Phenomenological Approach to Imagination In Poetry

Exploring the Creative Role of Imagination in Poetry through a Phenomenological Approach

by Dr. Anil Kumar*,

- Published in Journal of Advances and Scholarly Researches in Allied Education, E-ISSN: 2230-7540

Volume 1, Issue No. 2, Apr 2011, Pages 0 - 0 (0)

Published by: Ignited Minds Journals


ABSTRACT

Phenomenological studies examine imagination as a dimension of language and explore the creative role of imagination in the creation of new meanings in language. This exploration has many implications in poetry where language is used creatively and new meanings emerge from the creative and unexpected use of language by the poet. This paper aims to  describe  a  phenomenological  account  of  imagination  in   poetry by introducing the concepts that appear most relevant to imagination in poetry within the domain of phenomenological studies. In order to do this, the study focuses on the main tenets  of  phenomenological  studies relevant to  imagination  in poetry, namely the concepts  of ‘metaphor’  and  ‘intentionality’. The  discussion highlights  the level  of creativity of imagination in poetry in comparison with the reduction of imagining to perceiving in language. Likewise, the poetic image in  poetry is also introduced as animage which is not a resume of the old meanings of perception.  Phenomenology of imagination in poeticcreationtakes us beyond the pervious analyses of the characteristics of imagination as a creative faculty and helps to establish a link between creativity, meaning and imagination.

KEYWORD

phenomenological approach, imagination, poetry, language, meaning, creative role, metaphor, intentionality, poetic image, perception

between man and the world‖. The imagination must instil ―a second life into familiar images‖; i must create ―metaphors of metaphors‖ (Gaudine‘s introduction in Bachelard, 1971/2005, p. xi). With reference to Bacerlard‘s phenomenology of imagination, further distinctions between metaphor and poetic image can be made in order to characterize the quality of imagination in poetry as being able to create fresh and innovative images. For Bachelard, metaphor is real whereas poetic image is unreal. This means that poetic image is not bound to conceptual reality Poetic image is original because it comes before thought and it relates to the realm of archetypes (Hans, 1977). On the other hand, metaphor is intellectual and belongs to the realm of mind. Hans (1977) characterises Bachelard‘s poetic image as ―varioutional, reverberational valuational and dynamic‖ (p. 317). The poetic image does not have a past. Metaphor is apprehended once for all while poetic image is new each time it is apprehended. The discussion on the concept of metaphor and the creative power of imagination in Ricoeur‘s hermeneutics and Bachelard‘s phenomenology indicates the existence of the level and intensity in the innovative power of imagination in creating meanings in language and in poetry. The capability of language/metaphor/ poetic image to create new meanings as discussed above is the result of mediating role of imagination. Imagination plays a key role in establishing a new semantic relevance in irrelevant semantic fields. It synthesizes incongruent, dissimilar, opposites or impertinent elements and restructures new semantic fields. At the literal level, imagination puts together the already- established, recurring and familiar images and creates meaning without transferring to a new semantic field. These processes make a ―semantic shock‖ through which (new) meanings emerge out of the ruins of literal meanings. Semantic shock is the result of mediating role of imagination in abolishing the logical distance between separate semantic fields (Kearney, 1998, p. 4). Dynamic freshness of metaphor/poetic image depends on the exten and strength of semantic shock involved in creation of meaning. In the context of poem, since the poetic image is put in relationship with other images, semantic shock leads to more innovative and new meanings through the medium of imagination.

