Study of Mobile Sms Security Issues and Techniques

Exploring SMS security issues and future research directions

by Nalla Girish *,

- Published in Journal of Advances and Scholarly Researches in Allied Education, E-ISSN: 2230-7540

Volume 2, Issue No. 2, Oct 2011, Pages 0 - 0 (0)

Published by: Ignited Minds Journals


ABSTRACT

The short message service (SMS) isone of the highly used and well-tried mobile services with global availabilitywithin all GSM networks. The existing SMS is limited to the transmission ofsecure plain text between different mobile phone subscribers. SMS does not haveany built-in procedure to authenticate the text and offer security for the texttransmitted as data, because most of the applications for mobile devices aredesigned and developed without taking security into consideration. This paperdetails an overview of the current SMS security aspects and concerns during theSMS transmission. It also chronologically presents the existing mechanisms usedto protect the SMS with the goal to provide useful advices for furtherresearch. In addition, the security and efficiency of these mechanisms areanalysed, considering the limitation on the mobile devices and the securityrequirements. Finally it suggests the SMS security future direction forgenerating extra research topics.

KEYWORD

SMS, security, mobile, text, transmission, authentication, mobile devices, mechanisms, limitations, research topics

INTRODUCTION

The use of mobile devices has increased rapidly over the years, particularly, during the last decade. These wireless devices were initially started as devices to store personal information. Short message service (SMS) will play an important role in the future business areas, which are popularly known as m-commerce, mobile banking, governmental use, and daily life communication. Furthermore, SMS has become a popular wireless service throughout the world as it facilitates a user to be in touch with any mobile phone subscriber anywhere in the world, instantaneously and without any hassle (Grillo et al., 2008; Zhang et al., 2005).

SMS SECURITY TECHNIQUES

Unprotected communication channels pose serious security vulnerabilities. Thus, it is importantly pertinent that both the mobile applications and the mobile operators must apply some reliable protective techniques to avoid these assailable vulnerabilities. This used to protect the mobile subscribers from the undesirable communication attacks during the SMS transmission. It can be provided in the network base (transport layer) or in the application base (mobile application) (Tiejun et al., 2008). This section reviews and describes the security mechanisms used for protecting the SMS transmission besides analyzing this mechanisms based on the security requirements comparing with the mobile performance capability. Beside, describes on how this mechanism can be applied to avoid the security concerns. There are twotypes of techniques that can be applied in differentways as mentioned (application layer and networklayer). This paper focuses on the application layertechniques, which are considered as the current SMSresearch issues since it is under the researchers’control and development.

SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

Several challenges have to be over comed for widedeployment in the mobile systems. These challengesinclude a complexity (difficulty) management ofapplying PKI mechanisms to the limited devicescapability during the deployment process in the largescale heterogeneous mobile system (Seema et al.,2004). As known PKI technology is a kind ofasymmetric cryptography techniques, which dependson high intensive computationally of generating keys,and that makes them less suitable for devices oflimited size and processing power, such as, mobilephones (Dankers et al., 2002). In simple terms, if themobile user likes to use the PKI mechanisms, theseshould have the full support for the PKI features which require a high mobile capability (Cai et al., 2005).Currently, all the mobile devices have limitedcomputational capabilities and a limited power supplysince they are depending on batteries, thus, traditional PKI quite unsuitable for these existing devices (Lee etal., 2007). It is obvious that, mobile devices must have the high power capability to implement the PKIfunctions, beside owns associated capacity. That willprovide a huge effort for the authentication process,

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and can lead to a significant achievement of higher levels of security. However, due of resources in the mobile devices, the PKI implementation consider as a serious drawback for the mobile devices application. Thus, the relationship between the high security requirements and the mobile performance is inversely proportional, as the PKI provides a high security level for protecting the SMS transmission; however, at the same time it decreases the mobile performance. Moreover, the server architecture mobile securitysystems user has to get the mobile network operator or the service provider’s approval as it still depends onthe services of the mobile network operator or theservice provider. Furthermore, the overhead cost ofcommunication is increased due to the users’ need toaccess to the servers in many cases, such as,uploading and downloading the cryptographic keys.Researchers do not expect that the mobile operatorswill provide the security services to the transmitteddata through the SMS service for individuals, at leastnot in the near future. Additionally, in the currentmobile systems, some applications based on the PKIhave already been installed. They can satisfy thesecurity requirements through the use of the X.509 asthe certificate standards. Although the mobile PKI fulfills all the securityrequirements, it is still unsuccessful to provideheterogeneous PKI standards for other mobile devices(Leung et al., 2003). Furthermore, different certificatestandards from different Certificate Authorities (CA),(vendors), are considered as overheads for the mobileapplications. Therefore, mobile applications have toproceed with different verification processing functionsfor different PKI certificate standards. In addition, any modification on the server side must also be madeapplicable to the user’s mobile application. For

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example, changing or upgrading the certificate standards means upgrading of the mobile application process. Thus, the mobile application has to deal with any new certificate standards, as the current PKI cannot maintain integrity between the standards.

LIMITATION

Although this review paper details all security concerns of GSM systems and mobile devices during the SMStransmission, but it does not mention the techniqueswhich could be used to secure GSM architecture. Thisis because we have already introduced the securitytechniques in application layer to provide end to endsecurity and protection.

FUTURE DIRECTION

Presently, there are two directions for enhancing thePKI limitations, such as, a high power capabilitydemand as mentioned earlier. Firstly, install themiddleware server (with suitable requirement) betweenthe mobile devices and the PKI server. Thismiddleware can shield the mobile devices from the PKIcomplexities and precedes some on the PKI mobileoperation on behalf of the mobile, such as, verifyingand storing the mobile certificate to reduce the mobilepower consumption. The XML Key ManagementSpecification (XKMS) can be the main structure for that middleware (Inc, 2002; Kangasharju et al., 2005;Nguyen and Ivar, 2008; Weerasinghe et al., 2006). The XKMS can be a good solution for the client’s (mobiledevice) deployment limitation and resolving differentvendor’s problem in the mobile PKI M-PKIimplementation for the security of the end-to-end SMStransmission. Figure 16 demonstrates the installationof the middleware server base on the XKMStechnology. Secondly, provide or create a directcommunication (No certificate authority) between themobile devices can be also a solution, as we havementioned that the main duty of the certificate authority is authenticating the communication user, therefore,

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the main challenge is how we can ensure the authentication (Al-bakri et al., 2010).

CONCLUSION

SMS is an integral part of mobile communication and SMS security is undoubtedly useful and interesting but yet a challenging issue to consider. It holds great potential in applications related to businesses, government bodies as well as in military. This paper reviews the SMS security by outlining the different security issues related to SMS systems and the mechanisms used to overcome these issues during the entire SMS transmission circle from the mobile source to the final mobile destination. Based on the author’s experience, it is apparent that PKI provides high level security to protect SMS during transmission because it resolve and avoids most of the issues related to SMS security. However, it decreases the mobile performance as it requires high mobile power capability to apply the PKI process. Alternative methods should be offered to improve the mobile PKI usage in a mobile environment.

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