

An Analysis on Socio-Cultural and Economic Growth in Mughal Administration

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Abstract – During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries about 85 per cent of the population of India lived in its villages. Both peasants and landed elites were involved in agricultural production and claimed rights to a share of the produce. This created relationships of cooperation, competition and conflict among them. The sum of these agrarian relationships made up rural society. At the same time agencies from outside also entered into the rural world. Most important among these was the Mughal state, which derived the bulk of its income from agricultural production. Agents of the state – revenue assessors, collectors, record keepers – sought to control rural society so as to ensure that cultivation took place and the state got its regular share of taxes from the produce. Since many crops were grown for sale, trade, money and markets entered the villages and linked the agricultural areas with the towns.

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INTRODUCTION

The Mogul Empire was a Persianate empire. The beginning of the empire is conventionally dated back to the founder Babur's victory over Ibrahim Lodi in the first battle of Panipath (1526). It reached its climax under Akbar, Jahangir and Shahjahan. Akbar transformed the Moghul empire into a national monarchy. He also forged matrimonial relations with several Hindu Rajput dynasties. He separated religion from politics, rejected the Islamic theory of state and raised the policy of religious toleration to the height of secularism. By associating with Rajputs, he strengthened the process of national state. His successor Jahangir and Shahjahan scrupulously followed his religious policy. But Aurangzeb reversed the Akbar's policy of religious toleration and the Moghul empire disintegrated within a short period of time.

In the Moghul period an innovative class of historiography – that of official histories or *namahs* – came into vogue in India under Persian influence. Akbar introduced the practice of commissioning officials or others to write the history of his new empire giving them access for this purpose to state records. This practice continued down to the reign of Aurangzeb who, however, stopped it in his eleventh regnal year. Besides, such official histories, biographical works of great historical interest were also produced during the period under survey. And we are not entirely dependent upon chroniclers; we have in some instances contemporary, independent historians.

The historians of the Mughal Period did not develop any philosophy of history from which certain lessons may be drawn, and they mainly concentrated on the

political history completely neglecting the cultural, religious and social aspects. So the historians of this period certainly differed from the historians of the sultanate period in social status, class, outlook, idiom and approach. The element of personal gain, getting a reward or repaying a debt of gratitude receded into the background or at least was not so prominent now as in the previous period.

The purpose of this study is to analyse the relationship between social structure and economic performance in India. It seeks to establish whether the social system had a significant dysfunctional role in hindering growth in the past, and whether the situation has changed since independence. It analyses the extent to which governments in office really tried to change the social structure and the degree to which their rhetorical commitments were constrained by the inertia of tradition and by the vested interests which inherited economic and social power. It is interesting to compare India and Pakistan because they had a common history before 1947 and have since followed social policies which, in theory, are quite different.

Unfortunately, information on income distribution is poor and the social structure has such complex repercussions on growth that rigorous conclusions are not possible. However, it is hoped that the historical approach adopted here has at least the virtue of putting contemporary problems in perspective. The social structure of India and Pakistan is more complex than that of most countries, and survivals from the past have been tenacious. The present situation is a palimpsest impossible to decipher without historical analysis. In the past two

decades, the goal of economic growth has achieved the status of a secular religion. Economists have provided models explaining why and how it occurs, and governments have attempted to implement policies which ensure that it happens. These efforts have had some success.

There is no evidence that the present distribution of income is particularly favourable for economic growth. The highly unequal distribution of land and the virtually complete tax exemption of the upper income groups in agriculture were an inheritance from the past which could not be changed without some temporary disturbance of production, but in the long run a more equitable system should make more productive use of land and labour. In industry, the policies of bureaucratic control which have promoted concentration of wealth and income have reduced efficiency.

In many respects the Moghul economy was highly sophisticated and its performance at times matched that of Western Europe, but the social structure involved a high degree of exploitation through fiscal and caste mechanisms. The fiscal system with its heavy reliance on land tax had some analogy with that of Manchu China and Tokugawa Japan, but caste was unique. Both the fiscal system and caste had dysfunctional elements. At its best, under Akbar, the fiscal system worked reasonably well, but the primary economic aim of the Moghul elite was short-term maximization of the tax levy on the villages. It was a regime of warlords and not a bureaucracy.