INTENTIONALITY AND IMAGINATION

Phenomenology basically studies how we experience ranging from perception, thought, memory desire, and so on. Imagination certainly is one of the various types of human experience which phenomenology attempts to define and conceptualize. In this section, the focus is to show how the concept of ‗intentionality‘ in phenomenological studies conceptualizes imagination as the medium of creating meanings in language. In addition, the concept of ‗double intentionality‘ will be used to explain the role imagination in creation of meanings in poetry. Intentionality refers to direc meanings of things. Double intentionality refers to indirect meanings that exist behind direc meanings as mostly seen in poetry. Before proceeding to discuss these issues, it is importan to define ‗intentionality‘ and explain the relationship between intentionality and consciousness in phenomenological studies. In phenomenology, The central structure of an experience is its intentionality, its being directed toward something, as it is an experience of or about some object An experience is directed toward an object by virtue of its content or meaning (which represents the object) together with appropriate enabling conditions (Smith, 2008, Phenomenology, para. 1). Intentionality is a particular characteristic of consciousness in phenomenological studies. It is ―the property of consciousness that it is a consciousness of or about something‖ intentionality means ‗aboutness‘, that every mental process has always a reference to a content or is directed upon an object or a phenomenon (Perus, 1997, para. 2). This means that consciousness by itself does not exist. It exists because it always ―intends‖, ―represents‖ or ―is directed‖ towards a content or an object or a phenomenon (Smith, 2008, para. 5). In phenomenology consciousness is known as ―intentional consciousness‖ and its acts as intentional acts o consciousness. Imagination as an act of consciousness or a mode of consciousness was firs articulated by Husserl (1970). He also defined the concept of image as ―a thing in consciousness a relation – an act of consciousness directed to an object beyond consciousness‖ (Husserl, 1970 p. 14). The following helps to understand the relationship between intentionality and consciousness: Consciousness is defined by intentionality. It is consciousness of an object on the one hand and an inner awareness of itself on the other hand. Being confronted with an object, I am at once conscious of this object and aware of my being conscious of it. This awareness in no way means reflection: to know that I am dealing with the object which, for instance, I am just perceiving, need not experience a second act bearing upon the perception and making it its object. In simply dealing with the object I am aware of this very dealing (Gurwitsch, 1940, p. 330). This means that every experience has a ‗primary object‘, which is external and is not in consciousness, and the ‗secondary object‘, which is internal and is the object in consciousness Thus, the secondary object must include not only the consciousness of the primary object, but also the consciousness of this consciousness. For the very same reason every intentional consciousness of a primary object must in addition include itself as its own secondary object, every intentiona consciousness of a secondary object must in addition include itself as its own tertiary object, and so forth (Gurwitsch, 1940). So far the relationship of intentionality and consciousness has been discussed. The attempt here is to define imagination as an intentional act of consciousness in creation of meaning first in language and then in poetry. Intentional act is when an act is directed towards an object under a certain aspect by its abstract content that is the meaning of that act. Image and imagination as intentional acts acquire their meanings in the process of directedness or aboutness, that is intentionality. Let‘s consider a pen and an act of imagining a pen as an intentional act of consciousness. The image of a pen is constructed in our mind as the result of imagining, when we become conscious of both the object of pen and also the act of our being conscious of it. The mental representation of the pen shapes meaning of the pen. Meaning of the pen is different from the real object. The intentional act here is imagining or image-making. This means that we do no understand the pen, feel the pen, believe the pen or have other experiences with the pen Otherwise, the meaning of pen would be changed in terms of different experiences. Ou experience is to imagine a pen. Hence the resultant meaning of a pen is specific to this intentiona act of imagining. The explanation given above is an example of creating direct meaning from the perspective of the theory of intentionality. Images derive their specific aboutness from the specific aboutness of the ideas, beliefs, and intentions of their creators – the poets, for instance, in the case of images in poetry. In imagining experience as an intentional act of consciousness, when objects are not present o when we imagine things that do not refer to any real objects in the world, the above discussion centers on the idea of double intentionality. This is mostly the case of images in poetry. How do their meanings shape? How are indirect meanings of images formed behind their direct meanings? What follows investigates the answers to these questions. We are conscious of absent or non-existent things in the same way as for real objects according to the theory of intentionality (Siewert, 2006). The argument concentrates on the way meanings are created through the act of imagining. The example symbol will be explained with regard to meanings of non-existent objects, absent objects or images with indirect meanings such as in poetry. Symbols illustrate how the intentional act of imagining of an image (referring to a symbol) results in meanings that embody layers of indirect meanings. The focus o discussion is that ―A symbol is a double intentionality‖. This means that ―one meaning is transgressed or transcended by another‖, which is the work of imagination (Kearney, 1998, p

154).

