

Analysis of Kargil War: Some Reflections

Dr. Pinky Dhall*

M.A., Military Science, M.A, Sociology, Ph.D. Asst. Prof. (Guest Faculty), Mehgaon, College

Abstract – The Kargil conflict can be sorted as a 'restricted war'. It was started by Pakistan to accomplish blended military and political goals, yet made essential misinterpretations that destined the endeavor to disappointment. The inquiries examined in this article are: the reason was India astounded; for what reason did the two nations watch such incredible restriction; did the Kargil conflict have a nuclear measurement; and is 'constrained war' a practical idea with nuclear prevention getting in South Asia. It likewise contends that the Kargil conflict was a special case, in a few measurements, to the 'strength precariousness conundrum'.

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INTRODUCTION

After its devastating thrashing by India in the 1971 war, Pakistan grappled with the hard reality that it couldn't take away Kashmir by force. Kashmir was moderately calm for around eighteen years without any Pakistani plot. In any case, Islamabad started to demonstrate its real nature by and by in late 1980s. Since 1989 it took fall back on the approach of low force conflict (LIC)¹ to drain India in a roundabout way through a strategy of "thousand cuts" and attempt to accomplish its long haul goal of grabbing Kashmir far from India. As a major aspect of this plan, Pakistan started cross-fringe fear based oppression against India by equipping and preparing different gatherings of Kashmir activists, and furnishing them with political, monetary and military help. These aggressors were to complete subversive exercises in Kashmir with a definitive target of the withdrawal of the State from India. Following 10 years in length intermediary war of this kind, Pakistan propelled a constrained scale-war against India in mid-1999 at Kargil sector of Kashmir.

The 1999 Kargil War occurred between May 8, when Pakistani forces and Kashmiri aggressors were identified on the Kargil edges and July 14 when the two sides had basically stopped their military operations. It is trusted that the planning for the operation, by Pakistan, may have happened about as ahead of schedule as the harvest time of 1998.

The spring and summer attack of Pakistan-supported military into region on the Indian side of the line of control around Kargil in the province of Jammu and Kashmir and the Indian military battle to repulse the interruption left 524 Indian soldiers dead and 1,363 injured, as per December 1 measurements by Defense Minister George Fernandes. Prior Government figures expressed that 696 Pakistani

soldiers were murdered. A senior Pakistani police official evaluated that roughly 40 regular people were murdered on the Pakistani side of the line of control.

By 30 June 1999 Indian forces were set up for a major high-height hostile against Pakistani posts along the fringe in the debated Kashmir area. Over the past a month and a half India had moved five infantry divisions, five independent detachments and 44 battalions of paramilitary troops to Kashmir. The aggregate Indian troop quality in the locale had achieved 730,000. The development incorporated the arrangement of around 60 frontline aircraft.

The Pakistani push to take Kargil happened after the February 1999 Lahore summit between then Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the Indian Prime Minister Atal Bahari Vajpayee. This meeting was accepted to have de-heightened the strains that had existed since May 1998. The major intention behind the operation was to help in internationalizing the Kashmir issue, and for which worldwide consideration had been hailing for quite a while. The interruption plan was the brainchild of Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff, Gen Pervez Musharraf and Lt Gen Mohammed Aziz, the Chief of General Staff. They got just an 'on a fundamental level' simultaneousness, with no specifics, from Nawaz Sharif, the Pakistani Prime Minister.

Pakistan's military go for doing the interruptions depended on misuse of the expansive holes that exist in the resistances in the sector both on Indian and Pak side of the Line of Control (LoC). The territory is to a great degree tough with not very many tracks driving from the primary streets towards the LoC. Amid winters the territory gets substantial snowfall making development relatively inconceivable. The main mountain pass associating the Kargil territory to the Kashmir Valley, Zoji La,

typically opens before the finish of May or start of June. Accordingly, moving of reinforcements by surface means from Srinagar would not have been conceivable till at that point. Pakistan Army ascertained that regardless of whether the interruptions were found toward the beginning of May, as they were, the Indian Army's response would be moderate and constrained, in this manner enabling him to solidify the interruptions all the more successfully. In the occasion, be that as it may, Zoji La was opened for the enlistment of troops toward the beginning of May itself. The interruptions, if compelling, would empower Pakistani troops to secure various overwhelming statures from where the Srinagar-Leh National Highway 1A could be prohibited at various spots. The interruptions would likewise attract and secure Indian Army saves. The interruptions would, further, give Pakistan control over generous tracts of key land zone over the LoC, in this manner, empowering Islamabad to consult from a place of quality. The interruptions would unalterably adjust the status of the LoC.

