



A Study on Corporate Criminal Liability: Comparative Approach

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Abstract: Corporate criminal liability has become a pivotal subject in the realm of legal studies and governance due to the increasing complexity of corporate operations and the globalized nature of business. This article examines the evolution, theoretical underpinnings, and enforcement mechanisms of corporate criminal liability from a comparative perspective. The article elucidates the many methods of holding businesses liable for illegal actions by examining legal frameworks across nations, including civil law and common law systems. It also explores challenges related to mens rea, vicarious liability, and the role of compliance programs. Through a comparative lens, the article highlights emerging trends, such as corporate social responsibility (CSR) as a preventive measure and the impact of international conventions. The study concludes by recommending a harmonized approach to corporate criminal liability to enhance accountability and deterrence while fostering ethical corporate behavior globally.

Keywords: Corporate criminal liability, Comparative approach

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INTRODUCTION

Corporations, as key economic entities, wield significant influence over markets and societies. With this influence comes the potential for misuse, including engagement in criminal activities such as fraud, environmental violations, and corruption. Corporate criminal liability aims to address such misconduct by holding corporations accountable for their actions. However, the legal principles and mechanisms governing corporate liability vary significantly across jurisdictions, creating a complex and often inconsistent global framework.

Corporate criminal liability rests on the premise that corporations, as legal entities, can commit crimes and be subjected to penalties. Two primary theories underpin this concept:

Vicarious Liability: Rooted in common law traditions, this theory attributes the actions of employees or agents to the corporation, provided the acts occurred within the scope of employment and intended to benefit the corporation.

Identification Doctrine: This theory, which is most often used in countries like the United Kingdom, states that a company's activities are seen to be the same as those of its major executives ("directing mind").

Civil law systems, such as those in Germany and France, often approach corporate liability differently, emphasizing administrative sanctions over criminal penalties. These systems focus on the corporation's

failure to prevent crimes through adequate supervision or compliance measures.

VIEWS ON THE APPROACHES TO CRIMINAL LIABILITY AMONG COMPANIES

A business could face criminal fines if its workers do unlawful conduct. Businesses should be held responsible for their acts and pushed to be more responsible (i.e., exposed to greater scrutiny) by having their own personnel participate in criminal activity, according to the basic assumption of this upward spiral. The problem of corporate crime has prompted the establishment of legal frameworks with the potential to prohibit and punish corporate misconduct. To combat corporate wrongdoing, many statutes have been enacted, including criminal, administrative, and civil ones. Corporations may be held accountable by civil and administrative laws in any jurisdiction. The question of whether corporations should face criminal charges is, however, highly debated. Many nations have acknowledged and made use of the concept of criminal liability, but they have done so within quite varied conceptual frameworks. Various criminal consequences, such as fines, corporate probation, order of adverse publicity, etc., are intended to be used under the American model to penalise firms when their workers commit crimes while working on behalf of the corporation¹

If they want to do their jobs well, corporate representatives in the French and English models need to be very senior or play a key part in making decisions for the firm. In India, where the common law tradition has its roots in the English common law, a corporation might face legal consequences when an official commits a crime on behalf of the business.²

THEORISING CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY DIFFERENTLY IN DIFFERENT NATIONS

The question of whether mens rea is required to hold companies accountable for crimes has long been a topic of controversy among judges, lawmakers, and the general public. Corporate criminal liability was only established via the expansion and development of common law concepts in the United States, Canada, and England. Initially applied to crimes involving grave responsibility in the mid-nineteenth century, this was later expanded to include offences with complete mens rea. At this stage, three major theories had emerged for establishing guilt: India's hybrid method, the United States' vicarious responsibility, Australia's corporate culture or holistic approach, and Canada and England's identification theory for mens rea violations. Despite that,

England

Corporations were more powerful and influential in society and the economy in the 1600s and 1750s. The necessity to regulate corporate wrongdoing became increasingly apparent as the body of evidence mounted. The 1840s marked the beginning of corporate criminal responsibility for strict liability breaches, when it was first recognized by English courts³. Consecrated cleric Bowen contended that the presentation of the idea of corporate criminal risk into English regulation was the best method for applying tension on firms. Courts have used the concept of vicarious liability from wrongdoing regulation to hold organisations criminally liable in subsequent cases when ordinary individuals may also be found vicariously responsible.

