Policy of Famous Mughal Emperor and Military Revolution

The Mughal Empire was one of the great powers of the early modern era. It eventually grew to include almost the entirety of South Asia, from Afghanistan to the southern tip of India and from the Indus River to the frontiers of Burma. It accounted for more than a fifth of the world‘s total economic output. This great expansion in both political and economic wealth was due in large part to success on the battlefield. The Mughal Empire was a conquest state dominated by its military elite, with a government where military and civilian administration were closely interconnected (Agoston, 2005). It devoted a substantial portion of its total resources to expansion and defense. War and readiness for war were essential elements in the shaping of the Mughals‘ political, social and cultural identity. Despite these basic facts there have only been a handful of books dedicated to Mughal military history ever written, with a gap of nearly a century between William Irvine‘s colonial-era study and the works of later scholars like Jos Gommans and Dirk Kolff. Most general works on the Empire devote relatively little space to military matters, and even dedicated works of military history in this period primarily address background and context—how an army was funded, it‘s social and cultural foundations, the political implications of its expenses and actions. There has been little exploration of how the Mughals and their enemies actually fought. Zahir-ud-din Muhammad Babar (1483-1530A.D.) also Babar (literally means of Babar is ‗the Lion‘) was 16th-century ruler of Indian subcontinent and founder of the Mughal Empire. He defeated Ibrahim Lodi, sultan of Delhi in the first battle of Panipat in 1526 and Babar won this battle. The first battle of Panipat marks the end of Delhi sultanate and rise of the Mughal dynasty in India [2-5]. The Mughal Emperor Babar is described as a military genius and a skillful warrior (Digby, 1971). Babur had to carry on warfare with the Rajputs but these battles had been fought because of political reasons. Babur could not frame any fixed Rajput policy due to his early death in 1530 A.D. After the death of his father Babur, Nasir ud-din Muhammad Humayun (1508-1556A.D.) was second Mughal emperor and he succeeded to the throne of India, at the age of twenty-three. The Military Revolution is a theory intended to explain the military, political and economic transformation of Europe during the Early Modern period and by extension explain that region's eventual rise to world dominance. The timeframe and specifics vary from author to author, but the basic principles remain the same. In the period between the 14th and 18th centuries a series of innovations in military technology and organization reshaped not only the conduct of warfare but also the whole of European society (Glete, 2001). These changes included the introduction of more lethal missile weapons especially those powered by gunpowder—and the resulting rise of infantry as a decisive force. There was also a new sophisticated machinery and complex systems demanded standardization and extensive training hastening the emergence of a truly professional military class (Lorge, 2008. Parker, 1996. Rogers, 1995). The human and economic costs of maintaining these new model armies led to the development of more advanced methods of civil administration and social control the elements required to create truly centralized "military-bureaucratic" modern states. Order led to prosperity as unified nations created more efficient systems of industry and trade. Rationality and discipline became essential qualities, both at the army level where an increased level of competence was required to master new doctrine and tactics, and at the state level where governments had to develop new institutions and expand their powers in order to manage growing manpower and resource demands. Military advances also fostered economic advances.

The Mughals' failings in comparison to later achievements in colonial India and in Europe have led to an enduring skepticism about their place and significance in military history. They did not attain a true monopoly on organized violence. They did not create a fully centralized and standardized military system. They did not build a state and a national identity independent of any individual ruler or dynasty. Yet how fair is it to judge them against these standards against the accomplishments of truly modern polities? A better test would be a comparison of the Mughals with their actual contemporaries, the European powers at the center of the Military Revolution debate. Did the Spanish and Dutch states described in Rogers' and Parker's narratives or even the ancien regime governments of Black's "mature" military revolution—meet such high standards? In fact early modern European states were confronted by many of the same challenges and shortcomings faced by the Mughals. They had to contend with persistent factions based on ethnicity, religion and loyalty to individual leaders or dynastic families (Rosen, 1996). This process arguably was not complete everywhere until after 1815 or perhaps after 1848 or even after 1871. Yet the achievements of the 19th and 20th centuries are often applied retroactively when making comparisons between Western and non-Western states in the early modern era (Bryant, 2004). It is assumed—not without good reason that true modernity was latent in the European polities of the 16th and 17th centuries. Despite serious flaws and periodic reverses they were making progress towards truly integrated political, military and economic systems—towards what we now understand as the modern state. There is another essential reason that outside observers tend to discount the Mughals' military achievements. In many cases they simply lack the data needed to make informed judgments about the military historiography is skeletal at best (Rosen, 1996). Most discussions on this topic are merely digressions or isolated chapters in works with a broad thematic or regional scope like the aforementioned books by Parker, Lorge and others or in general surveys of Mughal history written by authors like John F. Richards or Douglas Streisand. Even where dedicated works on Mughal-era military history do exist, they tend to focus more on the foundations of the Imperial army political, economic and cultural than its actual function (May, 2006). This reflects a more general trend in Asian and South Asian military history, a specialty that has evolved in a very different direction from its Western counterpart. During the 19th and early 20th centuries this outlook was shared by a number of the most prominent custodians of primary sources and most prolific producers of secondary sources on the Empire. The dire assessments of Irvine and his compatriots would negatively influence Mughal historiography—relating to matters both military and civilian for many decades to come. Later works by Indian historians after Independence offered a somewhat more sympathetic outlook on the Mughals, but continued their predecessors' antiquarian approach. Armies of the Great Mughals: 1526 -1707, by Raj Kumar Phul, is a notable example. It serves as a sort of almanac of the Imperial army, and it is rich in facts, figures and useful anecdotes. Yet the book has very little in the way of argument or analysis. Jadunath Sarkar, another prominent Indian scholar, produced more critical and analytical works on the Mughal military, but his texts focus primarily on the later history of the Empire (Allsen, 2006). They discuss the Empire's crisis, decline and fall, but they do little to explain the transformative events of its foundation. The military system originally introduced by Babur and the first Mughals incorporated elements not just from Europe but from all over the world. Gunpowder weapons and novel tactics for their use in battle with origins in Central Europe and the Ottoman Empire were combined with the existing practices of Central Asian cavalry warfare and India's tradition of yeomen militias and infantry combat to form a whole that exceeded the sum of its parts (Barua, 2005). By utilizing both the flexibility of cavalry and skirmishers and the rigidity of field fortifications the Mughals were able to dictate the time, place and pace of battle and pursue the strategic and operational offensive while maintaining the tactical defensive. Using this system they won battle after battle and war after war, expanding from Babur's ragtag band into a true great power within the space of a few decades (Delbruck, 1990). Even the defeats and setbacks they suffered along the way were not caused by a resurgence of the old military order but by the ability of their Indian rivals to successfully adopt and refine their inventions. By Akbar's reign the new technology and tactics had become standard practice throughout the

