A Study on Role of Linguistic Analysis in Native Speaker’s Intuition

INTRODUCTION

To understand and explain the idea of a native speaker, one must first investigate and think about the concept (Ellis, 1993). In certain circles, the topic of what it means to be a "native speaker" is useless since "everyone is a Native Speaker of the specific language" indicates that the individual has "grown" in his/her mind/brain. That's all there is to say in the actual world". But the search for a deeper understanding of the idea of the native speaker and possibly a reevaluation is not futile and has been critically examined by various researchers recently in the area of language education. The notion and impression of the native speaker is being challenged as the English language and the mobility of the human race grow more and more accessible. Using the collective contributions of numerous researchers in the area of language instruction, I seek in this study to examine and systemize a more unified concept of a native speaker. The native speaker's knowledge of the subject is next tested. The talents of a native speaker are shown based on the internalized knowledge that a native speaker has of his or her language. It is briefly discussed whether nonnative speakers may join the "native speaker Dom" (Nayar, 1994) after explaining the notion of the native speaker. At long finally, the issue of whether or not using a native speaker as a role model or learning objective for language acquisition is addressed.

Is it possible to categorise or define what a native speaker is in a standardised manner? Alternatively, is this a pointless inquiry due to its inherent circularity? In recent advancements in the area of language instruction, this topic appears to be of special relevance and requirement to address the problem of what a native speaker is, and whether he or she is the goal that learners should aim for. As a native speaker of a language, you are presumed to know what a "native speaker" is, but what exactly is a "native speaker"? (Davies, 1991; Myhill, 2003; Paikeday, 1985). Based on current research and studies in the domains of Second Language Acquisition and language education, I will try to make some sense of this elusive conundrum. First, according to Davies (1991), Bloomfield says, "The first language a human being learns to speak is his native language; he is a native speaker of this language." Bloomfield's statement seems to have been quoted by Davies (1991). (p. 43). This definition, on the other hand, seems to be overly narrow. First learned languages can be replaced by later acquired languages, even though they may not be completely forgotten, because the first language is "no longer useful, no longer generative or creative, and therefore no longer 'first'" in the case of children who are transplanted, either through migration or adoption, at an early terms of grammar, which is an important concept in theoretical linguistics (Davies, 1991, p. 1). Native speakers, according this argument, are infallible and have complete knowledge of their native tongue. Nayar (1994) contends that native speakers are not "ipso facto informed, accurate, and infallible in their competence" in their own language (p. 4). Errors in native speakers' competency are excused since they are considered "native speakers," however the author says this has to be re-examined and questioned. In the meanwhile, neither Bloomfield nor Chomsky have provided an appropriate solution to this perplexing problem. The term "native" comes from the etymological root meaning "[native speaker] of a language by reason of location or country of birth". This suggests that the person was born knowing the language. Because people might be relocated to different areas in infancy, such as when they immigrate or are adopted, this is insufficient in deciding whether a person is a native speaker of a language or not. For this reason, even when one is born in a certain location, it does not ensure that one will grow up speaking that place's native tongue. Similarly, children who are adopted early in life may not grow up speaking the native tongue of the country where they were first placed for adoption. Some may argue that the only true native speaker is a monoglot, someone who speaks just one language fluently. A monoglot, on the other hand, may be the exception rather than the rule among native speakers of a given language; this assumption is not entirely accurate (Maum, 2002). In the end, what are our options? Being a monoglot (which is unusual) and having been born in a certain region does