By squeezing too hard, the Moghul elite reduced productivity and inhibited capital formation. The caste hierarchy within village society also lowered productivity by (a) pushing the living standards of the lowest groups down to a level which reduced physical working capacity and eliminated incentives for increased output, (b) allocating jobs on a rigid basis of heredity rather than aptitude, (c) instilling a ritualistic rather than functional attitude to work, (d) maintaining taboos on the use of animal husbandry and manure which kept productivity low. The Moghul superstructure has now disappeared, but village society, the bureaucracy, and some parts of the urban economy are still permeated by the same type of ritual inequality which is harmful to economic efficiency.

Colonial rule had important consequences. The social pyramid was truncated at the top. The claim of the Moghul aristocracy on national income went down from 15 per cent to the 3 per cent made available to those princes and *zamindars* kept on by the British. Their decline ruined the market for the Indian handicraft industry. Part of the Moghul surplus was transferred to the upper-caste village capitalists and money-lenders, thus increasing income inequality within the villages. Part of the fiscal resources previously used to support the Moghuls was used to create a modern military bureaucratic machine. The

modernizing activities of the new bureaucratic elite were sufficient to stimulate growth in population and output, but not to increase *per capita* income. A modern industrial and commercial sector was created on a limited scale with a heavy dependence on British managing agencies and very limited diffusion of modern skills to Indians. If India had not been subjected to colonial rule its history would probably have been like that of China. Its population would have been smaller because of internal wars and political divisions, but there would have been a bigger economic surplus available for a late-coming group of modernizers.

The precolonial economy of India is now and again depicted by Indian history specialists and lawmakers as a brilliant time of flourishing. As per R.C. Dutt, the doyen of patriot students of history, "India in the eighteenth century was an incredible assembling and in addition an incredible farming nation". Gandhi and others have focused on the social concordance of the accepted village social order. These sees have been exceptionally powerful and it is evidently essential to see if they stand up to discriminating dissection. Our own particular decision is that they embellish the profit of the Moghul economy which was presumably essentially lower than that of West Europe in the eighteenth century.

THE MUGHALS

Babur, who had invaded with some success the border areas of the northwest boundary, launched a well planned attack with the help of his political allies in India. In 1526, Babur and his Indian allies fought against Sultan Ibrahim at Panipat. The artillery used through Babur for the first time in north India helped him achieve easy victory. Ibrahim Lodi was killed in the battle and the road to Delhi and Agra was cleared for Babur.

When Babur supplanted the Lodi rule through his own his Indian allies were disappointed. The dissatisfied Afghan and non-Afghan nobles accepted Prince Mahmud Lodi as their Sultan and decided to carry an armed thrash about against the Mughals. The fifteen years of combined rule of Babur and Humayun rule is to be treated as an interregnum flanked by the fall of the Lodis and the foundation of Sher Shah Sur's Empire. Babur (d. 1530) and Humayun adopted the same state system in India that they found existing under the Lodi Sultans. For instance, the policy they followed towards the zamindars was the age-old tradition set through the Delhi Sultans. Babur mentions that the rais and rajas were found on all sides and quarters of Hindustan, obedient as well as disobedient to the Muslim ruler. In fact, he was satisfied when the rajas paid nominal allegiance to him as they did in the past.

The Baburnama clearly shows that Babur assigned the charge of territories to the nobles, granting them the

right to collect land revenue and carry on the government there on his behalf as was the prevalent system. The shiqqdars were posted in the parganas under khalisa. In short, Babur or Humayun do not seem to have made any significant change in the political system in North India.

The Afghan and non-Afghan nobles who fought against Babur and Humayun under the nominal leadership of Sultan Mahmud Lodi, failed to achieve success. This was primarily due to rivalry and dissensions in the middle of themselves. Their defeat in 1531 through Humayun finally sealed the fate of the old Afghan nobility. Thereafter, the leadership of the anti-Mughal Afghans was taken in excess of through Sher Khan Sur who, through now, had recognized his control in excess of the fort of Chunar and the region of south Bihar. The old Afghan nobles fled to Gujarat. This they did to join the service of Sultan Bahadur Shah who wanted to capture Delhi.

