India China Relationship from 2017(Doklam) to Till Date

On June 15, 2020, a severe face-off occurred at the Line of Actual Control (LAC), resulting in the deaths of twenty Indian troops and an unknown number of Chinese forces. A new chapter has begun in the seventy-year friendship between the two most powerful regimes in contemporary Asia. Professionals on both sides agree on this topic. According to Brahma Chellaney, India-China relations have reached a "tipping point," while according to Hu Shisheng, they have reached their "lowest point since the border conflict of 1962." Both sides have contributed to the current impasse, yet continue to place blame on the other. Despite Hu's allegation that the Indian government has "stepped up steps to behave strong against China," former national security advisor Shivshankar Menon has labelled the events in Ladakh a "fundamental and profound change in [China's] behavior," Recent Chinese actions along the LAC in eastern Ladakh, say Indian authorities, have gravely harmed bilateral relations and thrown off the framework for border management the two countries have been working on since 1993. Disagreements and mutual mistrust seem to be on the increase. In order to understand what went wrong between India and China, this study examines the current state of affairs between the two countries. The relationship between China and India has serious problems in 2017. The year 2017 saw a low point in ties between Beijing and New Delhi, which were exacerbated by military tensions along their disputed border, regional competitiveness, and strategic distrust. Fortunately, the rift that 2017 opened up between the two Asian giants may be repaired. However, it is indicative of larger trends and demonstrates that Sino-Indian ties have reached a crossroads from which they are more likely to go in the wrong direction. Therefore, it is essential that New Delhi and Beijing begin reassessing their relationship this year. The relationship between China and India has been worsening since last year as a result of many occurrences. Serious but recurring issues include the Dalai Lama's visit to the contested state of Arunachal Pradesh and China's continuous objection to the designation of Jaish-e-Mohammed commander Masood Azhar as a global terrorist. In compared to three other incidents that jolted bilateral relations and had far-reaching geopolitical ramifications, they were quite minor. Most notably, China's construction of a road in land it claims with Bhutan along a vital portion of the China-India border sparked a nearly two-month-long military stalemate at Doklam. To break the impasse, Beijing implied military threats and launched a huge media blitz against the Indian capital. This was the first occasion that India's armed forces had interfered in a territorial dispute with China. The tension in Doklam peaked as a result of the interconnectedness of two major problems. In Bhutan, there is a fight for control as a consequence of growing Chinese dominance and India's wish to safeguard what it considers to be its own area of recent years, a destabilising competition to build infrastructure around the de facto border, and numerous incidents, most notably two major standoffs in 2013 and 2014. Due to these two issues, the security situation between China and India is becoming increasingly precarious. To this day, basic enmity remains between the two sides, despite the fact that the Doklam problem has been resolved and will not disrupt the BRICS gathering in Beijing this September.[1]

India and China's relationship started a new era following Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Beijing in December 1988. This required substantial policy changes on the part of the government. Before the border dispute was resolved, India and China promised that their ties would be entirely normalised. Second, until an equitable, reasonable, and mutually acceptable solution is found, both parties have pledged to keep the peace along the LAC. Third, they reciprocally appreciated one another's efforts to promote global wealth and peace. In India, this informal agreement is known as the "Rajiv Gandhi-Deng Xiaoping modus vivendi." India has been quietly investigating the possibilities of bettering relations with Beijing since the 1980s. Nonetheless, by the decade's end, a fresh set of influences had made their impact. One such aspect was the armed war in the nearby Sumdorong Chu valley in 1986-1987. (known as the Wangdung incident). Tensions with China flared after India recognised Arunachal Pradesh as a distinct state in the northeast in February 1987. Several factors contributed to this change, including China's continuous process of warming relations with the West and the final thawing of ties between China and the Soviet Union under the presidency of former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Indian aggression abroad in 1989 has been linked to internal politics (a general election was scheduled for that year) and suspicions of corruption surrounding the Bofors arms sale. Inspiring broad faith in the steadiness and pragmatism of the nation, former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping reached out to both Atal Bihari Vajpayee and India's then-Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. India took this to suggest that China would be more open to talks about resolving their border dispute, willing to take steps to foster trust and maintain the status quo, and respectful of India's sovereignty. The administration also theorized that a more secure relationship between China and India would help keep tensions low between China and Pakistan. India's engagement with China included taming rhetoric, resuming summit level and other political exchanges, resuming trade and commercial exchanges, relaxing prohibitions on person contacts, confidence-building measures in the border areas, normalizing defense cooperation, and encouraging collaboration in multilateral areas.[2] increases in their GDP. There was a noticeable change in their attitude to foreign affairs as their strength grew around the turn of the century. What effect, if any, have recent attempts to reorient India and China's foreign policy had on the future course of their relationship?

