA AND SOUTH ASIA

The ties between India and Pakistan have been ominously reminiscent of previous India-US discussions. And ties between India and China. This reality illustrates the significance of the neighborhood of India in a future in which India might be a big force. Although India has made a long way since independence in terms of economic growth, its military strength and nuclear capabilities, the essence of ties between India and Pakistan has not improved substantially, and indeed it has deteriorated over the years. In four major military conflicts (in 1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999), the Indians have expended substantial money and manpower; and they have been protecting the western frontier (and, until 1971, the eastern boundary) of the land, with Pakistan[10]. In addition, in their attempts to hold the Cashmir Valley under Pakistani intervention the Indian Government has lost significant financial and political support. After 1991, Pakistan's usage of state-sponsored extremism has also increased through groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, which was responsible for the attacks against the Indian parliament in 2001 and in Mumbai in 2008. The position of Cashmir represents the center of the controversy between India and Pakistan, which remains unsettled through efforts to interfere at different times by the United Nations, the United States, Britain, China and other countries. These efforts were always welcome in India but not

Pakistan, which regarded them as help for the issue, rather than as violation of Indian sovereignty and of Pakistan's territories beginning in 1947. Pakistan is a legal international conflict. However, in 1947 the British had been occupying the Princely State of Jammu and Cashemire, whose king was then entering India in the wake of the war, with the assistance of Pakistani tribal militias. The west forces on the United Nations Center regard this question to Nehru (and India's) dismay as an regional problem that allows the Kashmiri citizens to self-determination through plebiscite. The controversy was then mired in disputes over the suitability of the requirements for a plebiscite within the region, with the de-facto jurisdiction of various Jammu and Cashmir areas established in India and Pakistan over the years. India gives its Kashmir region a special status, allowing the military to enforce Indian control over the area with significant independence. Civil society organisations in India and abroad have attacked the Indian Army's human rights record in the valley (as in other conflict-ridden areas of India such as the north-east), as India remains mindful of its global picture of human rights in spite of Cashmir. Therefore, it is not shocking that India have repeatedly refused Pakistan and its allies' efforts to internationalize the Kashmir dilemma by effectively overturning Obama's effort to make Cashmir part of his Special Representative in Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2009. India confronted many problems with its neighbours, such as Nepal, Bangladesh and the Sri Lankan area, as regards the larger South Asian country. Most of India's neighbors are weak: six of India's neighbors are listed among the thirty most vulnerable countries in the world in the Fund for the 2012 Failed States Index. The instability of these states magnifies the already complicated problems presented by a pure asymmetry in scale and power that is inevitably creating tension between India and its neighbours. Democratic groups, opposition forces and cultural movements have always turned to anti-Indian language and policies in an effort to undermine or topple regimes.[11]

FOREIGN POLICY IN TRANSITION UNDER MODI

Prime Minister Narendra Modi starts the second term, and the future of Indian foreign policy under his leadership is a tangible feeling of expectation. In reality, in five years since Modi first came to power in May 2014, the country's foreign policy has undergone a remarkable transformation. No Indian Prime Minister, in particular in terms of foreign policy, has ever produced the form and amount of academic literature that Modi has. Even the opponents of the government had to understand the transition in the foreign policy of India. Without any doubt the Modi government has left its unique mark in a short time; its goal to position India as a leading global player has been made evident. Foreign Minister Vijay Gokhale announced, "India has progressed beyond a non-aligned history, during the 2019 Raisina Dialog

in Delhi in January this year. Gokhale stated that "in the law-based system, India will have a stronger position within multi-lingual structures," stressing that the Indian future will be primarily formed by the kind of function which New Delhi continues to have. "With regard to the norm, India is a stronger nation than the other nation in which the world is founded," he emphasized. Foreign Secretary It was not shocking that his arguments were generally acknowledged. After all, during Modi's first term, without many people in the strategic community understanding it, the government has managed to drive the conversation regarding Indian foreign policy steadily but decisively. Although the biggest adjustments were always dismissive of the Modi system, although the foreign policy objectives of India continued to be redefined in content and form. Many years earlier in 2015, when foreign secretary S. Jaishankar gave the Fullerton Lecture in India, the United States and China to the International Institute of Strategic Studies, he indicated that India today "aspires to be a leading force and not only a balancing strength." [12] He has long been in a state of mistrust regarding India's ambitions to great strength, reflecting the confidence of a corporation that is able to demonstrate the soft power of civilisation. This leads to hyper-energy diplomacy which seeks not only to achieve a global footprint, but also to emphasize the soft power characteristics of the country, from yoga and spirituality, to the Diaspora. The transformation is not only an indication of greater self-confidence in this nation but is also inspired by an desire to be a governor, not a rule-maker. It impregnated Indian foreign policy with any risk-taking, overcoming the sensitivity to threats of previous expenditures. India, which is a prudent force forever, is able to have a greater presence in the world by playing a stronger game than ever. Instead of resisting alliances, the Modi government is redefining strategic sovereignty as an goal accomplished by enhanced alliances. This emphasizes that geopolitical control does not simply be a twin disjuncture in today's difficult global scene. For instance, India seeks to reinforce its strategical autonomy in relation to China, while participating in the so-called 'Quad.' In the meantime it is growing its geopolitical sovereignty vis-a-vis a Trump administration which is targeted at undermining the foundations of the global economic order as it sits together with Russia and China for a trilateral mechanism. In this paper, the first term discusses Modi's foreign policy and outlines the obstacles New Delhi continues to face over the next five years. This is a detailed overview of the Indian foreign policy environment over the past five years, split into three parts, noting its accomplishments and underlining its ongoing challenges.

CONCLUSION

India's foreign policy is founded on the Panchsheel doctrine of Mahatma Gandhi. Interestingly, Indian

Foreign Policy has defended national interest rightly in all its domains; it was founded in the 21st century as a powerful IT-based country. The value of foreign policy and its backwardness reinforce India's influence. New feature of Indian foreign policy is the advancement of research, technology and culture. It is very important to analyze how the values of Indian foreign policy have been affected in the national interest and these issues can be extensively discussed here. Global policy shifts according to a nation's national growth, security and investment. It depends on digital modes to a system focused on information technology. There have been several improvements to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's Indian Foreign Policy. Bowling types. India developed the Nonalign Movement Ideology, and it has been influential during the time of Narendar Modi. India is growing as a significant phenomenon as a mega-power in the digital world. In Sab ka Saath and Sabka Vikas, India would definitely do well in all South Asian developing countries.

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