Sultan Bahadur Shah of Gujarat was financially as well as militarily the most powerful of the Indian rulers. Some of the coastal towns in Gujarat had already appeared as emporium of international trade. These port towns were visited through merchants from dissimilar foreign countries. Therefore, this trade acquiesced vast revenue to the state exchequer through customs dues. He also possessed strong artillery.

In 1531, Sultan Bahadur Shah started on an expansionist career. He conquered Malwa and annexed it to his Sultanate. In 1533, he laid siege to Chittor and conquered it. Thereafter, he decided to march to Gwalior against the Mughals. In relation to this time, Rumi Khan, the commander of the Gujarat artillery, secretly entered into alliance with Humayun and assured him of his help. The Gujarat army was totally demoralized through the treachery of Rumi Khan. Finally, Bahadur Shah took shelter in the island of Diu and the whole of Malwa and Gujarat was occupied through Humayun. But this Mughal conquest was short-existed. Soon after his victory in Gujarat, Humayun received the alarming news of the rebellion of Sher Khan Sur who had declared himself as Sher Shah Sur. He seized vast land from the Sultan of Bengal and raided the eastern territories held through the Mughals. Humayun left his brother Askari beside with other Mughal nobles in Gujarat and retreated to Agra. On Humayun's departure, Gujarat rose in revolt against the Mughals. Bahadur Shah came back from Diu and chased the Mughals out from Gujarat and Malwa.

Meanwhile, Humayun made war preparation in a haste and started towards Chunar, a stronghold of Sher Shah. In relation to this time Sher Shah took the impregnable fort of Rohtas from its Raja. Humayun

conquered the Chunar fort, and entered Bengal without meeting any serious resistance put through the Afghans. In Gaur (Bengal) there was a period of inactivity on the part of Humayun. Sher Shah took full advantage of the situation. He closed the line of communication flanked by Agra and Gaur and attacked the Mughal forces in the eastern territories upto Benaras. Informed in relation to the deteriorating circumstances, Humayun started on the journey back to Agra. He met the Afghan army close to Chausa in 1539 and was defeated with heavy losses. In 1540 Humayun met the Afghan forces under Sher Shah at the battle of Qannauj. He was defeated and fled to Kabul.

The Living standard of mughal eMPORE

Moghul India had an exceptional arrangement to astound Western guests. From the time of Akbar to Shah Jehan the court was a standout amongst the most bright on the planet. It was cosmopolitan and religiously tolerant. Literary works and painting thrived and there were great castles and mosques at Agra, Delhi, Fatehpur Sikri, and Lahore. The honorability existed in walled strongholds with collections of mistresses, enclosures wellsprings and substantial entourages of slaves and servants. They had gigantic wardrobes of unbelievable pieces of clothing in fine cotton and silk.

With a specific end goal to cook for their requirements, various workmanship commercial ventures processed high caliber cotton materials, silks, jewellery, enhancing swords and weapons. These extravagance commercial ventures acted like an adult in urban centres. The urban populace was greater in the Muslim period than it had been under Hindu rulers, for position limitations had formerly kept artisans out of towns (2). Generally urban laborers were Muslims (3). The principle market for these urban items was provincial, yet a huge divide of material yield was traded to Europe and South-East Asia. Other fare things were saltpetre (for explosive), indigo, sugar, opium and ginger. Europeans had incredible challenge in finding items to trade for Indian products. They were equipped to fare a couple of woollen merchandise and a few metals, yet the just things the Indians truly needed in return and which were worth the expense of transporting so far were valuable metals (4). There was, subsequently, a steady stream of silver and gold to India, which retained an exceptional arrangement of the bullion handled by the Spaniards in the New World. It was this sensation which generally awed and aggravated Europeans in their relations with India.

Consistent with the confirmation of European explorers, a percentage of the urban centres of Moghul India were greater than the grandest urban

communities in Europe at the same period (5). We don't know if the general degree of urban to sum populace was greater or littler than in Europe, however the atmosphere made it conceivable to get twofold and triple editing in a few ranges, so it was in fact conceivable (with a given transport framework) to uphold greater towns than in Europe (6). The vast majority of the sumptuousness workmanship exchanges were placed in urban communities, and there was likewise a decently made keeping money framework for the exchange of finances from one part of India to an alternate one. In urban social order, occupation was regulated by organization regulation and an innate rank structure, however word related versatility was more amazing than in villages in light of the fact that town life was commanded by Muslims, or, in some business territories, by Europeans.

