

The Geopolitical Dimensions of Halayeb issue according to the Egyptian Political Perspective

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Abstract - Egypt is considered one of the most important countries with a large area neighboring Sudan, and because of its area, it neighbors Sudan from the north with a border line whose length is (1273 km) and constitutes (16.5%) of the total length of Sudan's borders with neighboring countries. Sudan has known its current borders since 1899 under the dual rule of Sudan (Anglo-Egyptian), which drew and worked with these borders until its exit upon Sudan's independence in 1956, which stipulated maintaining the agreements that it had previously approved, especially regarding the borders. However, despite this, the Halayeb problem erupted as a difficult crisis between Egypt and Sudan that waded destroying the relationship in the region by escalating the crisis to undesirable consequences. This crisis believes that both Sudan and Egypt have not been able to represent an Arab Islamic hope and the Egyptian influence in Sudan is a required contribution on the part of the Sudanese themselves.

Keywords - Halaib, Shalateen, Egypt, Sudan, crisis

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INTRODUCTION

Egypt's relationship with Sudan is a deep, strong historical relationship, and Sudan has a very important situation for Egypt by virtue of its borders, geography, water supply (the Nile), history, and other common interests of all kinds. The Egyptian influence on it was based on many strategies, the most prominent of which are:

1. Egypt is an African country, and Sudan is its entrance to the heart of the African continent.
2. Egypt's relationship with Sudan is an eternal relationship that goes back to before the Pharaonic era.
3. There is a great expansion and overlap of Sudanese tribes in Egypt, as well as Egyptian tribes in Sudan along the Nile River (Nubian tribes) and on the coast of the Red Sea (Beja tribes). Through the Arbaeen Trail (DarbEl-Arbaeen or Forty Days Road), Sudanese products and camels came to Egypt, and the tribes moved from Egypt to Sudan individually and in groups.
4. The Nile River is the source of life and development for the two countries. It has linked their interests strongly and closely, as Egypt had a large and important impact on most of the irrigation projects that were implemented in Sudan.

5. The Arab-African region, especially Egypt, Sudan, and the Arabian coast on the Mediterranean and Red Seas, is considered a target and is the focus of attention of the major powers and global strategies to separate the Arab side (North Saharan Africa) from the African side (Sub-Saharan Africa), which allows the intervention of external powers and opens ways for them to control the economy and resources of the region [2].

The Halayeb region enjoys strategic importance to the Egyptian and Sudanese sides, as Egypt considers it an important strategic depth because it makes its southern borders on the Red Sea coast exposed and vulnerable, which threatens its national security. While Sudan considers the region as an important factor in preserving Sudan's unity and political stability, due to the region's political and geographical extension on the Red Sea coast, in addition to its commercial and economic importance to both countries.

States are more likely to use integration as a means of accomplishing their goals and furthering their interests. Trends towards cooperation and integration have come to define the conduct of participants on the international scene in the modern world. After World War II, unions and leagues were more formally established in an attempt to foster integration and collaboration. In this context, the establishment of the Arab League, which coincided

with the conclusion of World War II, may be evaluated. The Arab League's founders aimed to provide a foundation upon which they could more successfully advance their goals. The present research begins with a historical description of the Arab League's establishment before using neorealism theory to examine the organization's integration and divergence. It is suggested, in a sense, that rather than an integration-oriented attitude, actors' behaviour in the Arab League is rooted in a very different inclination, which makes sense from a Neorealist perspective. Stated differently, the goal of this essay is to elucidate the factors that contribute to the Arab League's current state of divergence and the lack of such integration. Neorealist theory has been used to analyse current trends and approaches within the Arab League.

The agony of historical fragmentation has only partly been felt by the Egyptian land. The boundaries of the nation have not altered much throughout time. Egypt has been mostly contained inside these limits from the Pharaonic dynasty forward. Egypt still has one area, and its name has never changed. It has existed on its own as a province at times, and as a sovereign state at other times. It is one of those locations where geography and history have constantly coexisted and joined forces, appropriating the history of the geographical region.