Aside from keeping the plan top mystery, the Pakistan Army additionally embraced certain means to keep up a component of astonishment and augment trickery. There was no enlistment of any new units or any crisp troops into the FCNA for the proposed operation. Any huge scale troop development including even a few battalions would have drawn the consideration of the Indian Army. The Pakistan Army mounted guns units, which were enlisted into the FCNA amid the substantial trade of shoot from July to September 1998, were not de-drafted. Since the trading of ordnance fire proceeded with from that point, however at a lower scale, this was not viewed as phenomenal.

There was no development of hold arrangements or units into FCNA until after the execution of the plan and operations had started with the Indian Army's reaction. No new managerial bases for the interruptions were to be made, rather they were to be provided food for from those as of now in the current protections. The calculated lines of correspondence were to be along the ridgelines and the nullahs well far from the tracks and places of the Indian Army troops as of now in position. After it was concluded, the plan was put without hesitation towards the finish of April. The primary gatherings were broken into various littler sub gatherings of 30 to 40 each to carry out numerous interruptions along the ridgelines and occupy overwhelming statures.

The territory of the Kargil and encompassing locales of the LOC is unwelcoming in the best of times. A portion of the attributes of the locale are rough statures of up to 18,000 feet and cruel whirlwinds and temperatures diving to about - 60 degrees Celsius in the winter. The fight landscape of 'Operation Vijay' is ruled by high height pinnacles and ridgelines the majority of which are more than 16000 ft. This area is a piece of the 'frosty forsake' district of Ladakh. Dry,

and in the meantime extremely frosty, the Kargil Mountains are an impressive constituent of the Greater Himalayas. Not at all like other comparable high height territories, the Kargil Mountains lose snow cover quickly as the late spring advances. Beneath the pinnacles and the ridgelines are free rocks, which make climbing to a great degree troublesome. On the off chance that it isn't the snow cover, at that point it is the rocks, which cause extraordinary hardships on the troops.

Indian Army Patrols distinguished gatecrashers on Kargil edges amid the period 8-15 May 1999. The example of penetration plainly settled the investment of prepared Mujahideen and Pakistan Army regulars in these operations in zones east of Batalik and north of Dras. Pakistan depended on ordnance terminating from over the fringe both all in every aspect of Kargil and Dras. Indian army propelled operations which prevailing with regards to removing the infiltrators in Dras sector. Infiltrators were additionally pushed back in Batalik sector.

INDIAN ARMY OPERATIONS

The Indian Army recognized the interruptions between May 3-12. From May 15 - 25, 1999, military operations were planned, troops moved to their assault areas, gunnery and other gear were moved in and the important hardware was acquired. Indian Army's hostile named Operation Vijay was propelled on May 26, 1999. Indian troops moved towards Pakistani occupied positions with air cover gave via aircraft and helicopters.

Operation Vijay in the Kargil locale of Jammu and Kashmir amid the late spring a very long time of 1999 was a joint Infantry-Artillery try to remove general Pakistani soldiers of the Northern Light Infantry (NLI) who had meddled over the Line of Control (LoC) into Indian domain and had occupied un-held high-height mountain pinnacles and ridgelines. It soon turned out to be evident that exclusive gigantic and supported capability could annihilate the gatecrashers' sangars and efficiently break their will to battle through a procedure of whittling down and, all the while, empower the heroic infantrymen to shut in with and remove the interlopers. Hence started an exceptional adventure in the historical backdrop of the work of Artillery capability in fight.