Deng's diplomatic strategy of "keeping a low profile and bidding time," or Tao Guang Yang Hui, was called into doubt in 2008–2009 by scholars including Wang Jisi and Yan Xuetong. China's booming economy and, by inference, its increasing national might have prompted calls for the country to take a more active role in international affairs. Almost everyone in China thinks the 2008 financial crisis showed the world how flawed the West is, paving the way for China to emerge to power. China's decision to rethink and realign its foreign policy was influenced by a number of factors, including rising tensions with Japan over the Senkaku (or Diaoyu) Islands and with Vietnam and the Philippines in the South China Sea. Some people disagree with President Obama's proposal to shift U.S. foreign policy emphasis back to Asia. Some Chinese academics have claimed that Tao Guang Yang Hui is holding Beijing back from pursuing a stronger "can-do" foreign policy, arguing that "it was not fair for Beijing to keep harping on tao guang yang hui while doing something different." Yan argues that Deng meant for Tao Guang Yang Hui to make up for economic ground lost during the Cultural Revolution. To succeed in the long run, China must put it ahead of short-term gains. China has eschewed taking the lead on international issues in favour of bolstering its ties to the United States. The shift from nationalism to problem-solving in China's foreign policy has required a shift in focus from reactively adjusting to global trends to more actively directing such developments. Despite China's lack of interest in India as either an ally or a danger to its development, the country's new "striving for accomplishment" foreign policy will have significant effects on the subcontinent's largest democracy. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) touches on India's main concern, which is that China would expand its economic advantages in its neighbourhood to build shared interests and achieve strategic legitimacy. The significance of India's historical role in South Asia and the independence of Jammu and Kashmir cannot be overstated. However, China and India did not work together on the BRI. Perhaps China had anticipated India's cooperation with the BRI. The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) was already a difficult project for India to link with the BRI before China identified it as a flagship project. When coupled with China's claim of authority in the South China Sea, the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) recent operations along the LAC in Depsang (2013) and

China's stance, India may have felt it was more necessary to show it cared about China's issues than its own. According to reports, Beijing was flummoxed and unsettled by India's reactions to aspects of China's new foreign policy that looked designed to hurt India's regional and multilateral interests. China was certain that it had not taken any measures to harm India, but it feared that India's response may end up hurting China's interests.[3]