With the rise of Arab nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s, represented by "Nasserism," Egypt became a dominant force in the Arab world. Egypt was progressively removed from this position and now only serves as the Arab League's headquarters and general secretary in a symbolic capacity after the loss of the Arab forces in the War of 1967 and the late 1970s normalisation with Israel. Due to the differences within the Arab world that make it more vulnerable to geopolitical fragmentation as a result of shifts in the global order and the rise of new Arab powers in the Maghreb and the Gulf, Egypt does not appear to have been able to maintain the means of influence that it formerly held over the Arab world.

However, Egypt has a number of geopolitical advantages that, when used wisely, may be quite beneficial:

Egypt, along with Jordan, serves as the only official entry point for discussions between Israelis and Palestinians, making it a crucial conduit for any resolution to this dormant dispute. Competition from other nations in the area, such as Turkey and Qatar, is present as Egypt attempts to hold onto its authority over the Palestinian problem. During the most recent Israeli attack on the Gaza Strip, this problem was evident.

Egypt's relations with Hamas, which President Sisi accuses of backing the Muslim Brotherhood and destabilising the Sinai, were not ideal. Turkey and Qatar took advantage of the situation to force Egypt out of the peace negotiations by claiming that it was

siding with Israel against Hamas. After a protracted diplomatic effort that ultimately resulted in a cease-fire, Egypt was and is still the Arab world's greatest demographic power. The population of any other nation in the area is less than half that of Egypt.

A considerable portion of Egyptians have emigrated to other countries. Three million people live between the Gulf and North America, as represented by them. However, a lot of academics are hesitant to discuss the Egyptian diaspora. They acknowledge that although this population satisfies some requirements for the formation of a diaspora (distorsion, preservation of strong ties to the home country, and savings remittances), it does not satisfy other requirements like awareness of group unity, collective memory (strongly tied to time and space), and a strong organisational system.

Egypt has maintained its military dominance in the area. It continues to be the leading army in the Arab world, and its contribution to all cooperative defence initiatives in this region cannot be disregarded. With 438,000 soldiers, 4624 tanks, 370 combat aircraft, four submarines, eight frigates, and an average yearly budget of USD 5,450 million, the Egyptian army is still sought after for all Arab defence initiatives. The plans for united Arab troops, the Muslim coalition forces, and the coalition Saudi Arabia formed to intervene in Yemen all demonstrate the significance that the countries behind these initiatives place on Egypt's military might.

LITERATURE REVIEW

A great deal of study has been done on the topic of our article. Considerable study has been done. Robert MacDonald's 1965 book *The League of Arab States* is among the most significant. The author of this book examines the treaties among member nations, such as those pertaining to defense and economic cooperation, with an emphasis on the dynamics of regional organization and the effects of the League of Arab States [15].

The Arab League as a Regional Arrangement, written by Majid Khadduri (2017), is another important piece on this topic. It examines the aspirations of Arab nations to unite and how the movement towards that goal became known as Pan-Arabism. Furthermore, as the author notes in [16], the movement's origins may be traced back to the period when the Ottoman Empire's many ethnic groups rebelled against Turkish rule and aspired to eventually secede from Ottoman rule.

The authors of the article *The efforts of the Arab League Education, Culture, and Scientific Organization (ALECSO) in the field of renewable energy*, written by Alnaser et al. (1995), present and discuss the initiatives taken to advance this technology in the Arab world through events and programmes sponsored by the Arab League

Education [17], Culture, and Scientific Organization. Additionally, the outcomes of the meetings of Arab ministers, the establishment of the permanent Arab Committee for Renewable Energy, the publications produced by ALECSO in the area of renewable energy, and the collaboration between Arabs and Arabs worldwide are emphasised [18].

The League of Arab States Approach towards Arab Spring: Paradoxical and Dualism, by Majid Bozorgmehri and Tohid Sahraei (1394 [2015 A.D.]), is the last significant essay regarding the Arab League. The primary contention of the authors in this article is that the member states of the Arab League have distinct and contradictory policies regarding the political and security issues within the union, particularly the Arab spring. These policies are based on varying national interests [19], economic levels, and member state approaches.

The literature mentioned above covers a wide range of topics related to the Arab League, with the exception of the causes and reasons for the league's inability to integrate. It mostly concentrates on the historical, political, and security dimensions of this union. The primary goal of this work is explained by this gap in the body of research [20]. The primary causes of this divergence the member states' primary objectives of survival, security, and relative gains will be covered in this study instead of convergent cooperative behaviors that support integration. As a result, we note that the Arab League still lacks integration six decades after its founding [21].