A precedent for the "adjust prior" theory was set by Master Denning in the case of H.L. Bolton (Engerring) Co., Ltd. v. T.J. Graham and Children Ltd.⁴ The organization may by and by be considered capable by the governing body, as indicated by His Lordship, regardless of whether they knew nothing about the specific wrongdoings carried out and thusly the "coordinating brain" of the individual whose activities and goals were allocated to the firm. Their Lordship ought to be cited,⁵

United States of America

In spite of at first emulating the English model, the US sped up its advancement to a great extent because of the inescapability of enterprises in American culture. As opposed to their English partners, American courts had the option to hold organizations criminally at risk in a far more limited measure of time. In an early endeavor to expose the idea of corporate criminal obligation, the American general set of laws used same rationale. The courts initially forced criminal corporate for public government assistance or administrative offenses that didn't require evidence of mens rea disturbance, unfortunate behavior, non-feasance, or vicarious responsibility. Around the beginning of the 20th 100 years, and going on into the contemporary period, the idea of corporate criminal risk acquired boundless acknowledgment in American culture.⁶

Canada

With regards with organization criminal culpability, Canada has complied to the custom-based regulation thought of "recognizable proof" laid out on account of Tesco. On account of R v. Canadian Dig and Dock Co., the High Court of Canada,⁷ As indicated by the agreement, the distinguishing proof hypothesis demonstrates that the association's directing idea is indivisible from the actual organization. The court's equity, Estey J., mentioned the objective fact,

India

Both the development of English law and its influence on Indian law with respect to corporate criminal responsibility are striking. "Corporations" used to be seen as a means to evade accountability for misconduct in the eyes of the law. But the law as it stands now makes it quite apparent that corporations may face charges for intentional wrongdoing.

The Indian legal system has not only required the vicarious hypothesis in addition to the regulation of the "ID" hypothesis. In contrast to their English and American counterparts, the Indian legal executive took a chill pill when it came to the organization's potential criminal danger.

Put simply, the American theory of vicarious risk has far-reaching implications, implicating every expert or employee of a company in some way with corporate criminal liability. Legislation in India, Canada, and the United Kingdom is based on the recognisable proof theory, which has a very narrow scope: only the actions of the highest-ranking individual in charge of an organisation may be held criminally liable.

WHO MAY BE HELD CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR CORPORATE ACTIONS?

Our first order of business in discussing the applicability of corporate criminal responsibility is to identify

the various entities that could be subject to it. This is one area where different legal systems disagree. Distinct from their owners, managers, and the general public, corporations have their own distinct "ethos" that differentiates them from other businesses and organisations. One may deduce a company's ethos from its management philosophy, organizational structure, objectives, regulations, attempts to maintain legal conformity, and disciplinary actions against employees.⁸ Organizations reserve the option to have individual perspectives and moral decisions, as indicated by a US High Court administering, and the public authority can't blue pencil them except if there is an outrageous need. What's more, partnerships are perceived as aloof subjects in criminal regulation; a wronged association might be sued. Perceiving the presence of corporate damage yet dismissing it when it abuses individual privileges is impossible to miss, while possibly not totally crazy.

If two corporations in the United States combine, the former will remain in existence as a component of the latter and will be held liable for any wrongdoings committed by the former. Because corporations exist to "pay, satisfy, and discharge any existing debts and obligations," the courts have ruled that companies in dissolution might be criminally accountable. The firm will continue to operate in India until the liquidation procedures are completed. The firm is liable for any criminal offences perpetrated by its officers while the business is under liquidation. In a merger or acquisition, the newly formed company takes on the debts and obligations of the dissolved ones.⁹

WHAT ARE THE CRIMES THAT CAN BE IMPUTED TO CORPORATIONS?

There are three methods for sorting out whether organizations might be sued. Under the primary framework, known as broad obligation or whole risk, partnerships are criminally able and the culpability of juristic people is similar to that of individuals. For every offense, officials under the subsequent framework should indicate whether partnerships might have to deal with criminal penalties. The third framework is a recording of the relative multitude of wrongdoings that aggregate elements are equipped for being considered liable for.