The principal major ridgeline to fall was Tololing in the Drass sub-sector on June 13, 1999 which was caught following a little while of unpleasant battling. The assaults were gone before by managed discharge ambushes from more than one hundred Artillery firearms, mortars and rocket launchers terminating in show. A great many shells, bombs and rocket warheads destroyed devastation and kept the foe from meddling with the ambush. The 155 mm Bofors medium weapons and 105 mm Indian field firearms in the immediate shooting part crushed all unmistakable foe sangars and forced the adversary to relinquish a

few positions. The curves of discharge trailing behind the Bofors high hazardous shells and the Grad rockets gave a marvelous sight and imparted fear into the psyches of Pakistani soldiers.

The catch of the Tololing complex made ready for progressive strikes to be propelled on the Tiger Hill complex from a few headings. Tiger Hill was re-caught on July 5, 1999 and Point 4875, another overwhelming component toward the west of Tiger Hill and sticking into Mashkoh Valley, was re-caught on July 7, 1999. Point 4875 has since been re-named "Weapon Hill" to pay tribute to the breathtaking execution of the Gunners in the Drass and Mashkoh sub-sectors.

More than 1,200 rounds of high touchy descended upon Tiger Hill and caused extensive scale demise and obliteration. By and by, the Gunners of the Indian Artillery discharged their weapons boldly in the immediate shooting part, under the very nose of Pakistani mounted guns perception posts (OPs), without respect for individual wellbeing. Indeed, even 122 mm Grad multi-barrel rocket launchers (MBRLs) were employed in the immediate terminating part. Many shells and rocket warheads affected on the apex of Tiger Hill in full perspective of TV cameras and the country viewed in riveted consideration the might of the Regiment of Artillery .

While the country's consideration was bolted on the battling in the Drass sector, enduring advancement was being made in the Batalik sector in spite of substantial setbacks. In the Batalik sector, the landscape was substantially harder and the foe was much more emphatically dug in. The control fight itself took just about a month. Gunnery OPs were built up on overwhelming statures and maintained Artillery discharge was brought down on the adversary ceaselessly by day and night permitting him no rest.

Point 5203 was re-caught on June 21, 1999 and Khalubar was re-caught on July 6, 1999. Inside the following couple of days, additionally assaults were squeezed home against the staying Pakistani posts in the Batalik sub-sector and these fell rapidly in the wake of being pounded by Artillery fire. Indeed, Artillery capability had an essential influence in softening the resistances and crushing the adversary's unit central command and coordinations framework.

The Indian Artillery discharged more than 250,000 shells, bombs and rockets amid the Kargil conflict. Roughly, 5,000 Artillery shells, mortar bombs and rockets were discharged every day from 300 firearms, mortars and MBRLs. Such high rates of flame over long stretches had not been seen anyplace on the planet since the second World War.

AIR OPERATIONS

From May 11 to May 25, ground troops bolstered by the Air Force endeavored to contain the danger, evaluated the foe attitudes and did different preliminary activities. Passage of the Air Force into battle activity on May 26 spoke to a change in perspective in the nature and guess of the conflict. In operation Safed Sagar, the Air Force completed almost 5,000 forays of numerous kinds more than 50-odd days of operations.

The Western Air Command led the three-week-long exercise Trishul three weeks previously Kargil. Amid Trishul, the IAF flew 5,000 fights with 300 aircraft utilizing 35,000 work force and connected with focuses at high rise in the Himalayas. The IAF asserted to have flown 550 fights in Kargil, however pretty much 80 were on or near the objective. Not long after Kargil, both the president and senior air staff officer of the Western Air Command were bafflingly exchanged to the Central and Eastern summons. Operations in this territory required uncommon preparing and strategies. It was soon understood that more prominent aptitudes and preparing were expected to assault the little/scaled down targets surviving, frequently not noticeable to the exposed eye.