METHODOLOGY

First: geographical location factor

The Halayeb region is a coastal region on the Red Sea, located on the Sudanese coastal border in the northeastern part of it, in the form of a triangle, one side of which is the Red Sea coast from the south of Halayeb to (BirShalatin), with a length of 200 km, and the second side from (well ofShalatin) to the southwest of (Umm al-Tuyur mountain) then a circle of latitude 22° north with a length of 200 km, and the base of the triangle is completed by a circle of latitude 22° north with a length of 300 km, Map No. (1). In general, the Sudanese coastal border represents a narrow strip ranging in width from (20-40 km), and is confined between the Red Sea hills to the east and the Red Sea hills to the west. The Halayeb Triangle has an excellent trading location that overlooks the Red Sea, and constitutes a good area for monitoring and preventing any maritime penetration or any overland across the Red Sea to Sudan and Egypt.

The total area of the Halayeb Triangle is 18,500 thousand km², as the region, in addition to its strategic location on the Red Sea, it's very rich in mineral ores such as manganese, phosphate, iron and gold, in addition to the oil that was recently discovered [5].



Figure 1: Location of the Halayeb and Shalateen triangle.

Second: Ethnic factor

The Halayeb Triangle area is inhabited by three tribes, including two large tribes: the Basharia and the Ababda. The third tribe is the Rashayda tribe. The Bsharia tribe is said to have its origins dating back to the Pharaohs, because there are many Pharaonic words spread in the dialect they speak. As for the Ababda, it is said that their origins extend to Al-Zubayr bin Al-Awwam, who came from the Arabian Peninsula, and as for the Rashaida tribe, it is said that they are nomadic Bedouins. Both the Ababda and the Rashaida speak eloquent Arabic, which includes some words from the language of the Bisharia tribe, as the people of the Bisharia tribe speak a special dialect that contains many Pharaonic words [14].

The borders between Egypt and Sudan were demarcated in 1899 in accordance with the (Anglo-Egyptian) bilateral rule agreement, which determined the northern border of Sudan with a circle of latitude (22) north. The border line extends in a straight line starting from the Red Sea coast towards Al-Uwaynat in the west at the Sudanese border triangle. - The Egyptian-Libyan, who worked to divide the Nubian tribes between Egypt and Sudan (the Danagla, Mahs and Sukkot) inside Sudan and (Al-Fadja and Al-Kunuz) inside Egypt, as well as the Beja tribes (Bishariyya and Ababda), which were also split between the two countries. The border line extends in a straight line starting from the Red Sea coast towards Al-Uwaynat to the west at the Sudanese-Egyptian-Libyan border triangle, which divided the Nubian tribes between Egypt and Sudan (the Danakla, the Mahs, and the Sukkot) inside Sudan, and (the Fedja and Al-Kunoz) inside Egypt, in addition to the Beja tribes (Al-Basharia and Ababda) which was also divided between the two countries.

This tribal overlap between the borders of the two countries prompted Sudan to demand that it make some amendments to the border line between Egypt and Sudan to reunite the tribes that live on both sides of the border and subject them to a single administrative and political system. The real goal of this demand is to subjugate the region known as (Halayeb) or Triangle (Jabal Alia) for Sudanese

political administration [10]. Accordingly, we find that the problem has a tribal basis because it constitutes one of the main reasons and motives for the Sudanese side to demand or raise the problem from time to time. What is striking is that raising this problem is directly linked to the political positions between the two countries.

Third: Economic factor

Halayeb and Shalateen are areas rich in wealth and natural resources, some medicinal plants, livestock and fish resources, as well as mineral resources, in addition to the fertile soil that helps in the establishment of all agricultural activities that depend on rainwater and groundwater. The Halayeb Triangle also includes natural marine resources represented by coral reefs and seaweeds a huge diversity of rare marine organisms, in addition to Mount Elba, which contains many mineral and natural resources of great environmental and economic value [13].

