

Internal Security Threat to India from State Sponsored Terrorism by Pakistan

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Abstract – *The study of various politico-security implications of terrorism in Pakistan and state-sponsored terrorism for India becomes imperative in the presence of deteriorating security situation in the country especially in context of Kashmir. The paper throws light on the deteriorating security situation in India due to state-sponsored terrorism by Pakistan especially in context of Kashmir and brings out various politico-security implications of terrorism in Pakistan for India. The chapter also draws our attention to the issue of state terrorism as one of the important implications and the human rights violation by the state institutions that have taken place under the aegis of legislative rules such as Armed Forces Special Protection Act (AFSPA).*

Key Words – Internal Security, India, State-Sponsored Terrorism, Pakistan, Kashmir

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Terrorism in Pakistan poses grave threat to the internal security of India and has various politico-security implications for the country. India's four large states viz. Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir share border with Pakistan which are victim of the spill over effect of terrorism from the neighbouring country of Pakistan. These states are the destination for illegal weapon smuggling and drug trafficking. They could be a new source of destination for the terrorists present in Pakistan as has been the case in Kashmir. Pakistan is involved in supporting organized crimes activities in India. It is believed that Pakistan is sheltering the most-wanted criminal of India and the leader of Indian organized crime syndicate D-Company, Dawood Ibrahim. In an interview with *India Today TV*, the reputed Pakistani journalist and author Arif Jamal confirmed presence of Dawood Ibrahim in Pakistan. (*India Today*, 23 August 2015) He claimed to have met Dawood twice in Karachi and that Anees Ibrahim, brother of Dawood Ibrahim was his neighbour in defence neighbourhood of the city. (*ibid.*) Arif Jamal believes that Dawood and his gang have the support and protection of the Pakistani army and opined that "Pakistan's support to Dawood Ibrahim and his group is actually part of Pakistan's strategy to beat India and whoever is ready to act against the Indian state" which he sees it as part of a bigger strategy. (*ibid.*) Dawood Ibrahim has been involved in several terror activities in India. There is an increased collusion between terrorist elements and organized crime posing security threat especially in the region along the border. The terrorists and the insurgents receive weapons from across the border with the help of organized smuggling groups. Most of the arms and explosives come from Pakistan through ISI and Pakistani-based fundamentalist organization.

Due to increased vigilance along the borders and improved means of transport and communication, the smuggling routes have diversified from Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab borders to Rajasthan, Gujarat and Western coast of India. The smuggling of weapons and narcotics trade are a serious threat to Indian security. Narcotics and illicit weapons trade gives rise to black money and money laundering which is the source of financing terrorism. A number of Indian reports point to smuggling of fake Indian currency smuggled into the country from Pakistan.

India faces internal security threat from the various secessionist and insurgency movements supported by Pakistan's ISI. Pakistan has encouraged the secessionist tendencies in India by supporting and funding the insurgent groups and connected them with the Pakistan-based militant groups. India in order to combat insurgent and terrorist activities supported by Pakistan has committed political violence, i.e. state terrorism. Many reports by international human rights organizations accuse India of committing human-rights violations in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Thus, endangering the democratic structure of the country. India is respected in the international community for being the largest democracy in the world but it comes under attack in the wake of fear created in public as a result of terror attacks carried out by Pakistan based militant groups.

Rise of indigenous extremist groups in India: SIMI and IM

SIMI was established on April 25, 1977 as student's organization of Jamaat-e-Islami Hind (JIH). It found