Australia, the Unified Realm, the Netherlands, and Canada have all embraced the principal framework. It appears to be that the Indian general set of laws in like manner embraced the main arrangement of English regulation, as segment 11 of the Indian Correctional Code characterizes 'individual' to incorporate companies for a wide range of offenses expressed in the code. Companies in Britain might be considered responsible for practically any wrongdoing under the sun. The idea of *lex non cogit promotion impossibilia* forces a few constraints, regardless of whether wide obligation is the standard. For offenses that convey the main punishment of prison, juristic individuals are accordingly acquitted of obligation. Comparable thinking holds that lawmakers have explicitly safeguarded organizations from obligation regarding a few violations or those that are intrinsically unimaginable for partnerships to do. Thusly, organizations can't participate in infidelity, assault, prevarication, or plural marriage. In any case, there are journalists who battle that organizations could affect such wrongdoings. Organizations might be considered responsible for homicide in situations when its faculty are careless, as per courts in the two India and Britain.¹⁰

WHEN AND WHICH NATURAL PERSONS CAN CAUSE CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY?

· **France**

Organizations might be considered criminally answerable for the demonstrations executed by its organs and delegates under Article 121-2 of the French Correctional Code. The organization is naturally considered responsible when its organs or delegates have the fundamental mental state and actual represent the wrongdoing. A singular's capacity to do a managerial or other basic obligation as forced by resolution or the sanction of a business makes them an organ. A more extensive meaning of "delegate" than "organ" incorporates different jobs, like interval supervisors, outlets, specialists, and executives. Thus, regardless of whether different individuals or lower-level specialists do anything unlawful for the upside of the business, the company can't be expected criminally to take responsibility. This limitation makes the French framework the most severe model among the nations talked about. Corporate business should be executed by the organs and agents. Since the lead of a wrongdoing requires the presence of both an objective component the benefit and an emotional component mens period the idea of a wrongdoing executed in the interest of the business contrasts as per the idea of the wrongdoing.¹¹

· **England**

At the point when the English overall set of laws imported the possibility of personality from the common law of misdeed, it laid out what is presently known as change prior hypothesis. An adequately senior corporate part, as indicated by this human point of view, capabilities not as a specialist of the organization but rather as the actual enterprise. As per the court's similarity in *Tesco Grocery stores Ltd v. Nattras*, organizations resemble human bodies; the top leaders resemble the neurological frameworks that manage the activities of the organizations. Consequently, there is no requirement for any more proof since the mens rea and actus reus of the business are intrinsically those of the great positioning administration. An issue of regulation decides if an official controls the organizations similarly as the mind controls the human body. The definitive component in this test is the official's capacity to act independently.

· **America**

From common regulation comes the respondent predominant worldview, which the US has embraced. The guidelines controlling vicarious obligation are executed through the idea of respondent prevalent. This implies that when individuals follow up for organizations, their actus reus and mens rea are consequently ascribed to the organizations. In the event that a representative carries out a wrongdoing while at the same time addressing the organization in his authority limit, the business may be considered responsible. Any worker, not simply chiefs or chiefs, may bring criminal accusations against a business under government regulation. Most states in the US observe government regulation and expect organizations to take responsibility for the activities of their laborers. It is additionally expected that the laborers have been working inside the boundaries of their sets of expectations. A representative's liabilities are characterized as those "straightforwardly connected with the exhibition of the kind of obligations the worker has general position to perform" in the work environment. Since laborers give the feeling that they have authority doesn't mean they truly have. It is unessential whether the activity was extra vires, unlawful, against organization strategy, or went against to express directions gave to the specialist.

· **India**

India additionally took on three model arrangement of corporate criminal risk. Under first framework the corporate is obligated on the hypothesis of modify back or recognizable proof for the common wrongdoings, like misrepresentation¹² This is the immediate criminal obligation of partnerships. The High Court of India held that:

“[I]t is true that there are some crimes which, in their nature, cannot be committed by corporations. But there is a large class of offences, of which rebating under the federal statutes is one, wherein the crime consists in purposely doing the things prohibited by statute. In that class of crimes we see no good reason why corporations may not be held responsible for and charged with the knowledge and purposes of their agents acting within their authority conferred upon them. If it were not so, many offences might go unpunished.”