The historical border conflict between Egypt and Sudan

Since time immemorial, history has told us that Egypt and Sudan have always been the subject of the ambitions of every tyrannical colonizer, and that colonialism in different eras and nationalities, as soon as it lands in Egypt, heads towards Sudan, which confirms that the fate of Sudan and Egypt has always been the same since ancient times and even in our modern history till today. Therefore, the colonial attack on the Nile Valley, the basis of which is to create strife between Sudan and Egypt, is nothing but an extension of the old colonial ambitions that always sought to subjugate Egypt first and Sudan second, seeking in order to prevent cases of unification between the two parts of the valley so that it does not become a force in front of everyone who is ambitious to achieve his goals and ambitions. In the Nile Valley, not only between Egypt and Sudan, but in all Arab countries after these countries began to rise up and fight for their own people. The main problem between the two countries was the ideological dispute between them, and this dispute resulted in multiple problems, dealing with the problem of the border dispute between the two countries over the Halayeb Triangle, as it constitutes an important precedence at the level of disputes between both of Egypt and Sudan [11].

When Britain was in control of the two Arab countries, Egypt and Sudan, the Halayeb crisis appeared on the scene for a period and then calmed down for another period. The latest episodes of tension between the two countries came to the surface despite the presence of more than one border overlap between Egypt and Sudan but there is no problem arose between the two countries except the area of the Halayeb region, this importance of the region made it a subject of dispute between Egypt and Sudan. Since 1902, Halayeb has become part of Sudan, when Cairo issued a decision in October 1902 declaring the return of Halayeb to

Sudan, after its conviction that the bilateral rule agreement of 1899, which guaranteed that the Halayeb region belongs to Cairo.

After Sudan's independence from Egypt, the conflict over the Halayeb region began in 1958, when Egypt, during the rule of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, demanded from Sudan its right to recover the Halayeb Triangle by an Egyptian memorandum delivered to the Sudanese government in January 1958 in which it objected to the new election law that Sudan had issued on February 27, 1958 AD. The memorandum indicated that the law violated the 1899 agreement regarding the common borders, as it included the area north of the city of Wadi Halfa and the area surrounding Halayeb and Shalatin on the coast of the Red Sea within the Sudanese electoral districts. Egypt then demanded its right to these areas, which Sudan administers north of the 22 degree latitude, and it was this is the first time that a dispute was declared over the border between the two countries. The dispute over the region has continued since that time, as whenever relations between the two countries deteriorate and become more severe, the Halayeb problem is raised [8].

Halayeb continued under the rule and Sudanese authorities until 1995 AD, when Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was subjected to a failed assassination attempt in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, to attend the African Summit Conference. Egypt accused the Sudanese government of orchestrating the assassination attempt, and as a result, President Hosni Mubarak ordered the Egyptian army to control the entire Halayeb Triangle, so it moved. The Egyptian army besieged and expelled the Sudanese forces present in the region and closed the Sudanese-Egyptian centers in Shalatin. This was actually achieved in the year 2000 AD, when Sudan withdrew its forces from Halayeb, and the Egyptian forces imposed their control over this region since then. From that time, the region became under the Egyptian sovereignty.

The crisis was last renewed between the two countries in 2002, when the Sudanese president told the Qatari newspaper Al-Watan in August 2002 that "the disputed Halayeb region with Egypt is Sudanese territory. Al-Bashir stressed that Khartoum will not abandon the region" [3].

This escalation came in light of the recent renewed disputes between the two countries due to Egypt's rejection of the agreement that the president Al-Bashir signed with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement on 7/20/2002, which was known as the Machakopin Agreement*. The former Egyptian Assistant Foreign Minister (Mohamed Wafa Hegazy) described the agreement as leading to the separation of South Sudan and threatening the sources of the Nile. He added, "What the Sudanese

president is doing opens the door to the fragmentation of the Arab world” [3].

After the revolution of January 25, 2011 in Egypt, Sudan took advantage of the unstable political and security situation in its neighbor Egypt to propose three scenarios to resolve the Halayeb border issue, the first of which is to make Halayeb an Commonarea between the two countries, provided that the Egyptian government recognizes it as Sudanese territory and its administration is shared between the two parties through the Egyptian-Sudanese police and the withdrawal of the army from it. The second scenario is Sudan’s resort to international arbitration in Hague (The Permanent Court of Arbitration). The third scenario is the option of a referendum for the residents of this region to choose voluntarily to join either Egypt or Sudan [1].