its ideology in the writings of Sayyed Abul Ala Maududi, the founder of JIH. All Muslim students and youth below age of 30 could become its member. It was founded to create Islamic consciousness among the Muslim students and engage in missionary work among the non-Muslim students. In 1979, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Iranian revolution occurred and Zia adopted Islamisation policy in Pakistan. SIMI increasingly became radicalized in the wake of these events and growth of militant anti-Muslim Hindu organization. SIMI as recorded by Yoginder Sikand saw Islam as the sole “solution to the problems of not just the Muslims of India, but of all Indians and indeed of the whole world”. (*The Hindu*, 26 November 2008) SIMI's objective was to restore the Khilafat (Caliphate) and global revival of Islam. It separated from JIH in 1982 and expanded to set up branches in various parts of India. Some security analysts believe that the SIMI and IM are separate organizations but linked through a shared ideology while some believe that IM is nothing, but a façade used by Pakistan's ISI to veil the activities of Pakistan-based militant groups under Indian face. (Jamal 2015: 109) The majority is of the opinion that the hard-line militant members of SIMI split off to form IM, the militant wing of SIMI. Currently they is no distinct organization.

Indian Mujahideen (IM) as an organization appeared formally in November 2007 when it claimed responsibility for simultaneous blasts in three cities of Uttar Pradesh, viz. Allahabad, Ayodhya and Varanasi, targeting lawyers in the court premises. (Fair 2010) According to Arif Jamal, IM may have emerged from SIMI in 2001 during SIMI's last public convention. (Jamal 2015: 109) Some 25,000 SIMI activists met during the convention and were called to jihad. (*The Hindu*, 11 March 2008) The Indian intelligence services believe that the IM is made up of three elements: (a) students Islamic Movement of Indian (SIMI) volunteers, (b) a group of Uttar Pradesh men with links to the Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami (HuJI), and (c) jihadist-linked crime cartel of jailed Mafioso Aftab Ansari. (*The Hindu*, 08 October 2008) The members of SIMI/IM organisation are mostly Indian Muslims. The top-level of the organization comprises of educated professionals while the lower level members are drawn from lower-middle class areas who felt underprivileged and victimized by the rise of Hindu nationalism. IM seeks to cultivate support among Muslim population in India which has grievances against the state. Praveen Swami, an Indian security analyst of domestic Islamist militancy in India notes that some of the SIMI/IM activists have had direct or indirect experience with communal violence which motivates them to join these groups. (*The Hindu*, 23 February 2009) The arrested IM leaders, Nagori and Bashir confessed: “We believe that for Jihad to take root deep inside India, the main actors had to be Indian Muslims and outside agencies could play a supportive role”. (*India Today*, 18 September 2008) IM's ideology and aim is reflected from the email messages it issues to media just before carrying out an attack. IM claimed responsibility for four attacks

carried out in Jaipur, Bangalore, Ahmadabad and New Delhi in 2008. It justified the attacks as “revenge of Gujarat” (the Muslim pogrom of 2002) and described the terrorism campaign as the “rise of jihad”. (Raul 2009) It was after the attack on German bakery in Pune in 2010, India banned IM. This was followed by US in 2011 and UK in 2012.

There are several reports that suggests that SIMI and IM enjoy the support of LeT and Harkat-ul-Jihad-Islami-Bangladesh (HuJI-B). (Jamal 2015: 109) The interrogation of the four leaders of IM arrested in 2008 by Indian security forces revealed the pan-India network of the organization and its connection with the terror groups like LeT and HuJI. IM leader Nagori admitted to the investigators that IM had received funds from the LeT in the past. (*India Today*, 18 September 2008) LeT operative Syed Zabiuddin Ansari alias Abu Jundal told Indian interrogators about the link between LeT and IM. Ansari admitted that LeT fully funds IM and uses it as it's front in India. (*India Today*, 23 July 2012) In interrogation report accessed by CNN-IBN, Muhammad Ahmad Zarar Siddibaqa alias Yasin Bhatkal, a terror suspect admitted to involvement in ten terror attacks in India since 2007. Yasin Bhatkal made important revelations of IM to be fully funded and managed by ISI of Pakistan. He also informs that ISI created IM to give impression of home-grown terror in India which also helps ISI to hide its own footprints on terror strikes in India. (*CNN-IBN*, 12 September 2013) One of the interrogators of Yasin Bhatkal, as cited by Praveen Swami, informs about ISI taking direct control of IM network after snapping of the links between LeT and IM in 2008. The new IM recruits are trained in camps run by ISI where they learn assault and tactical skills of sophistication which IM previously never possessed. (*Firstpost*, 06 September 2013) Shortly after the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the Government of India declared SIMI a banned organization under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967. Its president, Shahid Badar Falak was arrested the same year while Safdar Nagori, the general secretary was arrested in 2008. Despite the ban and the arrests SIMI remains the source for communal disharmony and Islamist violence in India. (Swami 2007)

