Influence of Philosophical Method on Sanskrit Poetics Grammar
Exploring the Origins and Development of Sanskrit Poetics through Philosophical Method
by Hemanta Kumar Santra*,
- Published in Journal of Advances and Scholarly Researches in Allied Education, E-ISSN: 2230-7540
Volume 16, Issue No. 6, May 2019, Pages 3070 - 3075 (6)
Published by: Ignited Minds Journals
ABSTRACT
Poetics, the science of poetry (kavya) known by numerous names such as Iiavyaastra, Alankarasastra, Sahityasastra in Sanskrit literature is a fully developed discipline which deals with the nature of kavya and its important aspects, viz., Rasa, Alankara, Guna, Dosa and many others in a comprehensive and critical manner. The continuous literary activities of the Sanskrit poeticians over a period extending from the hoary antiquity upto the eighteenth century A.D, resulting in the form of original works, commentaries and sub-commentaries have made this important Sastra detailed in its nature and varied in its scope. But the exact time of the origin of this science is not known. Bharatas Natyasastra (NS) is considered as the earliest available work dealing with the poetic theories in the field of Sanskrit literary criticism. But the origin of the Sanskrit Poetics is definitely prior to the NS of Bharata. For, in various works we find references to some authors like Nandikesvara, Kasyapa etc., who have probably preceded Bharata and whose works are not available to us. They seem to have significantly contributed to this science. Bhamaha tells us that he had predecessors whose works apparently he had utilized. While referring to these predecessors generally as anye, spare and kecit, Bhamaha cites -twice by name one Medhavin, probably a Buddhist Poetician.
KEYWORD
Philosophical Method, Sanskrit Poetics Grammar, Poetics, kavya, Alankarasastra, Sahityasastra, Rasa, Alankara, Guna, Dosa
INTRODUCTION
Sanskrit Poetics has a very long history of uninterrupted development which witnessed various changes in contents and outlook. In the field of poetics we find much by way of growth as a result of dialectical examination and refutation of views which resulted in a gradual rise, formation and development of five schools, Viz., I. Rasa-school of Bharata II. Alankara-school of Bhamaha III. Riti-school of Vamana IV. Dhvani-school of Anandavardhana and V. Vakrokti-school of Kuntaka. These schools are not in conflict with one another as they all recognise the Indispensability of Rasa in any literature worth the name. But they attach relatively more importance to some one element of these than to the rest. Bharata is considered to be the earliest exponent of RASA School. The greatest and most far-reaching contribution of Bharata to poetics is his formulation of the Rasasutra to explain the genesis of Rasa on this Rasasutra many, of the later rhetoricians built their own theories of Rasanispatti. (Even those others who did not do so, have, ffrhm Bhamaha onwards, at least incorporated the element of Rasa in their scheme of poetics). But the original work of LoHata, Sahkuka and Nayaka are yet not found and we have relied upon the summaries of their views furnished by their critics such as Abhinavagupta and Mammata. There are also several other works dealing with Rasa like Sarasvatikanthabharana, Srhgaraprakasa, Basarupaka, Srhgaratilaka, Bhavaprakasana, Rasatarahgini etc. Some poeticians made outstanding efforts to analyse the nature of ALAMARA and the role It plays in beautifying poetry, Bhamaha, Dandin, Udbhata and Rudrata are the main exponents of this theory. The significance of alahkara in kavya, particularly in the sense indicated by Vamana saundaryam alahkarah, has attained so much importance that the whole &astra is named after it, i.e. Alankarasastra. The great stalwarts in the field of Sanskrit Poetics who have made some kind of important contributions to the development of Sanskrit Poetics and widened its nature and scope are , Mahimabhatta, Mammata, Ruyyaka, Vagbhatta, Vidyadhara, Vidyariatha Visvariatha, Kesavamisra, Jagannatha, Visvanathadeva, Visvesvara Pandita, Yajriesvara Diksita and Devasarikara Purohita. Apart from this there are numerous poeticisms who have also contributed to this field but unfortunately they have not been successful in earning names of sublime reputation. In the present thesis we have concentrated only on the important works of prominent poeticisms as listed above.