The richness of court life, the global exchange silks and muslins, the substantial size and splendour of some Indian urban communities, the contempt for European items -these were the explanations why Moghul India was viewed as affluent by some European voyagers. The living standard of the high society was absolutely high and there were greater accumulates of gold and valuable stones than in Europe, however there is significant proof that the mass of the populace were more regrettable off than in Europe. The Moghul economy appears to have been at its crest under Akbar (1556-1605) and to have declined from there on (8). At its top, it is possible that the for every capita item was similar with that of Elizabethan England. By the mid eighteenth century, when India turned into an European state, there appears small question that the economy was retrograde by West European benchmarks, with a for every capita item maybe two-thirds of that in England and France.

Notwithstanding India's notoriety as a fabric maker, Abul Fazl, the sixteenth-century recorder of Akbar, makes reference to the absence of attire in Bengal, 'men and ladies for the generally part go bare wearing just a fabric about the loins'. Their loincloths were frequently of jute rather than cotton. In Orissa 'the ladies blanket just the more level part of the form and might make themselves blankets of the leaves of trees'. They likewise fail to offer the provincial cloth and covers, which European laborers of that period might have possessed. Regarding lodging and furniture the Indian proletariat were more regrettable off than their European partners and their eating methodology was additionally poorer. Utilization of meat and wine was irrelevant and there was no brewskie.

This Docility OF Village Culture

The head normal for Indian social order which separated it from others was the establishment of station. The beginnings of position are covered in ancient history. It isolates the populace into totally

unrelated gatherings whose investment and social capacities are unmistakably described and inherited.

Old religious writings group Hindus into four primary assemblies: brahmins, a position of ministers at the highest point of the social scale whose stylized untaintedness was not to be dirtied by manual labour; afterward in necessity came the kshatriyas or warriors, thirdly the vaishyas or traders, and at long last the sudras, or agriculturists.

Beneath this there were melechas or pariahs to perform humble and unclean errands. Yet this old hypothetical model of the Rigveda is to a degree deceiving. In every principle phonetic region of India there are in the ballpark of two hundred differentiate rank gathers with their own particular name, and each of these is liable to be separated into in the ballpark of ten sub-positions which are the successful limits of social life. Brahmins and untouchables are discernable all over, yet the characterization of middle of the road positions is vague and regularly does not submit to the kshatriya, vaishya, sudra classification. In every village there will be a position which is financially and socially predominant, what's more in numerous villages this prevailing station will be a laborer position. In all parts of India there are outcastes at the base (they are presently in the vicinity of 15 for every penny of the populace), and the vicinity of these "untouchables" gives all position Hindus a feeling of prevalent economic wellbeing regardless of how unfortunate they might be themselves.

In every village the prevailing position regulated the area, however their property rights were encompassed. When all is said in done, land might not be exchanged or sold to individuals outside the village, and occupants of the prevailing station can't be expelled. Generally villages fit in with developing ranks, with every family tending standard however unequal imparts of the area. Brahmins were not cultivators, in any case went about as a nearby organization or squirearchy in partnership with the by regional standards prevailing rank and utilized level position or untouchable labourers to grow their property. In every village there were artisans who furnished non-rural products and administrations, e.g. smithies, woodworkers, potters, cobblers, weavers, washer-men, hair stylists, water bearers, stargazers, guards and, infrequently, moving young ladies. Turning was not a particular art yet was done by village ladies. These artisan families did not push their items for cash yet had an inherited supporter customer (jajmani) association with an aggregation of growing families. Accordingly a washer-man or hairdresser might serve a family's needs free all through the year and get installment in kind at harvest time. Moreover, there was a more level class of untouchable village servants to perform modest assignments, e.g. clearing, evacuation of human and creature compost, as a fair exchange for installment in kind.