Secessionist movements supported by Pakistan in India

India though a country with largest democracy in world experiences the problem of secessionist tendencies in different parts. India with numerous religious, ethnic, tribal and vernacular groups is homeland to various insurgent movements that can be divided into movements for political rights like Punjab, Kashmir and Assam, movements for socio-economic justice like Naxalite and north-eastern states and movements based on religious grounds like Ladakh. Many of the insurgent groups have been listed as terrorist groups in India. Indian security forces have evidences which confirm the

role of Pakistan and ISI in supporting these insurgent groups and encouraging secessionist tendencies which threatens the socio-political structure of India as a nation. After the defeat in all the three main wars of 1947, 1965 and 1971, Pakistan resorted to 'low-intensity warfare' tactics towards India which continues till date in the name of Jihad. Pakistan realized that it was difficult to take down India in a conventional war and decided to instead 'bleed India through a thousand cuts' by exporting terrorism to India and supporting the various secessionist and insurgency movements within India. (Kukreja and Singh eds. 2005: 259) Pakistan under the military rule of General Zia-ul-Haq initiated proxy-war in Punjab and Kashmir. The seeds of present terrorism in India were sown by Pakistan in the Khalistan movement in Punjab and Kashmir during the 1980s and 1990s by taking advantage of anti-India sentiments in a section of population and exporting terrorism through Islamist militant groups based in Pakistan with the support from ISI.

Pakistan's ISI provided for training and weapons to the Sikh insurgent groups of Punjab province of India in the 1980s and 1990s. The insurgents in Punjab were demanding secessionism of state from India to create an independent Sikh nation named Khalistan. Some trace the origin of the Khalistan movement to the Punjabi Suba Movement led by the Sikh political party of Akali Dal which sought the creation of a province (*suba*) for Punjabi people in the 1950s. Officially Akali Dal never demanded for an independent country (rather opposed it) but later it came to be used as a premise for creation of a separate Sikh country by the proponents of Khalistan. Dr. Jagjit Singh Chauhan, a strong proponent of Khalistan is said to have travelled to Pakistan and US in 1971 as part of an effort to set up a Sikh government. He was invited to Pakistan by General Yahya Khan, the military dictator of Pakistan and presented some of the holy relics kept in gurudwaras of Pakistan. (Raman 2013: 94) Chauhan also placed an advertisement in the October 13, 1971 issue of *New York Times* proclaiming formation of Khalistan and received funds of million dollars for it. The enquiry made by RAW revealed that the Pakistani Embassy in Washington DC paid for this advertisement. (*ibid.*: 95) Chauhan remained in touch with Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, one of the leaders of Khalistan movement in India and intensified insurgency movement in the early 1980s. (*New York Times*, 11 April 2007) The Khalistan movement was initially peaceful which turned militant by early 1980s and the law and order situation deteriorated in Punjab. Operation Blue Star was launched by Indian government in the 1984 to flush out Bhindranwale and his supporters who had moved into Golden temple at Amritsar and fortified it with weapons. Attack on the holy shrine of Sikhs enraged the people. After the Operation Blue Star there was wide resentment in Sikh community. More and more people started supporting the Khalistan movement. Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her two Sikh bodyguards followed by mass massacre of Sikhs in the 1984 anti-Sikh riots in Delhi. Punjab experienced a decade long

period of unrest during the counter-insurgency operations that ended by the mid-1990s. The *Human Rights Watch* in its report entitled "Protecting the killers" accused Indian government of killing and torturing thousands of Sikhs during the counter-insurgency operations from 1985 to 1995. (Human Rights Watch 2007)