Many Indian analysts believe that the Indian government began closely monitoring foreign policy 10 years before China. By the late 1990s, the practise of nonalignment, sometimes known as the equidistance policy, had largely fallen out of favour. When compared to China, India wasn't actively seeking a new guiding principle or strategic plan. Rather, it took stock of its mistakes and implemented a number of changes in response. Vajpayee's administration brought in the nuclear component, Manmohan Singh's brought in the American component, and Modi's brought in the marine component. Indian diplomacy's two pillars—the quest of international space and the notion of multialignment—have not altered under Modi, despite what some in China may perceive to be a radical shift in Indian policy. Even while both India and China have altered their foreign policy recently, the motivations behind these shifts are quite different. When formulating their new strategy, India placed heavy emphasis on China's sphere of influence, but it seemed to play a much lesser role in Beijing. Since India's independence, successive governments have pursued dual goals: greater ties to the United States and more interaction with China. To deflect China's attention away from the border dispute, in the years following 1999, India's highest officials collaborated with Beijing to clarify the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and establish a new mechanism for political-level special representatives to negotiate an equitable, practical, and mutually agreeable settlement to the boundary dispute. Even though Singh's successors initially faced setbacks in negotiations with China, they persisted and, in April 2005, signed the Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question. The decision to develop a strategic and cooperative partnership between India and China for the sake of world peace and prosperity was inspired by this lofty objective. India was cognizant of the dangers posed by the partnership. In spite of the fact that India and China are likely to remain adversaries for the foreseeable future, the two countries' leaders implicitly acknowledged the prospect of future collaboration. During this time of relative peace, is it fair to say that China has welcomed India's offers of collaboration? working with the United States. Common opinion, on the other hand, is that Beijing did not care about India's main concerns even during the relatively quiet period that spanned the middle of the 1990s and the middle of the 2000s. Concerns have been raised about timing, given that the aggressive rebranding of Arunachal Pradesh as "South Tibet" occurred so soon after the 2005 agreement. Furthermore, China has restricted Arunachal Pradesh's ability to receive international finance for economic development initiatives. Having residents of Jammu and Kashmir State get visas in the form of stapled paperwork gives China the image of not respecting India's sovereignty over the territory. China's obstruction of identifying the culprits at the United Nations Security Council 1267 Sanctions Committee months after the terrorist assault on Mumbai in November 2009 shows a stunning lack of sensitivity to a major crisis. The strategic elite is pessimistic about China's expanding role in South Asia. By mid-2009, widespread complaints about the policy of engagement's lopsided advantages had emerged. One of the first to sound the alarm that the present debates were revealing deeper strategic discord and competitiveness was Indian security expert Chellaney. To describe China's strategy toward India, he used the Chinese proverb "wen shui zhu qingwa" (slowly boil the water to kill the frog), which means that China should avoid doing anything that would cause suspicion in India until a new balance can be formed in China's favour. At the same time, an alternative storyline developed, which held that China is the sole superpower to oppose India's ascent to power. India has traditionally seen China as a serious power. India has long pushed for China to join international organisations like the WTO and the United Nations. However, many Indian scholars claim that China seldom publicly recognises India as a significant power. During his time in power in China, Mao Zedong referred to India as a "capitalist lakey" and termed its prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, a "collaborator of imperialism." Former Chinese leader Zhou Enlai has spoken poorly of India, describing it as a "bottomless pit" that requires perpetual foreign aid. Deng's comments on India, China, and the Asian Century are among the few examples of this concept being spoken publicly; yet, this hasn't prevented it from resonating with the most senior officials in Chinese foreign policy. The antiquated belief that India could never become a worldwide power due to its caste system, poverty, and emphasis on the subcontinent persists among many Chinese writers. There is zero consideration for anything that has occurred since 1990. Some have speculated that China's westward expansion after the "reform and opening up" strategy is to blame for the current academic community's lack of interest in India. Shen Zhihua discusses the To me, China's relationships with many of its neighbors, including Vietnam, Mongolia, and India, are tenuous and unpredictable. Scholars in China, however, have given less attention to this relationship's history. Academics and government officials both are woefully misinformed about the area. I believe historians bear part of the blame for the little knowledge they have offered to policymakers. The prevalent belief that China prioritizes India over other large countries lends credence to this viewpoint. Mao's remark to Richard Nixon, the then-president of the United States, in November 1973, that "India did not obtain independence," is indicative of this. It has chosen to join forces with the Soviet Union rather than the United Kingdom. As in the early 1950s and late 1970s, when China discussed India's connections to the Soviet Union with American officials, the topic of India's ties to the United States would come up in China's meetings with Soviet authorities. Even if China "leaned to one side" and sided with the Soviets in the 1950s, only to swap sides in the 1970s, this remains the case. [4]

Modi was chosen the leader of India's National Democratic Alliance in the middle of 2014. Among the coalition parties, his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) had the greatest sway. It has been twenty-five years since any one political party had a majority in the House of Representatives. Though tensions had been rising between the two countries for some time, new Indian and Chinese leaders Modi and Xi met in early September of 2014, although the two sides' relationship seems to have deteriorated by early 2021, analysts are also exploring the likelihood that their contrasting leadership styles are to blame. Was your relationship strained by the change in leadership. [5]

