



*Journal of Advances and  
Scholarly Researches in  
Allied Education*

*Vol. VIII, Issue No. XVI,  
Oct-2014, ISSN 2230-7540*

## **HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS RELATION WITH POLITICS**

AN  
INTERNATIONALLY  
INDEXED PEER  
REVIEWED &  
REFEREED JOURNAL

# Human Psychology and its Relation with Politics

Hemant Kumar Babasaheb Tapkir<sup>1</sup> Dr. Manoj Kumar Sing<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Research scholar, Himalayan University, Itanagar, A. P. Email: hbtapkir@gmail.com

<sup>2</sup>Research Supervisor, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar University, Agra Email: manoj75r@yahoo.co.in

**Abstract – This article contrasts two theories of human rationality that have found application in political science: methodical, bounded rationality from current cognitive psychology, and global, substantial rationality from economics. Employing examples illustrated from the contemporary literature of political science, it analyzes the relative roles played by the rationality principle and by auxiliary assumptions (e.g., assumptions about the content of actors' goals) in explicating human behavior in political contexts, and concludes that the mode/predictions rest originally on the auxiliary assumptions rather than deriving from the rationality principle.**

-----X-----

The assertion intends that the principle of rationality, unless accompanied with sizable empirical research to determine the precise auxiliary assumptions, has little power to make accurate predictions about political phenomena. This article is concerned with the nature of human reason and the connotations of contemporary cognitive psychology for political science research that exercises the concept of rational behavior. I shall begin with a chunk of history, written from a rather personal outlook, to ascribe a setting for the discussion.

The older and/or more sagacious among you will determine the essay's title as having been plagiarized from Walas, whose seminal book, Human Nature in Politics, appeared in 1907.

Not that graduate students as participants in a scientific revolution. The circumstances of the political process had long since substituted the formal legal structure of political in situations as the main subject for study in political science at least at the Global University. Merriam's studies of power, Gosnell's quantitative methods, Lasswell's psychoanalytic analyzes seemed to us merely (paraphrasing Clausewitz) "the continuation of political realism by other means."

I was little prepared, hence, for the violence of the polemic pro and con "behavioralism" that reverberated over the land in the first two decades after World War. Nowadays, my periodic soundings in The Indian Political Science Review commiserate me that this civil animosity in the profession is capaciously over, and that the behavioral revolution is now seen as continuity rather than discontinuity in the development of political science. Possibly what we were doing was not

revolutionary science at all, but just conventional normal science.

This is presumably the suitable conjuncture, while experts insinuating to behavioralism, to inscribe a culpa mea for my part in popularizing that inopportune and somewhat deceiving term. It seemed, of course, in the title of Administrative Behavior, and also in the title of reference chief epistle to the economists, "A Behavioral Model," promulgated in the Journal of Economics. However, expert suspect that he was the main culprit. That veneration belongs to the Ford Foundation, which at that same time initialized and diligently popularized the phrase "behavioral sciences."

Although, expert's intention here is not to recollect about old battles. We should commemorate that political scientists are bequeathing all their endeavors to advancing the science, and we should do nothing to encourage a reinvigoration of the Method entreat. He accentuate that this is an assertion and not a novel piece of substantive research. The fundamental values for political science to which he and his contemporaries were and are committed encompass cogent empirical data as the foundation for theory and for normative recommendations; new sources of data incorporating polls, structured interviews, and systematic samples; the utilization of statistics, mathematics, and computer simulation where apropos as apparatuses for data analysis and theory construction; and the interpretation of phenomena in terms of foundational categories like power, decision making, rationality, and systems.

The research on which he shall elucidate corroborates those values: it is analytically based, exerting numerous different kinds of data-gathering

mechanisms, frequently employs mathematical and other formal methods, and is intuitive in its use of theory. The commentary will take us through three pivotal topics. First, I shall have to discuss something about the two main forms of theories of human rationality that endures in social science today the one of them having its focus in cognitive psychology, the other in economics. Next, I shall contemplate the denotations, for the balance in political science between rationalism (or a prior-ism) and empiricism, of determining one or the other of these two paradigms of rationality.

## THE CAST OF RATIONALITY

The term "rational" connotes behavior that is apropos to specialized objectives in the context of a given situation. If the particularities of the determining organism are overlooked, and we assess only those restraints that materialize from the external situation, then we may discuss substantial or constructivist rationality, that is, activity that can be adjudged objectively to be optimally adapted to the situation.

On the other hand, if we take into account the confines of knowledge and computing power of the determining organism, then we may spot it in-capable of making objectively optimal choices. If, however, it employs procedures of choice that is as consequential as its decision-making and problem solving intends permit, we may speak of procedural or bounded rationality, that is, behavior that is adaptive within the confinements imposed both by the external circumstance and by the capacities of the decision maker.