Pakistan was quick to exploit the opportunity in order to avenge India's support in creation of an independent Bangladesh in 1971. Also, from a strategic point of view Pakistan encouraged the creation of a Sikh state of Khalistan in the Indian Punjab to serve as a buffer state between Jammu and Kashmir and rest of India. Pakistan's ISI began to divert arms and ammunitions received from CIA for Afghan mujahideens to Khalistan militants. The Khalistan militants were trained and armed by ISI in training camps set up by ISI in Punjab and North West Frontier Provinces (NWFP). (Raman 2013: 91) A number of Sikh terrorist organizations came into existence like Dal Khalsa, Babbar Khalsa International (BKI), International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF), Khalistan Zindabad Force (KZF) and Khalistan Commando Force (KCF). Many of these terrorist-extremist Sikh groups, viz. BKI, KCF, KZF and ISYF remain banned in India. (Government of India)

Indian Government accused Pakistan of providing funds, weapons and training to these groups though Pakistan denied the allegations and claimed that the groups received support from the Sikh diaspora in UK, US, Canada and other countries. (*Dawn*, 12 July 2015) India alleged General Zia of extending "unusual hospitality" to Pakistan visiting Sikh pilgrims. Pakistan encouraged Khalistan proponents. The Khalistan movement protagonists, viz. Gagan Singh Dhillon, Gajendra Singh and Jagjit Singh met Pakistani politicians. Gagan Singh Dhillon who was banned in India after the Operation Blue Star in 1984 setup an organization named Nankana Sahib Foundation at Washington DC. G. S. Dhillon is said to have been a close friend of Zia and made frequent visits to Pakistan (Raman 2013: 95) though the Pakistan Government has denied the allegations. *Dawn* newspaper reports that General Zia had ordered his government to keep Sikhs under strict surveillance when Khalistan movement published a map of Khalistan which included parts of Pakistan's Punjab province. Also, in 1988 Benazir Bhutto cooperated with Indian Government by collecting information about Sikh activists and sending it to Rajiv Gandhi. (*Dawn*, 12 July 2015) After the Indian Government successfully crushed the movement for Khalistan in 1990s, there have been spurts of terrorist attacks and activities by banned Sikh groups. In 1995, former Chief Minister of Punjab, Beant Singh was killed by a suicide bomber for which Khalistan Commando Force was held responsible. (United States Attorney's Office 2006) The blasts at Inter-State Terminus in Jalandhar in 2006 were planned by Pakistan-based Khalistan Zindabad Force (KZF)'s commander Ranjit Singh

Neeta and Canada based Balwinder Singh Posi. (*The Indian Express*, 19 June 2006) The next year in 2007, a bomb blast at Shinger cinema hall in Ludhiana led to arrest of four activists of Babbar Khalsa International (BKI) who admitted that the objective was to revive terrorism and communal tensions. One of them admitted going to Pakistan to receive training in bomb-making and returned to train the youths in the same. (*Times of India*, 31 December 2007) In recent past there have been attacks on the Rashtriya Seva Singh (RSS) activists which indicates a pattern to single out the Hindu organization. In January 2016, an RSS leader Naresh Kumar was attacked in Ludhiana while a few days later an RSS branch in Ludhiana came under the attack. Brig. V.K. Ganeja (retd.), vice-president of the RSS Punjab unit was gunned down in Jalandar the same year. The police suspect the role of Sikh terror groups in the attacks. They believe that the Sikh radicals are feeling threatened with the increased RSS activities as RSS doesn't recognize Sikhism as a separate religion. Also, slogans of "Khalistan Zindabad" were found written on the walls of gurudwaras in the Golden Temple of Amritsar in Punjab (in 2017). (*The Tribune*, 18 October 2017) With increase in RSS activities under the present rule of BJP the religious minorities are feeling threatened. Such conditions create conducive environment for revival of dormant Sikh extremists group and for an adversary neighbour country to exploit the fear of the minority sects which could flame the secessionist tendencies in the country. Thus, it endangers the social and political cohesiveness of a nation.