not help one's search to determine what it means to be a native speaker enough. As a result, I've come up with a list of six characteristics that many experts in the fields of second language acquisition and language instruction believe define a native speaker. In addition to race, native speakers have the ability to write creatively, distinguish between their own speech and that of the standard form of the language, and have the "capability to understand and translate into the L1 of which s/he is a native speaker" (Davies, 1991). (Davies, 1991, p. 149). Other than these four traits, they are all disputed and problematic in their own manner. I don't feel that someone's race (or ethnicity) matters since, as previously said, a kid adopted by someone of a different ethnic origin than the child's own may easily be transplanted to a new location. When an ethnic Chinese kid is adopted by a family that does not speak the child's first language at an early age, it is possible for the child to be relocated to a nation where the local language does not speak the child's first language. He or she will likely grow up in a new context where he or she is no longer a natural his first language. Even in places like the United States, people of non-English descent may speak English as their first and primary language, as shown by the numerous descendants of non-British immigrants who have stayed in the country for decades. Furthermore, despite the fact that 91.8 percent of China's population is Han Chinese, not all 91.8 percent speak the same dialect. Ethnically Han Chinese people in China speak Mandarin, Cantonese, and other dialects or variations of Mandarin, which some consider dialects or dialects of Mandarin. Native speakers have the ability to write creatively in their own language, Davies (1991) noted. However, this feature isn't entirely correct Unless all native speakers have extensive formal education and a natural ability to express themselves creatively in written language, we can only infer that this trait is real and that it exists among all native speakers. We must also take into consideration the variances in literacy levels among members of a linguistic group, as well as those who are illiterate. Preliterate (Florez & Terrill, 2003) languages, on the other hand, have no written equivalents. If all languages have writing systems, and all native speakers of those languages are highly skilled and creative persons, such as authors and poets, then the assumption that native speakers are creative writers is correct. The latter two characteristics Davies specifies of a natural speaker are also questionable. Many native speakers are oblivious of the differences between their speech and that of the status form, as seen by the increasing usage of nonstandard between you and I for between you and me even among professional speakers like news readers, according to Cook (1999). (p. 186). As a result, Davies' assertion that native speakers can tell the difference between their speech and that of the "standard" type is not as clear as he claims. Cook also takes issue with Davies' assertion that native speakers are capable of translating from another language into their own one. According to Cook, this ability is only available to those people who speak a language other than their original tongue, and not necessarily all of them. When determining whether a person is a "native speaker," the most important element is that the person learned the language as a kid and has continued to use it into adulthood. According to Cook (1999), a person is not considered a native speaker of a language until they learned it as a kid. People who did not learn the language in school will almost certainly have a foreign accent when they speak (Scovel, 1969, 1988). Consequently, all other traits other than the one I have specified are of secondary importance; they are a matter of the individual's competence and way possible (2000): ―English is the language of my heart, the one in which I can easily express love for my children; in which I know instinctively how to coo to a baby; in which I can sing lullabies, tell stories, recite nursery rhymes, talk baby talk. In Japanese, there is an artificiality about my love; I cannot express it naturally or easily. The emotions I feel do not translate well into the Japanese language, and those which I have seen expressed by Japanese mothers do not seem sufficiently intimate when I mouth them‖. According to my understanding of what it means to be a native speaker, I'll describe the knowledge and skills that a native speaker has.