As for Egypt, it went through many circumstances and changes after the revolution; it suffered from local and external pressure towards preserving the sovereignty of Egyptian lands. The Egyptians also consider this border triangle to be purely Egyptian territory. The crisis renewed again in 2013 when Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir visited Egypt to strengthen relations between the two countries but the visit did not bear fruit, as the assistant to Sudanese President Al-Bashir announced that Morsi had promised Sudan to give them Halayeb and Shalateen because it belongs to them in view of the 1902 agreement which led to arousing Egyptian public opinion and its rejection of this decision or statement, which led to a denial. This is why he allegedly promised to give up these two Egyptian regions to calm Egyptian public opinion [9].

In 2014, presidential elections were held in Egypt, the Egyptian government insisted on having electoral committees in Halayeb and Shalatin, which caused a worsening of the situation within the Sudanese parliament, actually many of them accused the Sudanese authority of being lenient towards the Egyptian government which led to a worsening of the political situation between the two countries as a result of the weakness of the diplomatic solution. Sudan demanded its right to Halayeb and Shalateen, so the heated debate between the officials of the two countries was renewed again in early 2015.

After the Minister of State in the Presidency of the Republic (Al-Rashid Haroun) announced that the Halayeb region is 100 percent Sudanese and it is possible to engage in dialogue and understanding with Egypt regarding this matter, this has sparked resentment the Egyptian side through its Foreign Ministry spokesman, Ambassador (Badr Abdel-Aty), in a media statement. On January 6, 2015, he stated, “Halayeb and Shalatin are purely Egyptian land and the Egyptian state exercises Egyptian sovereignty over” He stressed that Cairo would not accept Sudan’s proposed solutions so as a result of that Sudan submitted an official complaint to the Security Council due to Egypt’s holding of parliamentary elections in Halayeb and Shalateen in 2015.

In 2016, Egypt rejected a request from Sudan to begin negotiations to determine the right to sovereignty over Halayeb and Shalateen, or to resort to lawsuits International Arbitration⁽¹⁾. This was done through a visit by the Sudanese Foreign Minister, where he merely stated that the two countries agreed to solve the Halayeb problem through negotiations, noting that negotiations between the two countries have been conducted dozens of times since 1958, but it did not make a progress in this regard, which means that the aforementioned statement is worthless. Egypt continued to refuse any resort to solve the conflict in legal means, knowing that all political and diplomatic methods were preferred in reaching this conflict. In addition to that, the Sudanese Minister of Defense visited Egypt in 2017 and did not address the statements or statements that were issued after that [12].

In 2019, the Egyptian government announced the launch of an international auction for searching and exploration oil and gas in the Halayeb Triangle. On March 21, 2019, the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the Egyptian ambassador in Khartoum warning companies working in the field of oil and gas exploration against submitting any offers related to the Halayeb region.

The Halayeb problem and its geopolitical dimensions according to the Egyptian political perspective

Preserving the unity of Sudan is preserving the entity of Egypt itself and the strategic dimension in particular. The differences and changes have prevented the establishment of relations between the two countries at the level of strategic relations, despite of availability of all the elements for success. The elements and relations that bind them are qualifying them to establish treaties and strategic alliances. The two countries were linked by distinct historical relations in fact they were united for a long period of their common history, whether in the days of the Pharaohs or in the Middle Ages, through Muhammad Ali and his allies even during the Egyptian dual rule, the two countries remained united until 1956 AD. Therefore, bilateral relations cannot be normal, due to the historical heritage, geographical reality, and cultural and human interaction. Thus we believe that the relationship must be built on a national basis, regardless of the nature of the ruling regimes. In addition, taking into account the geopolitical and strategic dimensions of that relationship as long as Nile is the gift of Egypt [7], the relationship with Sudan must be characterized by a kind of exchange and common interests in order for Egypt to ensure the flow of the Nile waters to it by supporting the unity of Sudan. In return, Sudan must take into account its relationship with its strong Arab depth compared to other neighboring countries to confront the challenges imposed on it by neighboring African countries and mitigate their impact due to their abundance

constituted one of the elements of weakness in the structure of the Sudanese state.