Kashmir since the partition has been a major source of conflict between India and Pakistan. Kashmir dispute can be called as "the single most significant reason for Pakistan's chronic instability". (Jones 2002: xii) The defeat faced in four wars fought over Kashmir dispute fuelled Pakistan's sense of insecurity vis-à-vis India and encouraged the growth of militant Islam culture within Pakistan which was later exported to Kashmir. This culture of nurturing militancy can be traced to the time of emergence of Kashmir conflict right after the creation of Pakistan when Pakistan sent its troops to Jammu and Kashmir after its Hindu monarch decided to join India. Under the Independence Act of 1947 (based on Mountbatten Plan), the 565 princely states were given the freedom to "accede to one or the other of the new dominions or to remain independent". (National Archives of India) Most of the princely states had acceded to either India or Pakistan based on geography or religious majority. However, the princely state of Kashmir was a peculiar case because of its strategic location complicated by religion. The ruler was a Hindu king ruling over a population that was majorly Muslim. But Maharaja Hari Singh of the princely state of Kashmir wanted to remain independent and hence, he decided to enter 'Standstill Agreement' with both India and Pakistan. The relation of Maharaja with Pakistan began to deteriorate with deteriorating law and order situation in the state. Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession with India on October 26, 1947. Pakistan

sent a large number of tribal *lashkar* (militia) to the valley of Kashmir to stir up a revolt against the Maharaja Hari Singh followed by Pakistani armed forces troops to occupy Kashmir by force. India alleges that the invasion was instigated by the Pakistan and its topmost leaders were aware about the operation which was codenamed 'Gulmarg'. According to V.P. Menon the raiders enjoyed free transit through Pakistan territory. (Schofield 1996: 143) Also, the raiders were equipped with advanced military equipment like mortars, artillery, and mark V mines which tribesmen could have acquired from Pakistan's army. (*ibid.*) Though the fighting was put to an end with a cease-fire in 1949, Pakistan government continued covertly to support insurgency and volunteer guerrilla fighters in Kashmir. The Pakistani government in denial argued that "it could not control the volunteers, who as individuals were not bound by the cease-fire agreement". (Stern 2000: 119) Years after the ceasefire, Pakistan government unsuccessfully tried to foment separatism in Kashmir until indigenous separatist violence broke out in the late 1980s as a result of economic backwardness and rampant corruption which was triggered by rigged 1987 state-elections. This was "the final straw in a series of insults", as opines Sumit Ganguly. (*ibid.*) The sensitive situation in the valley has been exploited tactfully by the Pakistani army and its intelligence services especially ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence). Pakistan adopts two-pronged approach towards Jammu and Kashmir: one, to exploit the anti-Indian separatist sentiments and two, exporting terrorism to the valley by Pakistan-based Islamist terrorist groups like Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) etc. operating in Kashmir. (Ganguly 2005: 179) Since the late 1980s, Jammu and Kashmir has been the victim of "ethno-religious, secessionist insurgency". (*ibid.*) The factors responsible for the origin of the insurgency were indigenous but Pakistan's involvement aggravated the situation. The state elections held on 23 March 1987 in Jammu and Kashmir which reappointed Farooq Abdullah as the Chief Minister is said to be rigged which triggered the simmering secessionist sentiments amongst the Kashmiris. This was followed by a series of demonstrations and strikes which grew into a widespread armed insurgency, supported by the ISI of Pakistan. During the 1990s it escalated into one of the most serious internal security problems in India. The opportune situation provided for Pakistan to make up for the failures of 1947 and 1965 and take revenge for the loss of Bangladesh in 1971. Officially Pakistan has always denied the charges of arming and training militants. However, there are many evidences to confirm the role of Pakistan's army and ISI in supporting and mentoring the militant groups active in Kashmir. (Human Rights Watch 2006: 05) The after the death of Shiekh Abdullah in 1982, General Zia had formulated a plan to train the Kashmiri youth to launch an 'armed crusade' in the Kashmir valley. (Schofield 2003: 140) After initially failure, the plan was revived in the mid-1980s. K.