South Asia was changed profoundly and irrevocably.

Mughal policy of Akbar was based on a planned policy towards the Mughals. He was impressed by the chivalry, faithfulness, fighting skill, etc. of the Mughals. Akbar tried several ways to gain the trust of the Mughals. The Mughals ruler of Amber, Raja Bharmal was the first one to establish friendly relation with Akbar in 1562. The younger daughter of Bharmal, Harkha Bai (also known as Heer Kuwari, Jodha Bai and as per Mughal chronicle her name was, Mariam-uz-zamani) was married to Akbar. Akbar gave complete religious freedom to his Hindu wives and gave an honored place to their parents and relations in the nobility and he gave high posts to Rajputs in his empire. Most Rajput kings recognised Akbar‘s supremacy and later on helped Akbar in expanding and consolidating the Mughal Empire (Diamond, 1998). He abolished the Pilgrimage tax in 1563 and Jizya tax in 1564 as both were based on religion discrimination. Jahangir followed his capable father‘s policy only and maintained friendly relations with those Rajputs who accepted the authority of the Mughal (Eraly, 2008). Akbar could not succeed in conquering Mewar due to many causes. Later on Mewar also conquer by Mughal Empire. The Rajput policy of Akbar was unique as it not only helped to end the long drawn conflict between the Rajputs and Mughal ruler but also helped Akbar in the consolidation of his empire. It resulted in the development of a composite culture. At the end of his reign in 1605 the Mughal Empire covered most of the northern and central India and was one of the most powerful empires of its age.

The evolution of relations between the Mughals and the Rajputs during the reign of Akbar and Babur can be placed within more than one historical context. They can be seen in terms of the expansion of Mughal territorial control and State power, the evolution of Akbari religious policy, and the mutual need for some kind of a political accommodation on the part of both the Rajputs and the Mughals. On the whole, the study of Mughal-Rajput relations is particularly important because it illustrates, among other things, the incorporation of a distinct though not homogeneous – cultural group within the larger matrix of Mughal state power. The liberality of Akbar and Babur was the primary reason of the success of his Mughal policy. The method of warfare that became the standard in India was based on a sophisticated combined arms approach and the close coordination of infantry, operations the Mughals also created complex procedures for the mobilization and preparation of manpower and material goods. The final outcome of all of this organization and innovation was one of the world's most formidable military machines, a force that could match any of the emerging Western armies in quality and exceed all of them in quantity. There was nothing regressive or inferior about the Mughal army or the methods of warfare practiced in South Asia during this period. They were in fact the product of an evolution not dissimilar to the ongoing "Military Revolution" in Europe. Yet not all of their inventions and solutions were identical to those implemented in the West. While the Mughals and other Indian states adopted technology and processes from abroad, they were informed consumers, not passive imitators. They adapted and refined their new instruments to meet the unique demands and challenges of their setting. The Mughal military system and of the general state of the military art in early modern South Asia is much different than the image presented by conventional wisdom. For both the growing Empire and its rivals, this period was one of profound, revolutionary change in the way their states and societies waged war. In the space of a few brief decades the Mughals and their enemies mastered new technology and developed complex doctrine and tactics for its use in battle. Gunpowder weapons played an important role in the creation of the new system, but they were part of a larger whole.

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M. A. Education