The shoulder-terminated rocket risk was inescapable and there were no questions about this. An IAF Canberra reconnaissance aircraft was harmed by a Pakistani Stinger let go conceivably from over the LoC. On the second and third day of the operations, still in the expectation to absorb information, the IAF lost one MiG-21 contender and one Mi-17 helicopter to bear let go rockets by the foe. Likewise, one MiG-27 was lost on the second day because of motor disappointment soon after the pilot had conveyed unsuccessful assaults on one of the adversary's principle supply dumps. These occasions just went to reinforce the strategies of the IAF in doing assaults from outside the Stinger SAM envelope and staying away from the utilization of helicopters for assault purposes. Assault helicopters have a specific utility in operations under moderately benevolent conditions yet are to a great degree helpless in an exceptional front line. The way that the foe let go in excess of 100 shoulder let go SAMs against IAF aircraft shows not just the immense force of the foe air safeguards in the territory yet in addition the achievement of IAF strategies, particularly after the initial three days of the war amid which not a solitary aircraft got even a scratch.

The territory in the Kargil region is 16,000 to 18,000 feet above ocean level. The aircraft are, thusly, required to fly at around 20,000 feet. At these statures, the air thickness is 30% not exactly adrift level. This causes a diminishment in weight that can be conveyed and furthermore lessens the capacity

to move as the span of a turn is more than what it is at bring down levels. The bigger span of turn decreases manoeuvrability in the confined width of the valley. The motor's execution likewise decays concerning the same forward speed there is a lesser mass of air going into the stream motor of the contender or helicopter. The non-standard air thickness likewise influences the direction of weapons. The terminating, henceforth, may not be precise. In the mountains, the objectives are generally little, spread-out and hard to spot outwardly, especially by pilots in fast flies.

The Indian airfields closest to Kargil were Srinagar and Avantipur. Adampur close Jalandhar was additionally sufficiently close to help air operations. Subsequently, the IAF worked from these three bases. The planes utilized for ground assault were MiG-21s, MiG-23s, MiG-27s, Jaguars and the Mirage-2000. The Mig-21 was assembled essentially for air capture attempt with an optional part of ground assault. In any case, it is equipped for working in confined spaces which was of significance in the Kargil landscape.

The MiG 27s are enhanced for assaulting focuses on the ground. They can convey a heap of 4 tons each. This could be a blend of weapons including gun, rocket cases, free-fall and impeded bombs and shrewd weapons. It has an electronic bomb locate which empowers precise weapon conveyance. These planes were, in this manner, perfect for use in the sloping landscape of Kargil.

NAVAL OPERATIONS

While the Army and the Air Force prepared themselves for the fight on the statutes of Kargil, Indian Navy started to draw out its plans. Dissimilar to the prior wars with Pakistan, this time the acquiring of the Navy at the beginning times of the conflict served to rush the finish of the conflict to support India.

In drawing up its strategy, the Navy was certain that an answer to the Pakistani misfortune must be two dimensional. While guaranteeing wellbeing and security of Indian oceanic resources from a conceivable astonishment assault by Pakistan, the Indian basic was that all endeavors must be made to deflect Pakistan from heightening the conflict into a full scale war. In this manner, the Indian Navy was put on a full alarm from May 20 onwards, a couple of days preceding the dispatch of the Indian retaliatory hostile. Naval and Coast Guard aircraft were put on a consistent reconnaissance and the units prepared up for addressing any difficulty adrift.

Time had now come to put weight on Pakistan, to guarantee that the correct message went down to the geniuses in that nation. Strike components from the Eastern Fleet were cruised from Visakhapatnam on the East Coast to participate in a major naval exercise called 'SUMMEREX' in the North Arabian

Sea. This was imagined as the biggest consistently storing up of naval ships in the district. The message had been driven home. Pakistan Navy, in a guarded mind-set, guided every one of its units to stay away from Indian naval boats. As the activity moved nearer to the Makaran Coast, Pakistan moved all its major soldiers out of Karachi. It additionally moved its concentration to escorting its oil exchange from the Gulf in suspicion of assaults by Indian boats.

As the retaliation from the Indian Army and the Air Force gathered momentum and a defeat to Pakistan seemed a close possibility, an outbreak of hostilities became imminent. Thus the naval focus now shifted to the Gulf of Oman. Rapid reaction missile carrying units and ships from the fleet were deployed in the North Arabian Sea for carrying out missile firing, anti-submarine and electronic warfare exercises. In the absence of the only aircraft carrier, Sea Harrier operations from merchant ships were proven. The Navy also readied itself for implementing a blockade of the Pakistani ports, should the need arise. In addition, Naval amphibious forces from the Andaman group of islands were moved to the western sea-board.