Subramaniam, the defence specialist of India maintains that 'Operation Topac'²⁶ was established by Pakistan in April 1988 as part of non-conventional war against India with the objective to nurture an indigenous insurgency in Kashmir. (*ibid.*) Operation Topac is denied by the Pakistani authorities. Victoria Schofield believes that this was widely publicized in the Indian Defence Review of July 1989 as part of Indian government's propaganda to pass on the buck to Pakistan for the insurgency disturbances in the valley. (*ibid.*: 141) But contrary to Schofield's observation, a report by the US House of Representatives (1993), *Task force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare* claims that Pakistan "began expanding its operation to sponsor and promote separatism and terrorism primarily in Kashmir, as a strategic long-term programme." (*ibid.*: 177) Desmond goes on to believe that Pakistan is unlikely to drop its covert support for Kashmir issue being central to Pakistan's Islamic identity. (Desmond 1995: 09)

In the insurgency of Kashmir, large number of Pakistan-based militant organizations have been involved. The local militant groups in Kashmir could be divided into those supporting an independent Kashmir like Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and those supporting accession to Pakistan like Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM). According to a report by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the ICJ mission met representatives of militant groups in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) which pointed at affinity with the operations of the militant groups in the neighbouring Jammu and Kashmir. (ICJ 1995: 67) ICJ mission found the border between PoK and Jammu and Kashmir to be porous. (ICJ 1995: 77) The line of control has been sealed from Indian side but it remains open from the Pakistan side which allows the militants to pass through. The Prime minister of Azad Kashmir, Sardar Abdul Qayum Khan in 1995 admittedly said, "We don't mind the boys coming in and going back". (Schofield 2003: 177) The Pakistan's ISI, after the Soviets pulled out of Afghanistan in 1988, diverted the militant groups based in Pakistan towards Kashmir in India. It prepared ground for a new jihad in Kashmir which coincided with the rise in insurgency. Kashmir being a new territory for Pakistan-based militant groups such as LeT, they depended on Kashmiri groups for logistic support to operate there. The young boys in Kashmir lacked the experience and training for which the ISI connected them with Pakistani jihadists groups. Initially, from 1989 to 1992, the LeT sent its own fighters to Kashmir to fight along with some of Kashmiri groups such as al-Barq and Tehreek-ul-Mujahideen. (Jamal 2015: 77) Besides supporting the militant groups based in Pakistan and in Kashmir to work against India, Pakistan's ISI planned to push the Hindu population out of Kashmir to make it a Muslim majority territory. It commanded the Hizbul Mujahideen and other Kashmiri militant groups to attack Hindu temples and properties and

eliminate Hindus in the Kashmir valley. Commander Masood Sarfraz of Rawalpindi Pakistan in 2001 interview with Indian journalist, Arif Jamal revealed that by 1992, the ISI had planned to open jihadi fronts in Jammu. (Jamal 2015: 81) The ISI wanted the LeT to rekindle communal violence in Jammu and eliminate the Hindus with the objective to turn the majority Indian Muslim population into mujahideen to be used against India. (Swami 1999: 15)