As far as criminal risk, both custom-based regulation and rule offenses, including those including mens rea, might be applied to organizations similarly they would to people. A partnership might be expected criminally to take responsibility assuming a wrongdoing is perpetrated by an individual or gathering responsible for tasks is connected with the organization's business. Under these circumstances, it's critical to decide how much power an organization has over an individual or gathering so it very well may be contended that they are going about as a mouthpiece for the company.¹³

France, Britain, and India stick to the tight vicarious risk model of corporate criminal obligation, though the US follows the wide immediate responsibility model. It appears to be that the more extensive methodology is more fruitful in battling corporate guiltiness. Equity and responsibility for serious types of corporate bad behavior are probably going to be blocked by these models' reluctance to embrace the total liability idea. One apparently innocuous activity joined with one more's will now and again frames violations; therefore corporate offices might be so divided and concentrated: to stay away from responsibility under confined models. Since firms might avoid liability by giving dynamic power to bring down level staff, the need that the violations be carried out by high-positioning authorities or administrators is one more critical obstruction to tending to corporate wrongdoing.

A further disadvantage of the English and Indian framework is that it requires the ID of the individual who did the offense. Recognizing the individual liable for a crime is some of the time hard. These frameworks neglect to fulfill the norms of generally productivity and equity, in spite of their assets in being straightforward, unsurprising, and in accordance with the crucial standards of criminal regulation. Additionally, the English, French, and Indian frameworks aren't as scary since arraigning businesses is difficult. Conflictingly, the American model sets up a wide arrangement of criminal responsibility for companies, which assists with in general equity and beats bad behavior down. There are a few advantages to the American model, for example, the collection hypothesis and the way that any representative might carry organizations to criminal culpability under unambiguous circumstances. The American model additionally addresses every one of the holes that different frameworks have. With regards to keeping away from corporate bad behavior, this strategy is straightforward, unsurprising, and powerful. In the mean time, the probability of organizations being seen as blameworthy for the activities of any of its workers prompts an ascent in case against these substances. This outcomes in huge monetary weights for both the courts and companies, as well as the removal of honest specialists and investors from their work and profit.

SANCTIONS

For quite a while, in doctrinal discussions, the topic of what punishments are proper for corporate wrongdoing has been a wellspring of contention for not considering organizations criminally dependable. At issue from the beginning comprises criminal obligation as a singular offense. Pundits contend that corporate faculty ought to be considered criminally capable if the firm is punished, no matter what their singular contribution in the wrongdoing. The pay of partners would be diminished in this design because of a lawbreaker fine against the organization, or the enterprise would be compelled to diminish the compensation of blameless specialists. Pundits say this would make individuals pay for others' violations, which is the reason they are against it. In any case, the significant contention puts out by the hypothesis is that corporate criminal culpability doesn't struggle with individual criminal obligation. The partnership is the main party that a criminal discipline might impact. Like how the group of an individual's crooks might experience the repercussions of criminal culpability, individuals from an organization may likewise feel these influences by implication.

Perhaps of the most grounded discipline at any point known the actual lodging of companies is clearly impossible. Most nations have found that the criminal money related punishment functions as an obstacle against corporate unfortunate behavior when utilized appropriately. Criminal punishments comprise the main part of the assents for business bad behavior.

CONCLUSION

The relative examination of corporate criminal risk uncovers huge varieties in legitimate methodologies, mirroring the different lawful, social, and monetary settings of locales. While customary regulation frameworks frequently favor wide vicarious risk, common regulation frameworks accentuate authoritative responsibility. To address the difficulties of globalization and transnational corporate tasks, a blended way to deal with corporate criminal risk is fundamental. Such a methodology ought to adjust prevention and recovery, focus on viable consistence projects, and encourage a culture of corporate morals. By embracing best practices and advancing worldwide collaboration, general sets of laws can upgrade corporate responsibility and add to a more attractive, all the more worldwide economy.

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