all the Sastras. Explaining the importance of Grammar Bhamaha rightly says: All the sastras in Sanskrit literature have contributed little or more to the development of Sanskrit Poetics. But the Vyakaranasastra has exercised a profound influence on it, From the Rgvedic age the Vyakaranasastra has enjoyed a significant position and therefore has been considered as one of the six Vedahgas. Prime importance has been attached to it by calling it the mouth of Vedapuruga. Dictums like - "Kanadam Paninlyam sarvasastropakarakam also reflect the importance and necessity of the study of Grammar for the knowledge of all Sastras. The discussion of the meaning of words which we find' in the Alahkara works is mostly based on the Mahabhasya of Patarljall and the Vakyapadiya of Bhartrhari, the' Kavyaprakasa (KF) of Mammata quotes twice from the Vakyapadiya as helping in determination of the meaning of a word that has several u significations. The influence of Grammar on the KASV is most prominent in the second Adhyaya of the fifth Adhlkarana, In this Adhaya he determined the purity of words on the basis of Grammar, the whole Adhyaya is directly concerned with grammatical Since issues it looks more like a work of Grammar than of poetics. Other rhetoricians lifce ^annStha Paniita also were indeed the system of Grammar and therefore they have used some grammatical principles or sutras of Panini while discussing their poetic theories.
NAVYANYĀYA
Navya carries the nuance of ―new,‖ ―neo,‖ or ―nouveau‖ and may also mean ―worthy‖ or ―laudable,‖ but it also has inflected in it naya in both senses of logic and new, so there is a double entendre implicated. ―Navyanyāya‖ is the name of the subschool of Nyāya that developed after the 10th century, closer to the era from the 14th to the late 17th century, in about three specific areas in northeast India: Kāśi (Varanasi), Navadvipa, and Mithila, where philosophers schooled in the classical Nyāya system interacted with intellectuals and philosophers and learned scholars belonging to developments in epistemology, metaphysics, and logic under which the standard Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophical categories are taken and, as it were, imploded dialectically may be too technical and otiose a discussion to enter here. The practical application, however, of the navyanaya theories extend from reasoning to jurisprudence, i.e. in areas outside of logic proper to concerns in political and legal thought; and this is exactly as Kauṭilya had set up the template or trajectory for ānvīkṣikī in the Arthaśāstra (29). The thinking on logic, likewise, has been perceived here to be so advanced that one could even see suggestions of improvements on certain cul-de-sacs or limitations reached within Western philosophizing, for example, on sense and reference distinction, meaning at large, Bertrand Russell‘s paradox, Gettier‘s paradox, the debates around realism versus antirealism, nonexistence versus absence, and so on (24, 25, 27), namely perception The almost immutable ―seven categories‖ bequeathed from the Vaiśeṣika side (Śivāditya‘s Saptapadārthī, c. 1100 CE (9, 21)) undergo variations, additions, subtractions, modifications, rejections, and affirmations that continue to the end of the period – the Navya-golden age - in question, and there is also excessive preoccupation with the more metaphysical - indeed, theologically nuanced - categories. Notably, ātmā was still a matter to be defended against the Buddhist denial of the invisible transbody self (or soul, as some might mistranslate this category), and there is much ink spilling over whether the knowledge of the ātmā is determinate (savikalpa) or indeterminate (nirvikapla), and in some sense introspective. But what pramāṇa does its knowing veridically fall under? Udayana (10, 18), during the middle period of Nyāya‘s flourishing had constructed a powerful cosmological argument for inferring the existence of God (shorty to that.) Gaṅgeśa in the celebrated Navyanyāya opus Tattvacintāmaṇi (c. 1300s) (32, 29) made a further attempt by actually summarizing and drawing out the strong points in the workings of the pramāṇa of inference to provide rational arguments for the existence of the supreme being (a notion quite foreign to the Vaiśeṣika – until perhaps much later (16)– not to mention the Mīmāṃsā and Sāṁkhya-Yoga). It may also be worth mentioning that, unlike the majority of the Mīmāṃsakas, the Naiyāyikas were Śaivas (worshippers of Śiva), and a few doubtless Vaiṣṇavas among them. They seemed stridently ―secular‖ (and rational) in their philosophizing as they were religious in their after-hours practices. Such an academic division of labour probably made sense in 17th-century Varanasi and Navadvipa‘s semi-seminarian scholastic environments. One may also note that while the Navyanyāya philosophizing climaxed in its rationally analytical and logical developments, range of human experiences (anubhava). The aesthetic and the sublime seem to find no place in their philosophizing either, much less under the rubric of the categories. Did karman ever feature as a possible natural kind or moral universal? This is such a pervasive trope in the tradition that one wonders how it could be so overlooked by the Naiyāyikas! (12) Did the so-called problem of evil that plagues Western theodicy occur to the Navyanaiyāyikas? (12) Ganeri, who has made an intense study of the Navyanyāya rational development of this period, remarks that there was not much of the ethics, aesthetics, or sentiments associated with the arts that concerned the philosophers of the Navyanyāya ilk (19). Yet it seems unlikely that the same philosophers who paid attention to the application of the categories they developed in jurisprudence, governance, and grammar could