The Egyptian-Sudanese position on the crisis

First: The Egyptian position towards the crisis:

The Egyptian position was based on many reasons, the most prominent of which were the following:

- 1- Administrative amendments to the border with Sudan were made with the aim of facilitating the need for the tribes living on both sides of the border line. Thus, they are administrative decisions issued in response to the desires of local officials in the disputed areas. Egypt did not conclude any international agreements between it and Sudan or Britain (during the dual rule of Sudan); to give these amendments an international character.
- 2- Based on an agreement between Sudan and the Egyptian Survey Authority in 1909, the two parties drew a map of the region in which the political borders were defined according to the 22nd parallel north, along with another line that later became called the administrative border in light of the administrative amendments.
- 3- Saying that Egypt has ceded its sovereignty in the disputed areas requires convincing evidence because it was subject to the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire at the time the amendments were made and it could not cede, sell, or mortgage any part of its lands except with the approval of the Sublime Porte, which did not happen, and according to international law, cession is The territory shall not be valid and legally binding unless the parties concerned expressly agree to this.
- 4- Sudan did not exercise specific powers except in areas north of the 22nd parallel. These powers were required by practical necessities to regulate the affairs of the population on both sides of the border, and these powers did not reach the level at which they deserved to acquire the status of acts of sovereignty.
- 5- The most important manifestations and causes of the Egyptian presence in the Halayeb and Shalateen triangle is that there is an Egyptian company (the Egyptian Elba Company) in the field of mineral extraction in this region. This company was established in 1954 and continued its work until merging with the Egyptian "Al-Nasr Phosphate Company" in the year 1963. Egyptian mining activity in the region dates back to 1915, when between 1915 and 1918 licenses were issued for exploration in the region to exploit mineral wealth. Ten licenses were also rejected, including seven licenses for the Sudanese "East Sudan" company. Cairo took into account that everything It occurs

north of latitude 22 north, in Egyptian territory, and Sudan was only notified of the licenses issued.

Second: The Sudanese position towards the crisis:

Sudan believes that the disputed areas north of the 22nd parallel have become an integral part of Sudan, and that they are no longer Egyptian lands, but purely Sudanese lands, based on some arguments:

- 1- Sudan, during the period of bilateral administration (Egypt and Britain), has been administering these areas since the administrative amendments were made to the border line that was established based on the 1899 agreement. Through possession of these areas it has undertaken all acts of sovereignty over them, and this is decisive evidence of the transfer of sovereignty to it.
- 2- Assuming that the amendments made to the border line were of a purely administrative nature, Egypt's acceptance of Sudan's continued administration of these areas and not objecting on it throughout the period between 1899 and 1958 indicates Egypt's abdication and abandonment of its sovereign rights. In these areas, the regions are also considered as support for Sudan in clinging to the aforementioned regions based on the idea of statute of limitations based on the principle of actual and uninterrupted possession of Sudan and the absence of opposition to it.
- 3- When Egypt admitted Sudan as an independent, sovereign country in 1956, it did not indicate any reservations regarding the borders in its recognition which means that it believed that it did not have any demands in these areas or it had given up these demands. Likewise, Egypt did not object to the memorandum that Sudan sent to it in January 1956, in which the Sudanese side explicitly indicated that it reserved with his own position regarding all agreements concluded on his behalf by the two bilateral administration states (Egypt and Britain).
- 4- Sudan adheres to maintaining its inherited borders since the colonial era. Sudan inherited its current borders from the bilateral administration also Sudan believes that the principle of the sanctity of inherited borders was affirmed by the Organization of African Unity (now the African Union) in its charter that was explicitly approved by the Conference of African Heads of State and Government at its first meeting in Cairo in July 1964, Egypt did not object to that, as did Somalia and Morocco at that time.

Motives for the conflict over the Halayeb triangle:

Egyptian and Sudanese relations shared very important historical and geographical dimensions so it was expected that many problems would take a place. Both countries inherited borders that were drawn by colonial powers and without the national will of the state and the people. It was not compatible with ethnic formations, the problem of neighborhood and borders became one of the most prominent geopolitical challenges that threatening Egyptian-Sudanese relations. There are different types of motivations surrounding the Halayeb Triangle, which are political, economic and military.