Kashmir has been in a state of simmering turmoil and discord since July 2016 after the announcement of killing of Burhan Wani, a Kashmiri militant and the commander of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) by Indian security forces. There has been rise in insurgency and anti-India feeling in the valley which is akin to the period of 1990's when the insurgency in Kashmir was at its zenith with Pakistan diverting mujahideens (freedom fighters) trained to fight Soviet forces during the Soviet-Afghan war. After the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, Pakistan employed the well trained and experienced mujahideen to fight in Kashmir. This was corroborated by disputed State elections in 1987 which acted as catalyst for the insurgency in the valley. Kashmir insurgency since has been one of the most potent internal security threat for India. In an interview to *Dunya News* the former President of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf admitted that Pakistan trained and supported groups like LeT (Lashkar-e-Taiba) to fight in Kashmir. He said that "the Kashmiri freedom fighters including Hafiz Saeed and Lakhvi were our heroes at that time" and religious militancy was started by Pakistan though "later on the religious militancy turned into terrorism". (*Dunya News*, 25 October 2015) Like in the 1990s, we find the same situation arising in the Kashmir valley again with increase in insurgency. The unrest simmering in the Kashmir valley triggered by killing of Burhan Wani led to widespread street protests across the valley with sporadic conflict breaking out between the stone-pelters and security forces. This is not the first time the people of Kashmir had taken up stones and hurled their anger at the security forces. In 2008, after the amaranth land dispute and later in 2010, after the Indian army allegedly carried out fake encounter killing young men from Baramulla district, thousands of people took to streets with anti-India slogans shouting "Azadi" (freedom). India blames Pakistan to fuel the unrest and insurgency in the valley. Burhan Wani's father calling his son "shaheed" (martyr) and over thousands of people flocking for Burhan Wani's funeral indicates to much deeper problems than just a foreign hand at work, according to Baweja. (*Hindustan times*, 22 August 2016) Happymon Jacob opines that "Kashmir would soon bounce back to the days of home-grown insurgency, with religious radicalization acting as a force multiplier this time". (*The Hindu*, 14 July 2016) However, the role of Pakistan in fanning the internal disturbances in Kashmir cannot be overruled. At the New York UN General Assembly meet (in September 2016), the Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif called Burhan Wani as a martyr and "symbol of the latest

²⁶ Operation Topac was named after Topac Amin, an Inca prince who fought a non-conventional war against Spanish rule in the eighteenth-century in Uruguay.

Kashmiri Intifada, a popular and peaceful freedom movement". (*The Indian Express*, 22 September 2016) The killing of Burhan Wani (on July 8, 2016) has marked a watershed point in militancy in the Kashmir valley. A confidential report prepared by J&K Police's Criminal Investigation Department (CID), "Radicalisation and Terrorism in J&K – A Study" is based on a detailed study of 156 local youths of the valley who joined militancy between 2010 and 2015. (*The Indian Express*, 04 June 2018) As per the report, killing of Burhan Wani has resulted in change in the nature of militancy in the valley. There is social acceptance of youth joining the militancy which earlier was a stealth process. Burhan Wani by revealing his true identity on social media has started the trend of using real identity and posting pictures on social networking sites. Because the recruits are local Kashmiris they enjoy the support and protection of the locals from the security forces which disrupts the operations. Militants if killed are eulogized and thousands of locals assemble for the funeral. The killing of the local Kashmiri militants in encounter by the security forces has, instead of discouraging, pushed others to join militant groups and resulted in steady supply of direct recruitment of local Kashmiri men into militant groups thus keeping the valley on constant boil. Arun Shourie caveats that "this can (could) become a self-feeding spiral". (*The Indian Express*, 03 July 2018)

The Jammu and Kashmir state of India has twenty-two districts out of which districts of the Kashmir such as Anantnag, Kulgam, Budgam, Shopian, Pulwama, Ganderbal, Srinagar, Bandipore, Kupwaa and Baramullah are heavily affected by militancy by proscribed group of Hizbul Mujahideen (HM). There has been a surge in militant attacks on security forces and security establishments in Kashmir valley²⁷ with increase in local recruitment in militancy and violence. In the wake of heightened militant attacks on the local security forces in Kashmir, the Jammu and Kashmir police lost 37 policemen in 2018 out of which 8 were special police officers (SPO) and 29 were regular policemen. (*The Hindu*, 04 October 2018) This is the highest number of casualties that the J&K police force has witnessed in two decades. The local police force especially the SPOs have off late (as on 01 October 2018) become the targets of militants in the southern region of Kashmir. The abduction and killing of three policemen by militants in Shopian on September 20, 2018 led to a wave of resignations by the policemen, mainly SPOs especially in the valley. A peculiar feature of these resignations was the style of announcing resignations through videos uploaded online by policemen (majority of whom were the SPOs) in order to intimidate other policemen and display their clout. In 2018, over twenty automatic service rifles were stolen by the militants in the volatile districts of south Kashmir which saw a spike from ten