have ignored the alamkāras, poetics, drama, abhinayas or hand-gestures and poses, emotions, judgment (aesthetic), music, the arts, the mystical, and the divine that as participants in a culture rich in these elements and practices they could have ignored. This did not happen in the Athens of Greek philosophy or in the Middle Ages through to the Enlightenment. Reason need not shy away from such preoccupations that are very much human, even Indic or pan-Indian. It seems there was so little, if anything, of a more substantive treatment of ethics as moral philosophy that apart from the inclusion of dharma in the padārthas (possibly a concession to the Mīmāṃsakas). While they engaged in robust dialogues and dialectics with the Mīmāṃsakas and the Buddhists, the ubiquitous impact of Vedānta, which came to dominate much of the Brāhmaṇical intellectual milieu and whose pressures one could argue the Nyāya thinkers subtly took cognizance of, cannot be denied. Perhaps the Naiyāyikas needed to shield themselves against this onslaught and thus hold out their opposition rather more successfully than the other adversaries such as the Mīmāṃsā (mostly appropriated into the Vedānta ontotheology) or the Buddhists, or for that matter the remnants of Vaiśeṣika, were managing to. (13)
GOD’S THEODICITY IN NYĀYA-NAVYA
It may be an irony that it is left to the Naiyāyikas to harness the most decisive ―proofs,‖ that is, philosophical defense, for the existence of a creator god (as Īśvara, Bhagavān, Paramātmā). The arguments are more interesting and convincing for the robustness of the logical analyses and the evidence of a complicated epistemology that was being developed in this school over a span of some 1200 years, than they are for their incorrigibility and truth-warranting strength. Nevertheless, these scholastic efforts, which compare with the ―proofs‖ of Aquinas, J. Duns Scotus, W. Paley, A. Plantinga and others in Western philosophical theology (37), have (and Jaina) ilk. The logicians work up an argument to demonstrate belief in the existence of God through an expansion and fine-tuning of the ordinary five-step syllogism that takes as its stock example the inference ―there is fire on the hill, because…smoke,‖ and analogically the ―pot- (or watch-) maker‖ proof. (35, 32, 2) The Īśvara/God argument is basically an inferential one, and as such a hybrid of cosmological and design inferences: basically a cosmoteleological ―proof,‖ as Karl Potter put it, or even better, ―causal argument with cosmological, moral, and teleological variants‖ (31, 33). There are two parts to the proof: (1) to demonstrate that the world (jagat) was produced by an intelligent agent/maker (buddhimat-kartṛ). In standard terms this is an inference from the world to the existence of a first cause or necessary being that would account for the existence of the world, and that the first cause or necessary being has the properties associated with the concept of Īśvara (35). The first ―proof‖ is often dubbed ―from fabric to weaver‖ and looks like the standard design or teleological argument; however, the inferential reasoning adverts not to the complexity of the world, but rather to the fact of the world and the parts that make up the world. So the argument in a nutshell looks like this: ―Because the world has an apparent design – that is, it appears to be an artifact – there must be an intelligent designer who made it.
INFLUENCE OF PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS
Indian Philosophical systems viz,, Samkhya, Yoga, Ptirva Mimamsa, Uttaramimamsa or Vedanta, Vaisesika and Nyaya have influenced the poetic theories and poeticians of great importance.
(A) Samkhya System
The influence of the Samkhya system is mainly found on the interpretation of the.concept of Rasa, Bhattanayaka*s theory of Rasa known as Bhuktivada seems to be originated becaus the profound influence of the Samkhya system. The enjoyment, by virtue of the different forms of contact between sattva, rajas and tamas corisits of the states of (fluidity), vistara (dilatation) and vikasa (expansion), It is characterised by a resting (visranti) on one‘s own consciousness (samvit), which due to the emergent state of sattva is pervaded by beatitude (ananda) and light (prakasa) e of druti and is similar to the tasting of the supreme Brahman, The light of the Self, does not reveal Itself, in the samsarika existence, but is conditioned by the three constituent elements of mental substance.(buddhi), sattva, rajas and tamas, These three constituent elements are never present in isolation, but mingled together in unequal proportions* The three constituent
absolute predominence of sattva, fluidity (druti) determined by a contact of sattva with rajas and dilatation (vistara) determined by a contact of sattva with tamas. The source of this Samkhyan interpretation of Rasa is three gunas - sattva, rajas and tamas and their relation with sukha, dukha and moha as described in the Samkhya philos ophy.― Gunas are of the nature of the priti, apriti and visada. According to this theory, since all the wordly objects including Rasa are endowed with three qualities‘ they are of the nature of sukha, duhkha and moha. According to the Samkhya theory of causality(satkaryavada) an effect (karya) prior to its production exists In its cause and after the karanavyapara It gets manifested in the form of an effects In the same way sukha, duhkha and moha elements which remain present in the antahkarana in an unmanifested form get manifested while they come in contact with the external causal factors. Similar is the process of the realisation of the Rasa, which exists in unconspicuous form in its causes i.e, vibhava etc.,, and in due course of time, because of the karanavyapara transforms into the state of Rasa.