The shift in China's foreign policy toward its neighbors, according to Chinese experts like Ling Shengli, is indicative of the country's transition from regional to global power. China was aware that maintaining peace and order in the area would be challenging due to lingering effects of the Cold War, geopolitical flashpoints, and foreign pressures (like the United States). To ensure the safety of all parties, China sought to establish a security zone. China's efforts to increase its clout in South Asia seemed to be falling short. Cheng Ruisheng concludes that India should be worried about China's policy of developing relationships with other South Asian governments, which China is pursuing both independently and in tandem. Since China was content to accept India's historical supremacy and find ways to work around it, the Indian vision of regional participation as a zero-sum game irritated China. Even before the Modi government, this perspective held sway in China. In Though Modi's April 2015 visit to China was marked by sadness for India due to President Xi's dedication of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the trip yielded some positive signs. The Chinese strategic elite seems to have reached some definitive judgments less than a year after Modi's win. Many people believe that Modi will lead India to a more "assertive" foreign policy. To offset China's strategic advantages in the region, India reportedly established its "neighborhood first" programme, which provides economic benefits to India's neighbors in South Asia. Some people thought this would be bad for China, and their predictions came true.[6]

The change in Chinese leadership in 2012 was closely observed by academics in India. It was another power transition between generations, and Xi was mostly unknown. That's why a lot of Indian strategists were concerned that Xi would ignore their country in favour of internal affairs. The majority of Indians believe China will maintain its rapid economic growth and have a great deal of respect for China's economic accomplishments. The strategic community and intelligentsia were wary of China, but not completely negative, despite the country's geopolitical manoeuvres. At the outset of Xi's first term, conventional wisdom was that India-China ties would continue along their current track, although with occasional disruption from Chinese geopolitical manoeuvres. Experts have taken notice of China's forceful behavior in the South China Sea and along the India-China Land and Water Corridor (LWC), as well as the BRI and the Maritime Silk Road, launched by Xi in Astana and Jakarta simultaneously in late 2013. Xi's credibility as a future Chinese foreign policy leader has increased in comparison to that of his predecessors. It seems that Xi Jinping's announcement of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor as a flagship project under the BRI has marked a turning point in India's opinion of China as a result of Chinese operations in Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir. 89 India's longstanding anxieties about China and Pakistan's relationship have been eased by the realization that their strategic collaboration is not easily broken. However, in New Delhi, CPEC was seen as more proof of blatant disdain for a primary goal. A chasm of discord increased in size between them. China vetoed the designation of Masood Azhar, the head of the Pakistani terrorist organization Jaish-e-Mohammed, in both 2016 and 2017. When India applied to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group, China voiced severe reservations (2016). It was reported that the PLA and the Pakistan Army were conducting combined patrols in the area of Jammu and Kashmir that is now held by Pakistan. Instead of serving as a unifying force, trade and investment were employed just for financial gain. An increase from 2012's

attempts to fix the systemic problems that were the root of the problem. India's pharmaceutical, IT, and car exports were all excluded from the Chinese market despite their success in other, more competitive markets, despite China's claims that Indian goods were inferior. China's real expenditure in India was a long cry from Xi's promise of $20 billion. Indian retaliation was criticised by Beijing, which blamed right-wing and Hindu nationalist forces. The "right-leaning trends in India's political ecology have prepared the environment for the... Modi government to undertake a tough foreign policy against China," as stated by experts Hu and Wang Jue. The Indians' view of the relationship under Xi deteriorated as Beijing showed less sympathy for New Delhi's issues. The Doklam War of 2017 was the last straw. 96 China's incursion into the Doklam plateau, perhaps with the goal of unilaterally pressing its claim to the Jampheri (or Zompelri) ridge, has caused concern for India, which signed the Rajiv Gandhi-Deng Xiaoping agreement on the peaceful resolution of disputes. Experts in India say that since "both appear to have extended their definition of essential interests and are demonstrating considerably more sensitivity," the status quo between India and China must be adjusted, and a new equilibrium must be formed. The present leaderships of both nations appear to have a similar vision of the world, adding another layer of suspicion and misunderstanding to India-China ties. If this is the case, it shows that the Modi administration is more diametrically opposed to in Beijing than its predecessor was due to its perceived aggression, lack of regard for China's fundamental problems, and inclination to sympathise with China's enemies. As far as China is concerned, India has no reason to see China as a strategic threat. Although Modi has maintained the method of engagement (where they meet at informal summits) begun by previous administrations, this does not seem to have any impact. Even though he has shown a new realism in acknowledging and articulating differences with China and a certain self-confidence in asserting India's vital interests and in seeking reciprocity, Beijing appears to have misinterpreted his style as a fundamental departure in substance from the approach of his predecessors. Beijing may not have realized that a majority administration has more freedom in foreign affairs because of all the coalition governments China worked with between 1988 and 2014.[7]