According to Hymes (1971), a native speaker possesses linguistic and communicative skill as well as an intuitive understanding of the language in which he or she is fluent. What exactly does it mean? Is there anything that only a native speaker can understand and a nonnative speaker cannot? In this portion of the article, I'll show what makes a native speaker distinct from a nonnative speaker in terms of knowledge and skills. Scholars in the domains of Linguistics, Second Language Acquisition, English Language Teaching have catalogued the knowledge of a native speaker based on their research results and studies For native speakers, it is second nature to know: 1. idiomatic terms used correctly (Coulmas, 1981; Medgyes, 1992, 1994; Phillipson, 1996), 2. accuracy of grammatical structure (Coulmas, 1981; Davies, 1991; Phillipson, 1996), 3. natural articulation of words and phrases (Coulmas, 1981; Medgyes, 1992, 1994), 4. cultural background, such as "response screams" (Goffman, 1978, cited in Coulmas, 1981), curse words, and interjections (Medgyes, 1992, 1994; Phillipson, 1996) 5. vocabulary, colloquialisms, and other phraseological elements of an above-average size (Coulmas, 1981; Medgyes, 1992, 1994), 6. metaphors (Coulmas, 1981), 7. nonverbal cultural characteristics, such as binomials and bi-verbials (Coulmas, 1981) (Coulmas, 1981; Davies, 1991). they are able to pay attention to pragmatic norms of the language and achieve communication objectives while also paying attention to interpersonal interactions with other interlocutors (Kasper, 1997). They are able to employ a variety of verbal and nonverbal communication abilities to fix faults in conversational engagements because of their strategic competency (Canale & Swain, 1980). Instead of giving up on understanding or output, native speakers avoid avoidance (Davies, 1991). Nonnative speakers, on the other hand, often use the tactic of avoiding conversation. What are native speakers able to do with the information they've accumulated through time? The manifest and perform abilities of native speakers: 1. a conversation that is both spontaneous and fluid (Davies, 1991; Maum, 2002; Medgyes, 1992), 2. evasions of direct questioning (Davies, 1991; Halliday, 1978), 3. apprehensions (Brown, 2001; Davies, 1991; Halliday, 1978), 4. the interlocutor's next words or actions (Davies, 1991; Halliday, 1978), 5. Repetition of the message in different formats clarifies the message (Davies, 1991; Medgyes, 1992, 1994) Other verbal and nonverbal communication abilities allow native speakers to interact easily, in most cases, within acceptable sociocultural situations, in most cases, in communication exchanges.

Many linguists would agree with the emotion expressed in the first conjunct of the sentence above. The second conjunct suggests that some opponents want to impose arbitrary methodological constraints on linguistics. Quite the opposite, we suggest, many linguists fail to adhere to data collecting and analytic criteria that are commonplace in other areas. As an example, intuitions have been given a special place in the generative grammar. Since then, we've seen the creation of intricate theoretical structures backed by worrisome empirical data. Over the last half-century, linguistic study has relied heavily on two sorts of intuitions. Primary intuitions, as we'll call them, are purely introspective assessments of a language expression's clarity or intent. Intuitions concerning why a phrase is (or isn't) well-formed or has the theoretical propositions in principle. However, how they are employed in reality is another thing. Two key issues with the way primary intuitions are gathered and the over-reliance on this one sort of evidence are discussed in Section 2 of our paper.

It is a primary objective of the field of linguistics to describe in detail what Chomsky calls the "mind/brain" of a speaker. Our ability to utilize language in a variety of ways reflects this understanding. Conversation is the most prevalent form of language usage, although writing is also ubiquitous (at least in countries where literacy is widespread). Making introspective judgments on the form or meaning of statements is another method we might make use of language. However, it is not difficult to describe the job and elicit such evaluations even from individuals with little formal education, even if they are not linguists.

Many well-formedness judgments are quite strong, to the point that obtaining the intuitions of a single native speaker may first seem adequate. 20 native English speakers were tasked with evaluating the grammar and clarity of Cat on the mat or Mat the on cat the seams pointless: we can be sure that they will all react in the same way to this. Unfortunately, many of the major instances provided in the syntactic literature aren't quite that obvious in terms of whether they're good or bad at all. An author's recognition of this fact is shown by the use of a certain number of question marks before their examples. Furthermore, what one person considers to be clearly well-formed may be deemed such by another speaker. This is evident from variances in dialect that are well-documented, such as those seen in (1). 1) a. %Chris might can go. b. %Pat‘s a Red Sox fan, and so aren‘t we. c. %He don‘t like that. Students' opinions on certain sorts of literary examples have been split throughout the years by beginning syntax professors. The ungrammaticality of instances like (2), for example, is commonly claimed as evidence for vestiges of language. 2) %Who did you want to meet your parents? (1) and (2) indicate that even apparently solid intuitions may not be shared by everyone. The use of fundamental intuitions as evidence for grammatical hypotheses is not incompatible with the challenge to those who believe that Universal Grammar rules out such statements. In other fields where data varies widely, researchers try to examine as many people as possible and construct hypotheses based on what they find in common. As far as cognitive psychology and most biological studies go, this is a common method of doing experimentation. For their part, theorists of generative language often present their conclusions without first verifying whether or not they hold for all speakers.