In a skilful use of naval power in the form of 'Operation Talwar', the 'Eastern Fleet' joined the 'Western Naval Fleet' and blocked the Arabian sea routes of Pakistan. Apart from a deterrent, the former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharief later disclosed that Pakistan was left with just six days of fuel (POL) to sustain itself if a full-fledged war broke out.

PAKISTAN'S STRATEGY

A great deal has been composed on Pakistan's endeavors to instigate inconvenience in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) at different phases of its history and the war in Kargil was another such endeavor. The point which was exceptionally clear and obvious was to internationalize the J&K issue. Pakistan was very much aware that close regularity had returned in the Valley, and maybe the time had come to open another front to proceed with the push to internationalize the issue. Militarily, it planned to occupy statutes well inside our side, to change over the line of interruption into a true LoC. Sartaj Aziz, the Pakistani outside pastor had more than once been remarking about the "equivocal" idea of the LoC. Politically, poor key math was shown by Pakistan, basically on three major checks. Right off the bat, the operations were propelled with no thought in its planning in connection to the Lahore Summit. While politically, the Lahore Summit as a result of the visit of the Indian head administrator saw a defrost in the relations between the two countries, yet short lived, militarily, the planning and execution of the operation was going all out and was to make a major shame India a couple of months after the fact. It is, without a doubt, troublesome for us who are luckily in a popularity based condition to grasp the likelihood of a national issue like the Kargil operations not being

examined with the official leader of the nation. Regardless of whether Gen Musharraf discussed or informed his leader on the points of interest of the operation which was maybe in progress amid the visit of the Indian head administrator, will keep on being remain covered in puzzle, in any event within a reasonable time-frame. The previous Pakistan Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, while in a state of banishment in Saudi Arabia, had admitted that he had been simply educated of some military activity being pondered in Kargil, yet was not kept in the photo of the points of interest of the operational plans; a charge which has over and over been denied by Gen Musharraf. An examination of the planning of the operation shows that without a doubt the war in Kargil had been planned and was being executed while Prime Minister Vajpayee was going to the chronicled Lahore Summit.

I think the second error made by Pakistan in choice of the planning of the assault was in questioning the Indian government's ability of a military reaction. Pakistan kept on letting us know and the world that lone aggressors were working and no consistent troops had been utilized. It is clear that the Pakistani military initiative had not valued the striking back from India, especially since an intermediary government was in control which was surveyed to be not able show the political will in taking major retaliatory measures. The way that India retaliated with its military brought about Pakistan turning out at last sprinters up in a war which in any case it ought not have wandered into.

The third erroneous conclusion depended on Pakistan's conventional association with China. Pakistan maybe valued that start of inconvenience on the J&K fringes would get unfit help from China. It might be reviewed that in 1965 and 1971, Pakistan had construct its war plans with respect to some type of inferred bolster from China. In any case, in both these conflicts, aside from restorative good help as far as explanations made by China, there was no endeavor to physically intercede in the conflict. Correspondingly, in Kargil, from Pakistan's perspective, China's reaction and support was insufficient and like before conflicts, there was no military mediation. China, since the most recent two decades, has been seeking after its monetary objectives with foreknowledge, life and assurance and I feel that for the following a few decades, it will keep on striving for financial and military predominance. Till it accomplishes its objective of acknowledgment as a superpower, it is probably not going to utilize its muscles and will probably show discretionary development in taking care of touchy issues. A call to arms may maybe be the last choice which it might want to practice within a reasonable time-frame.

CROSSING THE LOC

There may have been political impulses for India not to allow the military to cross the LoC. In any case, the sacredness of the LoC was disregarded by Pakistan which, for political reasons we didn't misuse, and as occasions later demonstrated, it attempted further bolstering our good fortune in increasing some brownie focuses from the global group, especially the US, for showing most extreme restriction notwithstanding grave incitement. While the purposes behind not crossing the LoC may have appeared well and good, militarily it sometimes fell short for our strategic plans and put us under unwarranted weight. Wars, if push onto a nation, must be battled on the adversary's region; shockingly, in military terms, we neglected to accomplish our target.