The Doklam stalemate is a military battle on the ground, but it has far-reaching geopolitical repercussions, especially for the relationship between India and Bhutan, as Jonah Blank argues in Foreign Affairs. It also shows India that China means business when it comes to maintaining its dominance in the region. had visited the Doklam Plateau. The author, who oversaw the Indian military training team in Bhutan as its commandant, knew that People's Liberation Army patrols often visited the disputed zone in advance of key events like border discussions between China and Bhutan. PLA forces returned to Doklam in 2013 shortly before Bhutan held its second legislative election. Construction of a road on June 8th, as had been done in other claim areas to the north of the Chumbi Valley, was excessive. If the PLA were to conduct these operations before the next round of border discussions or the 2018 elections in Bhutan, it would make sense to do so. So, it's fitting that we're asking "why?" in the month of June in the year 2017. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) likely took this bold measure because of Xi Jinping's consolidation of power at home and China's exterior geopolitical compulsions. The Chumbi Valley is a narrow stretch of terrain of a few kilometres in width where China is particularly at risk. China's motivation for demarcating its border with Bhutan is rooted in its ambition to seize more Bhutanese land in order to expand the Chumbi Valley and its fear of being cut off by the Indian Army and the Royal Bhutan Army. Because the border has not been settled after 24 rounds of discussions, China is concerned that India and Bhutan would continue to get along without China's interference. Because it will put the PLA closer to the Siliguri Corridor, a larger Chumbi Valley would be dangerous for India's national security. This is not a new problem; similar dangers have existed since at least 1950. As proof of Indian government participation in the battle, Claude Arpi points to a letter written by Indian Political Officer in Sikkim Hariswhar Dayal and submitted to the MEA on 21 November 1950, exactly one month after the PLA invaded Tibet and captured the town of Chambdo. The Indian government would have to take defensive measures with the military if Sikkim or Bhutan were attacked. In light of the present threat, it's feasible that controlling the Chumbi Valley is a necessary defensive move. After a brutal revolution, the Tibetan people were able to overthrow the Sikkimese rulers and take control of the area. Presently, it serves as a vital transit link between Sikkim and Bhutan over what amounts to a narrow isthmus. This area is strategically significant since it controls the Jelep La and Nathu La passes that connect Sikkim and Tibet, as well as access to Western Bhutan from both our side and the Tibetan side. The valley's position between two parallel ranges of mountains makes it a natural stronghold. Therefore, I propose that any military preparations for border defence include the potential of invading the Chumbi Valley, but clearly this manoeuvre would NOT be carried out until we got shot down. Both India's economic and military standing, as well as the region's geopolitical landscape, have seen significant transformations during the last 60 years. Even though it seems improbable at the moment, a stronger PLA presence on the Doklam Plateau might pose a danger to the Siliguri Corridor, and India may choose to consider possible military responses to this possibility. [8] As Xi Jinping attempts to surpass Mao and Deng as China's most famous leader, he confronts opposition from several quarters. These include a shrinking gap in military and economic might, India's increasing closeness to the United States, and an aggressive and confident administration in New Delhi. As well as its opposition to CPEC and the One Belt One Road initiative, India has irritated Xi by hosting the Dalai Lama for over 60 years, inviting the Prime Minister of the Tibetan Government in exile to Narendra Modi's inauguration in 2014, and allowing the Dalai Lama to visit Tibetan communities in Arunachal Pradesh (territory claimed by China). When the Dalai Lama leaves office, China worries that extreme groups headquartered in India may acquire influence in Tibetan issues. In the months leading up to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party and the BRIC summit in November 2017, Xi had a good opportunity to show his strength and control in Doklam. The "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era" was recognised as an integral part of the Party Charter, marking a major milestone achieved at the Congress. At this point, Xi's stature rivals that of Mao Zedong. Army General Zhao Zongqi, who oversaw the Doklam incursion, escaped punishment in the recent shakeup of the PLA's leadership.