The more important difficulty is that individual speakers are frequently dubious about their own judgments, rather than the fact of diversity in judgments between speakers. Borderline examples may be influenced by many contextual elements, and this might make a significant impact in how the listener responds to the statements. To test their hypothesis, linguists may use their own intuition, which has the potential to bias their judgments on minor cases. Linguists may be influenced by the 'clever Hans' phenomena even if they ask others for their intuitions. For a full literature assessment, see Schu tze (1996). It is not difficult to understand how to gather intuitions in a method that overcomes these issues. Consulting native speakers' fundamental intuitions is a kind of psychological experiment, to put it simply. It follows that such data gathering should follow the typical experimental psychology methodological norms. Specifically: • In order to assess the data for statistical significance, the number of individuals should be big enough. • Stimuli (linguistic examples) should be presented in random sequence. • The hypotheses under investigation should be kept a secret from the participants, ideally via the use of double-blind presentation of stimuli. • The acquired data should be submitted to statistical analysis in accordance with best practices. Unfortunately, generative linguistics seldom takes even the most basic safety measures. Readers may easily check the validity of published data by looking through the examples in practically any article on syntax pertaining to a well-known language. few native speakers of a language accessible. The veracity of the data obtained using other procedures must be weighed against the practicality of such techniques in certain situations. Whatever the case may be, such occurrences should be the exception rather than the rule. Even if all of one's intuitions were meticulously and methodically recorded, this would still just be one kind of proof. There are several examples of linguistic behavior that may and should be utilized to demonstrate our understanding of language. As Smith noted, it is "characteristic of all scientific endeavor" to test theories against a variety of data and methodologies. Researchers in the field of psycholinguistics have used a range of paradigms, including several types of reaction-time tests, tasks involving the completion of sentences, and eye-tracking. However, although advances in linguistics have a significant impact on discussions in psycholinguistics, the opposite is true as well. The work of theoretical linguists is characterized by the generation of hypotheses and the subsequent testing of those assumptions only by intuition. Occasionally, they may use another sort of experiment to support their beliefs, such as when Chomsky (1968: 65) presented psycholinguistic "results [that] demonstrated a significant association between quantity of memory and number of transformations in certain basic circumstances." It's only as a supplement that evidence other than intuitions are introduced into the discussion. Few syntacticians viewed the derivational theory of complexity that Chomsky mentioned approvingly as a cause to revise their grammatical theories when it came out that it didn't hold more broadly (see Fodor et al., 1974, for a summary). When conducting laboratory tests in which competence grammar was used, it was assumed that numerous performance variables would have masked its influence on results. Many generative grammarians tend to view primary intuitions as more direct evidence of linguistic ability than other sorts of data, for reasons that have never been made apparent. However, there is no evidence to back up this claim. Linguists must rely on all available data to deduce what people's thoughts are when they use a language, as this knowledge cannot be seen firsthand. Primary intuitions may be clearer than other data because they exclude the semantic and pragmatic components of language usage, some suggest. Even if it is a unique way of using language, making judgments about how well-formed something is nonetheless a sort of language usage. When consulting fundamental intuitions, it is impossible to resist trying to ascribe a meaning to the term under discussion and imagining a situation in which it may be utilized. The use of basic intuitions about isolated As a side note, the employment of intuitions in linguistic argumentation isn't something we're arguing against. It's important to regard them as experimental data when they're utilized, and to assess them as such. Gathering insights from different speakers (where possible) and paying close attention to the presentation of the stimulus is essential. Additional information should also be included in theoretical debates. The use of primary intuitions as evidence for linguistic hypotheses is appropriate, but they should not be given preferential treatment over other types of evidence. The phenomena that Langendoen et al. (1973) referred to as "dative questions" provides an ancient but informative illustration of the dominance of informal intuitions in the approach of generative grammar. When the first object of a double object formation is questioned, Fillmore (1965: 29–30) stated that the phrase is ungrammatical (and, accordingly, he prefixed them with asterisks). 