The terms "procedural" and "substantive" were, of course, obtained from constitutional law, in comparison with the conceptions of procedural and substantive due process, the erstwhile assessing fairness by the mechanism exercised to reach a result, the latter by the object of the result itself. In the similar approach, we can adjudicate a person to be rational who uses a reasonable process for determining; or, optionally, we can assess a person to be rational who debarks at a conceivable decision.

There is an intrinsic dissimilarity between substantial and procedural rationality. To apprehend the substantively, or objectively, rational choice in a given situation, we require to discern only the choosing organism's goals and the objective characteristics of the situation. We need to know certainly nothing else about the organism, nor would such additional information be of any application to us, for it could not influence the objectively rational behavior in any way.

To account the meticulously or bloodedly rational choice in a situation, we must discern the choosing organism's goals, the evidence and conceptualization it has of the circumstance, and its capabilities to illustrate assessments from the evidence it holds. If we assess the history of political science over the past 50

years, we will see that it was principally the procedural view of rationality that was incorporated by behavioralism, but that during the past two decades this view has acknowledged growing competition from the substantive view. Now we like to extend a little further the elemental characteristics and theoretical structures of the two views of rationality, and then regard the inferences of employing them, autonomously or mutually, in the study of political behavior.

## RELATION OF RATIONALITY AND PSYCHOLOGY

A pivotal theme for Graham Walas in *Human Nature in Politics* was the reciprocation of the rational and non-rational constituents of human behavior in politics. That, of course, was also a focal theme for Harold Laswell in *Psychopathology and Politics* (1943) and *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (1945). But while Laswell's psychological contraption comes capaciously from Freud, Walas asserts as his principal mentor William James. However Laswell was cautious with borderline and not-so-borderline pathology, Walas was curious in the ubiquitous workings of intuition, ignorance, and ardor in normal behavior.

What is that orientation? Experts asserted incertitude, earlier, that political science has undergone, since World War, any alteration that deserves being called a revolution. Also have no such questions about the field of psychology. Cognitive psychology, in the past 50 years, has endured a radical overturning, from an extreme Behaviorism to a configuration that perceives thinking as information processing.

In psychology, Behaviorism cautiously averted discussing what went on inside the head-it adopted to adhere to the discernible facts of stimuli and responses. It chose rats to humans as subjects in its experimentations, possibly because rats could not be induced to give untenable introspective accounts of their mental feelings. Even the term "cognitive" was eschewed, as inferring an illicit mentalism.

## PRINCIPLE IN POLITICS

After this long expedition into the views of human rationality that are usually held in psychology and economics, let me come back now to the subject of political science. What type of rationality does Homo politics demonstrate? Is he or she a creature of objective, substantive rationality; or instead, one of subjective, procedural rationality? But I am anxious that I have previously tipped my hand and made it pretty obvious that I consider the later to be the case.

If that is certain, the rationality principle, as it is encompassed in theories of substantive rationality, will cater us with only constrained assistance in understanding political phenomena. Before we employ the procedures of economic reasoning to political behavior, we must present the political situation, not as

it materializes "objectively" to the analyst, but as it materializes subjectively to the actors. We can only choose the apropos model of adaptation after we initiate the imperative empirical study to ascertain this subjective representation both of goals and of the circumstance or illustrate on research in cognitive psychology to tell us about the nature of that representation. A few examples drawn from the political science literature will display what is integrated.

## REFERENCES:

Crecine, J. P. Governmental problem solving: A computer simulation of municipal budgeting. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969.

Downs, A. *An economic theory of democracy*. New York: Harper & Row, 1957. Eastman, D. Political science. In D. L. Sills (Ed.). *International encyclopedia of the social sciences* (vol. 12). New York: Macmillan, 1968, pp. 282-298.

Ericsson, K., & Simon, H. A. *Protocolanalysis: Verbalreports as data*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984.

Friedman, M. The methodology of positive economics. In *Essays in positive economics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953.

Friedman, M. The role of monetary policy. *American Economic Review*, 1968, **58**, 1-17. Gerwin, B. Budgeting public funds: The decision process in an urban school district. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969.

Hibbs, D. A., Jr. Economic outcomes and political support for British governments among occupational classes: A dynamic analysis. *American Political Science Review*, 1982, **76**, 259-279.

Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (Eds.). *Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

Keynes, J. M. *The general theory of employment, interest and money*. London: Macmillan, 1936. van de Kragt, A. J. C., Orbell, J. M., & Dawes, R. M. The minimal contributing set as a solution to public goods problems. *American Political Science Review*, 1983, **77**, 112-122.

Lasswell, H. *Psychopathology and politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934.