It might be reviewed that the Pakistan Army had occupied strategic statures on our side of the LoC, with the most profound entrance being around 7-8 km, which by chance likewise commanded the national roadway by perception. From these regions, the adversary could cut down viable fire on us and in the underlying phases of the conflict, could effectively forbid the roadway at Dras and Kaksar. There were various circumstances, both amid day and in addition during the evening, when my motorcade was let go upon from these adversary interruptions. The foe's fire had made serious harm our temporary travel camp at Dras. Afterward, with the enlistment of HQ 56 and 192 Mountain Brigade in Dras, the HQ was under consistent fire. Luckily for us, the HQ was well burrowed down which kept any serious harm. With this example of sending, our underlying strikes were strategically confined. We needed to dispatch operations from the flanks as the landscape and the adversary's organization blocked any ambush from the back. Be that as it may, as the operations advanced, the chance to address the destinations from the back by crossing the LoC was exceptionally achievable, yet our unambiguous terms of reference did not allow us to cross the LoC.

While the army's operations were antagonistically influenced by our not crossing the LoC, the effect of this choice on the lead of the operations of the airforce had more genuine and more extensive ramifications. As specified before, the lay of the landscape was with the end goal that for a fruitful air strike, the aircraft needed to approach the target in a south to north heading; this would have brought about crossing the LoC. The air assaults perforce must be propelled in a west to east heading which gave constrained air space and limited mobility. The final product of this was our trouble in precisely captivating targets and a significant loss of viability of the air strikes.

I think the fundamental purpose behind our arrangement of not crossing the LoC was to exhibit

our capacity to practice restriction and, all the while, show ourselves as a develop law based power that held the high benefits of keeping up peace no matter what, regardless of the incitement. Politically, we picked up from embracing this arrangement and were sufficiently tapped for showing development in dealing with this issue. Be that as it may, we additionally willynilly acknowledged the LoC as the accepted worldwide outskirt. While this may reinforce our case for enduring peace in J&K, it debilitates our case for asserting the whole J&K as an indispensable piece of the nation.

There was additionally an inclination that enabling the forces to cross the LoC would heighten the circumstance and with the two nations having nuclear weapons, the outcomes could have been deplorable. It is my firm conviction, enough reinforced throughout the years after the Kargil War that we ought to have challenged Pakistan's false front. We were balanced and adjusted as far as our hostile ability in J&K and could have taken care of any reaction to Pakistan's misfortune with the solidness it merited. On the western outskirt also, we were prepared to go up against Pakistan after our preparation. Because of our activities, I trust that the war would not have crossed the nuclear edge and would have stayed restricted to the Kargil sector. A ultimate choice in a working majority rules system, regardless, lies with the political initiative and I am certain contributions from the Service boss more likely than not been taken in light of this alternative.

INDIA'S MILITARY RESPONSE

Two "shepherds" in the zone of Banju in the Batalik sector initially saw the interruptions in the Kargil sector on 3 May 1999. That was accounted for to 3 PUNJAB, the contingent in charge of the security of that region. 3 PUNJAB propelled two watches on 4 and 6 May 1999, to research the revealed interruption. Both the watches were trapped by the gatecrashers and Pakistani interruptions were affirmed on 7 May 1999. Along these lines, more watch parties and troops were sent to evaluate the circumstance and contain the interruption. The Army's underlying evaluation toward the beginning of May was that, around 200 to 300 Pakistani interlopers had penetrated over the LoC and were occupying sure remote and unmanned regions. By 17 May, there was expanding proof that outfitted gatecrashers had occupied the statures in the holes between the Indian guarded regions in all sub-sectors of the Kargil sector in different qualities – Batalik (200-250); Kaksar (80-100); Dras (60-80); and Mashkoh (200-250).³⁷ By the most recent seven day stretch of May the Indian Army understood that the Pakistani interlopers had occupied as many as 70 positions along the LoC. They likewise went to the tardy acknowledgment that well finished the underlying appraisal of 800 gatecrashers were associated with the operation. More regrettable still, the gatecrashers had occupied various key positions

straightforwardly over the street from Kargil to Leh and were in a situation to remove the northern segments of Kashmir from whatever is left of the State. Airborne reconnaissance uncovered that the interlopers were outfitted with snowmobiles, gunnery and significant load of provisions.