(B) Yoga System
Like the Samkhya, the Yoga school of Patan^ali has also influenced poetic theory of Rasa. While dealing with Santarasa one clearly realises that Yoga system has had its impact on it. Bharata*s theory of Santarasa, its existence etc,, (vibhavadi) and latent emotion (sthayibhava) seem to be influenced by the Yoga system. The concepts like Yama, Niyama and Dharana used in the description of Santarasa are referred to the technical -terms of Yogasutras. The word lingagrahana also indicates eight limbs of Yoga. In this connection Abhinavagupta quotes a number of sutras from the Yogasutra of Patanjali to substantiate his position, Masson and Patwardhan support this position. They opine that Abhinava and Yogavasistha reveal very close similarity to each other. The data found in the Yogavasistha about Santarasa can be compared with that of NS. According to the NS (the portion interpolated at the end according to the editors of NS Santarasa can be realised only in the state of salvation when the original nature of the Self is realised. Further, four vrttis of mind namely, roudita, roaitri, karuna and upeksa, if I which cause Santarasa as described in the Dasarupaka of Dhananjaya are taken from the Yoga system.
(C) Purva-Fdmamsa System
The system of Purva-Mimamsa is mainly concerned with the interpretation of Vedic texts relating to the sacrificial rituals, and evolves the main principles of interpretation. Hence, during the discussion of the doctrine of Sabda and Artha in the rhetoric works the impact of Purva-Mimamsa system can be easily marked. According to the Mimamsakas the primary meaning of a word 54. is the universal (jitl) which is the essential quality common to all the particular instances of that class. It is admitted that while the cognition of the meaningbrought about by the word pertains to the universal, all the practical activities that follow the word pertain to the vyakti (individual). It is the primary relation of the word that must be to the universal, Mammata refers to the view of Mimamsakas in his KP, Hemacandra and Visvanatha also follow in the footstept of Mammata who gives full discussions of Abhihitanvayavada and Anvitabhidhanavada in the second and fourth chapters of KP. The poeticians seem to be more attentive to the Anvitabhldhana theory of the Mimamsakas of the Prabhakara School. They consider dhvani or vyanjana to be included in the primary function Abhidha itself, for, according to them,the meaning of a word is that what is conveyed by it. There is no restriction for the significative force of a word. In a sentence a word conveys not only its own individual meaning, but also its relation with the other words in the sentence. The samsarga, or the mutual relation of the word-meanings suggested by their Juxtaposition in a sentence is also Included in the primary meaning itself. In certain context the word may suggest new ideas beyond its normal sense but all of them come under Abhidha Itself. Just as the range of an arrow can be extended further and further depending on the force with which it is discharged, 5? the meaning of a word can be extended to any length.
BRIEF HISTORY AND DEVELOPEMENT OF THE NVAVA SYSTEM
The most ancient available work on Nyaya is the Nyayasutra (NyS) of Gautama or Gotama alias Aksapada (200A.D.). The earliest available commentary on the NyS is the NBh of Vatsyayana, On this NBh Uddyotkara wrote his super-commentary, Nyayavirttika on which again Vacaspatimisra wrote his super-commentary, Nyayavarttikatatparyatika, This Tatparyatlka is again commented upon by Visvanatha. Jayanta Bhatta, a Kashmirian author of renown (third quarter of the 9th century A.D.) has contributed to the Nyayasastra an elaborate Vrtti (only on select sutras of Gautama) called Nyayamahjari (MM). In the tenth century a great Naiyayika by name Udayanacarya wrote na number of works such as Kiranavali, Atmatattvaviveka, Nyayakusumanjali etc. Thus the period of Pracina Nyaya school starting from Aksapada to Udayanacarya is an The second phase of the developement of the Nyaya system is known by the term Navya-Nyaya (the Modern school of Indian logic). It is commonly believed to have been founded by Gahgesa Upadhyaya (12th century A.D.), the illustrious author of the Tattvacintamaoi (TC). But Udayanacarya actually stands on the threshold of ancient and modem ages of the Nyaya system. His Parisuddhi round up and is practically the last important work of the ancient age of Nyaya, but he also enjoys the privilege of heralding the modern age of Nyaya system with his work Kusumanjalj. However, the actual ushering of the modern age of Nyaya is credited to Gahgesa whose.work TC is called to be the first landmakk of Navya-Nyaya. With Gahgesa and after him, the Nyaya system became a rigorous quest for precision of meaning. Praclna Nyaya mainly deals with metaphysical, logical and some methodological topics. Navya-Nyaya is basically an epistemologiaal and linguistic system. Analyses of statement and concepts and theory of knowledge etc., form the subject of Navya-Nyaya. We find subtle logic at its extreme in the works of this period. It is the turning point which pioneers an altogether new method of philosophical investigation.