Cosmic symbols are categorized as the most basic level of symbols because they include ―both a thing and a sign‖. Cosmic symbols refer to ―aspects of the world – the heavens, the sun, the moon the waters – as signs of some ultimate meaning‖ (Kearney, 1998, p. 151). This means that the rea object is present in the world like in the case of a pen but it also has another referent. We become conscious of ―water‖ as a thing, for instance, when our consciousness intends towards i through the intentional act of imagining. As a result, its literal meaning is formed, that is to say water referring to its real colourless liquid. In addition, consciousness intends towards water as ―sign‖ whose referent is not present. It is through the double intentional act of imagining that we become conscious of its significance as a symbol. As a result, its symbolic meaning is created, for example water as referring to renewed spiritual life. The intentional act of imagining becomes more creative in other categories of symbols – fo instance dream images and poetic images. Dream images are images of the collective and individual unconscious. Dream exemplifies ―how we can say things other than what we are ostensibly saying; how behind direct meanings there are indirect ones. Because of this double intentionality, symbols are what make ‗poets of every dreamer‘ ‖(Ricoeur in Kearney 1998 p.154). Symbol in poetry reveals ―the welling-up of language‖, or as Ricoeur believes it is ―language in a state of emergence‖ (Kearney, 1998, p. 154). Symbol in poetry carries the highes level of creativity in the imagining act. It is important to note that symbol may not be created if i could not be imagined, referring to imagining as an intentional experience. In other words, its meanings is formed or created through the intentional act of imagining. The conceptualization of imagination in the phenomenological studies using the concept o ―intentionality‖ illustrates the role of imagination in creation of meanings in poetry which is made through a double intentionality. The double intentionality of imagination in poetry characterizes this concept with a sense of communicability which it creates in the context of the poem (Zalipour, 2010 forthcoming). As discussed earlier, intentionality means directedness o aboutness. In the case of the poetic image, there is a double intentionality. According to the theory of intentionality, when consciousness is directed toward an object, that is to say, when we become conscious of an object, an image is made. This image has its specific and direct meaning with regard to its maker/creator and experience of the imagining act. When this image (with its direct meaning) is put in the context of the poem by the poet, it is directed toward another image in the poem, and in such a context the image acquires another meaning (moving to a new semantic field) through the second act of intentionality. Poetic images are capable of being directed at othe images in the context of poem. In other words, they can communicate with other images through the double intentional act of imagining, which leads to the creation of new meanings. In the poem, Place (1988) by Merwin, for instance, the communicability of images through the double intentionality of imagination enhances the meaning of the central image of the poem to a symbolic one. On the last day of the world I would want to plant a tree what for not for the fruit the tree tha bears the fruit is not the one was planted I want the tree that stands in the earth for the first time with the sun already going down and the water touching its roots in the earth full of the dead and the clouds passing one by one over its leaves — Merwin, The Rain in the Trees (1988) In Place, Merwin manifests the poet‘s personal desire on the last day of the world. The persona of the poem desires to plant a tree that does not bear ―the fruit‖. The central image of the poem is a tree which is impregnated with new dimensions of meaning in the course of the image-making process within the context of the poem. The central image – a tree – does not possess the characteristics of a natural tree in the literal level: a woody perennial plant that grows to a heigh of several feet and typically has a single erect main stem with side branches, and roots in soil. A symbolic image of a tree grows line by line and image by image in this poem, and the image of tree acquires emblematic nuances at the end of the poem. Place is initiated with a conceptua image of time and place: ―On the last day of the world/ I would want to plant a tree‖ (lines 1-2) There are many sensory images in his poem that are closely related to the image of tree such as water, roots, clouds, earth, sun and fruit, the sunset, planting a tree, and bearing of the fruit. The central image of them poem, tree, becomes communicable to other images. In Place, all images are powerfully link to the central image so that they help the image of tree grows to a symbolic one. This becomes possible through a strong sense of intentionality. This means that the image of tree acquires its symbolic meaning in the process of aboutness as it is directed to other images in the second act of intentionality. The tree‘s specific aboutness is fed by the poet‘s intentions to create the symbolic image of the tree. The image of the tree as an intentional act is about a rea tree, but within the certain imaginary and the context of the poem it acquires its new meaning. In other words, the image of tree does not refer to the object of tree in real life. Communicability of the central image of the poem, close association of the images in terms of their meaning as well as the condensed imagery of the poem help the creation of symbolic meaning of the tree that can only be planted in the last day of the world.

CONCLUSION

The link between imagination and language has been addressed by the phenomenological thinkers The crucial role that imagination plays in the creation of meaning as discussed in Ricoeur‘s ‗semantic innovation‘ makes it evident that images can no longer be adequately understood in terms of their immediate appearance to consciousness and imagination is no longer the power of images to represent absent objects (Kearney, 2004). This paper examined phenomenologica /hermeneutic treatment of imagination with the focus on imagination in poetry. The discussion introduced the potential properties of imagination in language and poetry in order to highlight the mediatory role of imagination in creating new meanings. The exploration of the role of imagination as a medium of creating new meanings in language by phenomenologists takes the concept of imagination further in its developmental conceptualizations as a creative faculty of images. A more innovative and creative power of imagination in poetry is gleaned by comparing the examinations of metaphorical utterances in language and in poetry. The explanation also highlighted the level of creativity of imagination and poetic/literary image in poetry in comparison with the reduction of imagining to perceiving. The study showed phenomenological explanation of imagination as a medium of creating new meanings which is more intense and innovative in poetry compared with language. The characteristics of poetic image also demonstrated that imagination is not restricted to the realm of perception and sensation Creative imagination is a reverie in which poetic image is formed.

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