The underlying point of the Indian forces was to set up contact, survey the degree of interruptions, and contain the foe. Thus, a progression of assaults were propelled in the following days on highlights held by the Pakistanis. Truth be told, the Indian Army had started its hostile against the gatecrashers on 8 May. But since of the absence of ground cover and the interlopers' charge of the statures, the propelling Indian troops turned out to be simple focuses for Pakistani marksmen and heavy weapons specialists. In the wake of taking significant setbacks, India understood that the interlopers were vigorously furnished and all around dug in and their expulsion would require extremely ponder measures including more noteworthy capability and utilization of air control.

On 25 May 1999, the powerful Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) met in New Delhi to check out the circumstance and attempt a far reaching political-military investigation of the developing issue. In the gathering it was understood that Kargil interruptions acted military like well as political and discretionary difficulties. The political mandate given to the Indian military was to expel the pockets of interruption and reestablish the sacredness of the LoC. No time span was given. CCS likewise endorsed the utilization of air control against the dug in gatecrashers. Be that as it may, it entirely stipulated that LoC would not be crossed and in the event that it ended up important to cross it, endorsement of the Cabinet must be looked for. 39 India's military strategy in Kargil, radiating from this political mandate, depended on three goals: First, to contain the foe's pockets of interruption and keep their further develop and union; Second, to remove the gatecrashers and reestablish the LoC; Third, to hold ground so emptied and deny the same to the adversary.

STRATEGIC LESSONS FROM THE WAR

Many strategic lessons have emerged from the Kargil War. Some important lessons that should be noted are as follows:

- There are remote chances of full-scale conventional wars between two nuclear weapon states. But as long as there are territory-related disputes, the adversary may indulge in a proxy war leading to a conventional war or a limited border war.
- Loss of territory is unacceptable to the public or political authority. This is a strategic handicap and a risk in a conventional war setting, which increases in a limited war

scenario. It implies greater attention to surveillance and close defence of the borders or lines of controls.

- The new strategic environment calls for speedier, more versatile and more flexible combat organisations in the mountainous as well as non-mountainous terrain. The successful outcome of a border war depends upon the ability to react rapidly to an evolving crisis. The military would be expected to react quickly in order to localise/freeze/reverse the situation and to arrest the deterioration, enhance deterrence, and prevent escalation on the ground.
- Capability to wage a successful conventional and nuclear war is a necessary deterrent. A war may remain limited because of credible deterrence or *escalation dominance*, when a side has overwhelming military superiority at every level. The other side will then be deterred from using conventional or nuclear war due to the ability of the first to wage a war with much greater chances of success. It means more room is available for manoeuvre in diplomacy and in conflict.

CONCLUSION

Kargil spoke to a takeoff from the low power battle (LIC) operations that have most as of late encapsulated the military measurement of the Kashmir question. Though these kinds of operations normally set guerillas against Indian police and paramilitary forces, Kargil saw the two sides draw in with customary military forces over a true fringe even with Pakistani endeavors to seize and hold an area. The lessons the two belligerents took from the emergency and their individual judgments of whether their activities were effective could recommend the prospects for future military activities of more prominent force.

For India, Kargil affirmed its conviction that Pakistan is a foolhardy, adventurous, and dishonest state. Kargil inspired India to reevaluate whether to draw in Pakistan carefully on the Kashmir issue. What's more, the emergency fortified the across the board observation that India's insight foundation has endemic inadequacies. It likewise drove India to understand that universal regard for Kashmir isn't out and out bothersome, especially when the consideration centers around Pakistani misfortunes.

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Corresponding Author

Dr. Pinky Dhall*

M.A., Military Science, M.A, Sociology, Ph.D. Asst. Prof. (Guest Faculty), Mehgaon, College

E-Mail –