First: Political motives

- 1- Egypt tried to hold a presidential referendum in the Halayeb region in 1958 during the period of union with Syria, as it pushed election committees with the armed forces inside the region, which was completely under Sudanese control, with the intention of sparking a crisis [6].
- 2- The policy of de-escalation has been the Egyptian approach under successive governments towards Sudan due to Sudan's preoccupation with the issue of South Sudan. Egypt believed that there was no need to provoke more crises [4], but the crisis erupted again in 2002 because Egypt feared any threat to the unity of Sudan that would affect Egypt and threaten the sources of the Nile [3].

Second: Economic motives

- 1- Halayeb Triangle contains numerous minerals and different types of ore, so Egypt moved to seize the resources of this triangle, as it believes that Sudan does not have the right to explore in a disputed area, in fact Sudan has the full right to explore for minerals, whether oil or else.
- 2- Halayeb Triangle is considered as a source of many Sudanese food commodities especially camels (meat) that exported to Egypt through trading or smuggling.

Third: Military motives

- 1- Despite the small size of the Halayeb Triangle, it is considered the beginning of the Egyptian strategic depth towards the south, especially if a future conflict breaks out with the Zionist entity on the Red Sea. The seizure of Halayeb threatens Sudan's strategic facilities in the eastern part of the country.
- 2- It seems Moving the Egyptian forces inside the Halayeb Triangle were taken to escalate the crisis. All of these motives are aimed at escalating a war between the Arab brothers, in implementation of the hostile American plans and to weaken the energies of Sudan and Egypt [11].

Sudan has been known with its current borders since 1899 under the Anglo-Egyptian bilateral rule, which

drew these borders and worked on them until its departure upon Sudan's independence in 1956 where it noted and stipulated the preservation of the agreements that it had previously approved, especially regarding the borders. However, despite this, Halayeb problem is a difficult crisis between Egypt and Sudan aims to destroy a relationship in the region by escalating the crisis. Despite this crisis, it is believed that Sudan and Egypt still represent Arab and Islamic hope, as they are the most important arena of political, military and economic integration, which will bring good to the entire nation and make it a great power in the region.

CONCLUSIONS

- 1- The geographical location of the Halayeb and Shalatin region on the Red Sea, as well as the mineral resources it contains, caused border problems between Egypt and Sudan.
- 2- The role of British colonialism in demarcating the borders deepened the dispute between Egypt and Sudan.
- 3- The Halayeb and Shalatin region has important natural and diverse resources, such as agricultural and livestock wealth, and enormous mineral wealth, such as iron, uranium, and copper. Studies and research indicate that the region's land contains the best oil-rich region in the world in terms of high quality which explains to us the intense competition of colonial countries to plunder this wealth.
- 4- Ethnic and religious composition is one of the very sensitive topics, as external or internal political forces raise and deepen it among different nationalities and population groups to influence the government and weaken its political position.
- 5- Sudan has continued to annually renew its complaints and submit them to the United Nations Security Council, asserting that the Halayeb Triangle is Sudanese territory, and it will not relinquish an inch of it. Egypt, on the other hand, has refrained from directly responding to Sudan's statements, indicating its ongoing refusal to negotiate on this matter.
- 6- Sudan has continued renewing its complaint annually and submit it to the United Nations Security Council, asserting that the Halayeb Triangle is Sudanese territory and would not give up a single inch of it. As for Egypt, it contented itself with not paying attention to the Sudanese statements, as evidenced by the fact that it was and still refusing to negotiate in this regard.

The Egyptian and Sudanese relations carried an important historical and geographical dimensions, it was natural for this relationship to have some problems. Both countries inherited borders drawn by

colonial powers without the national will of the state and the people, they were inconsistent with the ethnic formations it turns to the most prominent geopolitical challenges that threaten Egyptian-Sudanese relations. The researcher believes that these geopolitical challenges have prevented the establishment of relations between the two countries especially strategic relations, despite of the availability of all the elements for the success of such a relations. In fact the elements and relations that bind them are qualified to establish strategic treaties and alliances. The relations with Sudan must be characterized by a kind of exchange and common interests in order to Egypt guarantee the Nile waters flowing to it. In return, Sudan must take into account its relations with its strong Arab depth compared to the neighboring countries facing the challenges imposed on it by neighboring African countries and mitigate their burden due to their abundance, which constituted one of the elements of weakness in the structure of the Sudanese state.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author would like to thank Mustansiriyah University, Mustansiriyah University (www.uomustansiriyah.edu.iq) Baghdad – Iraq for its support in the present work.

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