An additional trademark characteristic of Indian social order was the joint family framework. This framework is regular to numerous nations, and is helpful in giving a significant level of government disability. All eras of the family existed together and pooled their livelihood with small qualification between siblings and cousins as far as family commitments. Be that as it may, the framework hindered single person impetuses to work or save, and gave no intention in restricting family measure. In the Indian joint family, ladies were totally subordinate to men, and mature person men were relied upon to do what their fathers let them know. Ladies were not chosen by spouses, yet by the crew. Spouses were regularly respectably more senior than wives, yet widows were not permitted to remarry and were required to live in complete disconnection, in spite of the fact that their marriage may never have been consummated.

COMMUNICATION PERTAINING TO MUSLIMS AND ALSO HINDUS

The Muslim populace was dependably a minority yet in the Moghul period it had presumably come to be something like a fifth or a quarter of the sum. A minority of Indian Muslims (something like 10 for every penny) were slid from the Islamic winners (Turks, Afghans and Mongols) who had come to India through the Khyber Pass. The rest incorporated some persuasively changed over Hindus, and numerous more voluntary changes over -flat position Hindus pulled in by the more libertarian Muslim social order. The Muslim proportion developed as time goes on the grounds that polygamy and widow remarriage gave them more amazing richness than Hindus.

Muslims were exceptionally amassed in the North, in the Indo-Gangetic plain. In the South they were fundamentally in court towns and substantially all the more daintily spread. The foremost Muslim trespassers did persuasive changes, however later rulers controlled their evangelizing exercises somewhat as a result of Hindu safety, part of the way in light of the fact that they understood that this might lessen their upper class status. The main range where the indigenous populace was changed over to Islam all at once was East Bengal which had an in number Buddhist convention and looked on the Islamic intruders as deliverers from Hindu run the show.

Moghul control of India crumbled after the expiration of Aurangzeb in 1707. Given the size of the nation, which was as large as the entire of Europe, and its racial, phonetic and religious intricacy, it is not amazing that it went into disrepair. Aurangzeb is regularly rebukes for the cave in light of the fact that he was too aggressive. He dismissed Akbar's arrangement of religious tolerance, decimated Hindu sanctuaries, reimposed the jizya (a capitation charge on non-Muslims) and

usurped some non-Muslim august states when titles passed. Accordingly Aurangzeb was occupied with a steady arrangement of wars to hold his Empire together.³⁸ After his passing, it part into a few parts. In Western India, the Mahrattas secured an autonomous Hindu state with their capital at Poona. The Nizam-ul-Mulk, a high Moghul official who anticipated the breakdown of the Empire, instated himself as the independent leader of Hyderabad in 1724. In 1739, the Persian head Nadit Shah attacked India, slaughtered the populace of Delhi and took away so much goods (counting Shah Jehan's peacock throne and the Kohinoor jewel) that he was equipped to dispatch Persian charges for three years. He likewise affixed Punjab furthermore set up an autonomous kingdom in Lahore. The Punjab was later caught by the Sikhs. In other ranges which ostensibly stayed in the Empire, e.g. Bengal, Mysore and Oudh, the force of the Moghul head declined, as did his income. Constant interior warfare incredibly debilitated the economy and exchange of the nation.

CONCLUSION

The Indian economy was the most intricate and refined to be colonized by Europeans, yet its profit level was altogether underneath that of Western Europe around then of triumph in the mid-eighteenth century. Its relative backwardness was somewhat innovative yet was mostly because of institutional qualities which forestalled it from making optimal utilization of its generation conceivable outcomes. The parasitic state contraption had a conflicting impact on processing motivators in horticulture, which was strengthened by the impact of 'built-in depressants' inside the village, where there was a further chain of importance of abuse. Beneficial speculation was insignificant and the funds of the economy were put resources into valuable metals, royal residences and tombs. The gainfulness of the urban economy was additionally antagonistically influenced by the ruthless character of the state. Urban industry and exchange had less security against the subjective requests of the state than was the situation in Western Europe. There were essential Indian businesspersons who worked as brokers and dealers, yet universal exchange and part of the creation of extravagance painstaking work was in the hands of outsiders.

The "financial" toll underpinned an affluent governing class and a couple of specific lavishness products commercial ventures. This budgetary surplus may later have been a wellspring of fast financial development had it been prepared by a modernized first class, as happened in Meiji Japan, however in India the monetary surplus was whittled down,

redistributed as rental pay, and somewhat emptied off in the pilgrim period.

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