The next natural question is, "What is India's route ahead, given that?" Can a solution be found that doesn't compromise India's security, and if not, should the country learn to tolerate future standoffs of this kind and let the next generation figure it out? The first query may be answered instantly. India's long and close ties to Bhutan, as well as the country's security, might be protected via talks with the King of Bhutan. Despite having a democratic government, the King of Bhutan is nonetheless in charge of the country's military and security. The people of Bhutan have always placed their confidence in their king when it comes to matters of national security. If we don't address the second issue, we may be forced to depend only on our military capabilities, but that's only a real possibility if the Indian Army and the PLA are at conflict with each other. However, the fact that Bhutan is still a longtime and close ally of India makes the deadlock at Doklam Plateau particularly unusual. Thus, it is essential that India does all in its power to fortify connections with the democratic This partnership is based on India's concern for Bhutan's safety and its admiration of Bhutan's autonomy. India's and Bhutan's relationship must be built on a mutual commitment to safeguarding national sovereignty and interest. Support for the King's ongoing important position and a democratic government with confidence in its capacity to further develop its ties with India are both attainable, in the author's view, if Bhutan is allowed to become economically independent and its security forces are strengthened. The King of Bhutan paid a state visit to the Republic of India from October 31st to November 3rd, 2017. His visit allowed for an evaluation of bilateral ties between the two countries after the Doklam conflict. Now that China has abandoned its attempt to construct a road in the Doklam area (on August 28, 2017), some in the security community may say that Beijing made an error in judgment. Conversely, China is not prone to make similar mistakes. As has been repeatedly acknowledged, the Doklam standoff was designed to test India's resolve. The PLA would have had enough time to restructure its fortifications and come up with a new strategy to deal with the likely reaction of the Indian Army to its impending onslaught on the plateau. Clearly, the Chinese government does not consider the United States and China to be on same footing. Doklam seeing PLA presence might be seen as a warning by India not to disturb regional power balance. In light of this, it is possible to interpret Hua Chunying's comments from December 19th, 2017 as a warning that other occurrences like the one in Doklam are likely to occur and that this narrative is far from done. Despite the fact that many of these articles are amazing and lack important supporting evidence, the Chinese government remains committed to official historical records, which is likely to have far-reaching and varied repercussions. The People's Liberation Army's (PLA) possible move to expand territorial claims in disputed regions throughout the whole Indo-China border, not only in the north and east, is one such possibility (Arunachal Pradesh). Possible flashpoints include the Tri-Junction region on the borders of India, China, and Nepal, as well as the dormant Barahoti segments in the central sector of the Indo-China line. Since the PLA invaded and seized the Doklam plateau on August 8, 2017, they have been working to build up the region's infrastructure, much as they did in the regions to the north of the Chumbi Valley. For instance, by building a dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo river, China may revitalize its geopolitical imperatives by boosting the stakes in its "water conflicts" (origin of River Brahmaputra). 9 The impasse at Doklam seems to have been broken as a result of Indian military supremacy over the People's Liberation Army throughout the whole Sikkim boundary. Though one may hope for more restrained behavior from a regional power like China, the present administration