CONCLUSION
In the foregoing pages we have attempted a study of ' the influence of Nyaya philosophy on the various aspects of Sanskrit Poetics. In the course of our study we have examined various Nyaya concepts in relation with the Poetic concepts. We have had an opportunity of studying the poeticians who have been influenced by the Naiyayikas and also the conditions and times in which they composed their treatises. The evolution of the poetic concepts under the growing influence, of Nyaya logic is also observed and brought to light. We come to realise that the Sanskrit Poetics manifests its deep relation with the principle tenets of Nyayasastra of Gautama and his successors as well as Buddhist logicians. The important theories of Kavysbastra such as Sabdavrtti, Ras Dhvani. Dosa and Alankara have been influenced to a great extent by the logical concepts of the schools of Nyayasystem. The Nyaya theory of Sabdavrtti and the means of Saktigbaha have influenced the poeticians like MahimsHbhatta, Mammata, Kesavamisra and Jagannatha etc. The Nyaya theories of tatparya and anvltabhldhana have influenced rhetoricians like Bhoja in treating tatparya (intension of the speaker) as a separate Sabdavrtti. He holds the view that words convey the sentence meaning by their cumulative effect (samhatyakarjta) In this regard he follows Jayantabhatta who in his KM advocates attributes of the cumulative effect (samhatyakarjta) to the tatparyafeakti of words. Realist or Idealist?‖ JICPR (Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, Delhi) (14)1. 2. Bilimoria, P. (2008). ―Karma‘s Suffering: A Mīmāṃsā Solution to the Problem of Evil,‖ in: P. Bilimoria, J. Prabhu & R. Sharma, eds., Indian Ethics: Classical Traditions and Contemporary Challenges, vol. I, Hampshire, 2007, 2008, pp. 171-190. 3. Bilimoria, P. (2000). ―Śaṅkara‘s Attempted Reconciliation of ‗You‘ and ‗I‘: Asmat-yuṣmatsāmānvāya,‖ in: P. Bilimoria & J.N. Mohanty, eds., Relativism, Suffering and Beyond: Essays in Memory of Bimal K. Matil, Oxford University Press, Delhi, pp. 252- 277. 4. Bronkhorst, J. (1996). 'God's Arrival in the Vaiśeṣika System, ' Journal of Indian Philosophy, 24(3), pp. 281-294. 5. Chakrabarti, Arindam (1993). ―Is Liberation (Mokṣa) Pleasant?‖ Philosophy East & West 33(2), pp. 167-182. 6. Ganeri, Jonardan (2011). The Lost Age of Reason: Philosophy in Early Modern India, forthcoming, Clarendon: Oxford University Press. 7. Halbfass, Wilhelm (2003). ―Happiness: A Nyāya-Vaśesika Perspective,‖ in: P. In Bilimoria, P. and Mohanty, J. N. (eds.) Relativism, Suffering and Beyond Essays in Memory of Bimal K Matilal. Delhi, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1997; Paperback, pp. 150-163. 8. Halbfass, Wilhelm (1992). On Being and What There Is: Classical Vaiśeṣika and the History of Indian Ontology, Albany. 9. Krishna, Daya (2000). Indian Philosophy: A Counter Perspective, Oxford University Press, Delhi. 10. Krishna, Daya (1996). The Problematic and Conceptual Structure of Classical Indian Thought about Man, Society and Polity, Delhi: Oxford University Press. 11. Matilal, Bimal K. (2000). ―Nyāya Realism,‖ in: J. Ganeri, ed., Collected Works of Bimal K. Matilal, vol. I, Oxford University Press, Delhi.
Corresponding Author Hemanta Kumar Santra*
Assistant Professor, Department of Sanskrit, Netaji Mahavidyalaya, Arambagh, Hooghly, West Bengal