service rifles stolen or snatched in the previous year. (*The Hindu*, 30 September 2018) Alarm set after service rifles were stolen by a SPO of seven policemen in a high security area in Jammu (*ibid.*) who later was located to have joined the militant group. This marks the beginning of another dangerous trend in Kashmir militancy where the personnel of local security forces such as SPO, established to fight the insurgency and militancy in Kashmir are joining the local militants. The abysmally low participation of the people in the state elections also reflects the deteriorating security situation in Kashmir. The municipal elections in October 2018 saw the lowest voter turnout at 35.1 percent in the state of Jammu and Kashmir with voter participation in Kashmir valley abysmally low at 4.27 percent. (*The Indian Express*, 22 October 2018) In year 1989 when the militancy took over Kashmir, the state had witnessed the lowest voter turn-out but until now. The near zero voter turn-out gives a clarion call for the Indian government especially when just four years back in the 2014 elections the State had witnessed the highest voter turnout in last twenty-seven years. (*The Hindu*, 20 October 2018) This plainly reflects the rise in the level of alienation the people in Kashmir have come to feel from the government due to prolonged atmosphere of militancy and terrorism. With the rise in overall violence in Kashmir valley, ceasefire violations along Line of Control has also been on rise with maximum violations in 2017 in past fourteen years. (*The Hindu*, 17 October 2018) General D.S. Hooda (retd.) has hinted of the rise in the security and civilian casualties with the increase in the local recruitment and growing sense of alienation in Kashmir. (*The Hindu*, 01 April 2019)

Pakistan has shown less interest in improving the security situation in India by supporting it in anti-terrorism measures. Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, the head of Jamaat-ud-Dawa, an Islamic charity has ties with Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and responsible for the 26/11 attacks which killed more than 160 people. He has been designated as terrorist by the United Nations, US and India. But he moves freely in Pakistan organizing meetings, rallies and mobilizing people. Under the US pressure, Hafiz Sayeed has been detained a number of times since the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks but he has largely remained free. Pakistan authorities detained Hafiz Sayeed under Anti-terrorism Act (ATA) and put him under house arrest in January 2017 but a review board of the Lahore High Court ordered Punjab government to free Hafiz Sayeed from house arrest (in October 2017) due to lack of evidences. (*The Hindu*, 20 October 2017) Another terrorist Masood Azhar, head of the Pakistan-based militant group, Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)²⁸ has been roaming free in Pakistan despite of the efforts of India and US to enlist him as international terrorist. He had organized the Pathankot air base terror attack in India in

²⁷ Kashmir valley includes districts of the Kashmir such as Anantnag, Kulgam, Budgam, Shopian, Pulwama, Ganderbal, Srinagar, Bandipore, Kupwaa and Baramullah.

²⁸ Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) organization has been designated a terrorist group under UNSC but not its leader, Masood Azhar.

January 2016. At the completion of seventy years of independence on August 14, 2017 Nawaz Sharif, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, spoke of dedicating "this year's (2017) 14 August to the freedom of Kashmir". (*The Diplomat*, 17 August 2016) This just confirms continuation of support by the Pakistan state to the militancy in Kashmir. Kashmir is not a problem limited to bilateral issue between India and Pakistan but extends to the South Asian region. With the resolution of this forever dispute between India and Pakistan peace can transcend over the whole region as the peace in the region is intrinsically linked to terrorism in Pakistan and state-sponsored terrorism by Pakistan in Kashmir.

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