Over the years, India and China's relationship has been tense due to their shared border. It was an effort during Narendra Modi's first term as India's prime minister to strike a balance between cooperative and competitive partnerships. Relations between India and China have been tense since since the military standoff at Doklam in 2017, but an informal meeting between Modi and Jinping in Wuhan, China in April 2018 seems to have calmed tensions between the two countries. New Delhi took this action in the hopes that it would lead to more collaboration between the two nations' top officials and a subsequent easing of hostilities. The second informal summit, after the meeting in Wuhan, took held in Mamallapuram in October of 2019, reinforcing the commitment to develop relations. No simple solutions exist for the difficulties India will confront in its complicated relations with China because of their troubled past and the ever-changing geostrategic dynamics. It is very unlikely that China would withdraw from Pakistan due to China's geopolitical and economic interests and the numerous CPEC projects that have already been completed in the country. The Indian Ocean is becoming a more volatile geostrategic area because of China's growing goals and capabilities, as well as the increasing influence it has over a wide range of governments along the South Asian coastline. India has implemented a variety of security measures in response to this persistent threat. China's frequent incursions into Indian territory have weakened New Delhi's long-held strategic goal of maintaining neutrality among the world's major political blocs. The territorial conflict between China and India is only one of several reasons why ties between the two countries will always be fundamentally antagonistic. The Doklam crisis was discussed nonstop, leading to a complete breakdown in bilateral relations. The present discussion about recalibration of its relations with China suggests that India should take the necessary economic and geopolitical steps to reduce the power imbalance with China. Recent Chinese measures have set bilateral relations between the two nations back by at least half a century and reflect broader shifts in regional supremacy brought on by Beijing's expanding economy and military, both of which need a shift in Indian strategy.

Raj, Y. (2019). Why China decided to give in on Masood Azhar. Hindustan Times. https://www.hindustantimes.com/columns/why-china-decided-to-give-in-on masoodazhar/storysjwJXI1rbTxiAa9WpJxLN.html#:~:text=One%2C%20it%20was%20a%20nod,and%20the%20broader%20international%20community (September 2011): 195–216 See Wang Jisi, ―China‘s Changing Role in Asia,‖ Atlantic Council and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 5. Manoj Joshi, ―Depsang Incursion: Decoding The Chinese Signal,‖ Observer Research Foundation, May 14, 2013, https://www.orfonline.org/research/depsang-incursion-decoding-the-chinese-signal/. Xi Jinping, ―Let the Sense of Community of Common Destiny Take Deep Root in Neighbouring Countries‖ (speech, Conference on the Diplomatic Work with Neighbouring Countries, Beijing, October 23, 2015) Yan Xuetong and Qi Haixia, ―Football Game Rather Than Boxing Match: China–US Intensifying Rivalry Does Not Amount to Cold War,‖ Chinese Journal of International Politics 5, no. 2 (Summer 2012): 106. C. Raja Mohan, ―Foreign Policy After 1990: Transformation Through Incremental Adaption,‖ in The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy, eds. C. Raja Mohan and Srinath Raghavan (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2015), 105–13. At the Asian Relations Conference in 1947, Nehru referred to China as ―that great country to which Asia owes so much and from which so much is expected.‖ See Ramchandra Guha, ―Jawaharlal Nehru & China: A Study in Failure,‖ Harvard-Yenching Institute, Working Papers Series, March 2011. Shivshankar Menon, ―Some Thoughts of India, China and Asia-Pacific Security,‖ in China Report 53, no. 2(2017): 188–213; Shyam Saran, ―China in the Twenty First Century World Affairs,‖ in Journal of International Issues 18, no. 2 (Summer 2014): 156–68; and Harsh Pant, ―The India-US-China Triangle from New Delhi: Overcoming the ‗Hesitations of History,‖ India Review 18, no. 4 (2019): 386–406. Amit Bansal, ‗Opinion: China‘s Water Bomb Strategy: Should India Worry?‘, WION, 27 December 2017 available at http://www.wionews. Com/south-asia/opinion-chinas-water-bomb-strategy-should-india-worry, access ed on 30 December 2017

BA, MA (Political Science), NET Qualified in Political Science