1) a. Who did I buy a hat? b. Who did you give this book? For example, Langendoen and his colleagues (referred to as LKD) asked 160 native English speakers to substitute to into statements like (4) without altering the sense of the sentences. 2) a. Who(m) did you offer the man? b. Who(m) did you show the woman? Fillmore argues that participants should have put themselves between the verb and the next NP. Rather, many of the comments were put at the conclusion of the phrase. Another 109 people participated in LKD's second trial as well. When asked to compose a response, participants were required to use the same verb as the one in the question in a complete sentence. Example (3b) was actually ungrammatical, and the answers to the question should have constantly focused on a postverbal NP, such as, "I showed her my daughter." In several cases, participants perceived the stimuli in a manner that was thought to be implausible, such as when I presented the lady to my daughter. LKD concluded (p. 469) that at least one-fifth of their participants viewed instances like (3b) acceptable based on these two investigations. For example, how did his findings affect future syntactic literature on deductive questions? Definitely not. Most basic syntax textbooks and theoretically-oriented surveys of English grammar released following LKD's article did not address instances of ill-formed phrases like (3) are repeated by all of them. Since the conventional unsystematic use of primary intuitions has become so established among generative grammarians, contrary evidence from other sources, including more thoroughly gathered intuition data, has simply been disregarded. An additional sort of evidence that has been overlooked is utilization. It is now feasible for linguists working on a particular language to examine whether their fundamental intuitions are in accordance with what people really say and write using massive online corpora of both written and spoken material. Usage data, on the other hand, receives little attention from generativists. An example of this may be found in the literature on idioms, which illustrates the dangers of disregarding use and instead depending only on intuition. When examined against corpus data, Nunberg et al. (1994) found a number of statements in the idioms literature to be false. In addition, Riehemann (2001) has more. Raising hell is syntactically rigid, especially unpassable, according to Jackendoff (1997: 170). In fact, she discovered multiple uses of this phrase in non-canonical versions when searching through a huge New York Times corpus: 3) a. The scientists finally gave up after all the commotion. b. in part because of the hell that Plitman raised regarding Newcomb‘s participation in Leatherneck, the internal inquiry was reopened c. A few people in New York fantasized about George Steinbrenner's reaction if the Yankees had been robbed at Camden Yards in a similar manner. d. However, at Jack-in-the-box, how much havoc can you really cause? e. The only thing that was raised was a little dust and a little hell. Jackendoff's idiolect varies from that of the New York Times' writers and editors, one would argue. Perhaps. Because of Jackendoff's idiolect's idiosyncrasy, theoretical statements based on it should be doubted. If it's hard to challenge someone else's fundamental assumptions, then this kind of proof is fundamentally different from any other type of evidence utilized in science, where the capacity to reproduce experimental findings generally serves as a critical criterion for assessment. 4) When the idiomatic content is included in the head of X, the idiom is complete. Tokens or types? This phrasing of (6) is ambiguous in its application. This raises the question of whether or not the assertion regarding canonical forms of idioms applies to all occurrences of every idiom. Examples of elevated idiom chunks (e.g., the tables seem to have turned) make it clear that the writers meant the later (type) interpretation, rather than the former (token). However, even with this view, there are (6). Take a look at some of the negative-polarity idioms like "I was born yesterday," "I know... from Adam," etc. These idioms' canonical versions likely include the word not. According to Riehemann, 19 out of 28 incidences (contracted or not) of birth yesterday included Auxiliary verbs normally precede the minimum phrase containing not and the remainder of these idioms, such as was not born yesterday, for example. It's apparent that the auxiliary verb isn't only "idiomatic material" either. The phrase "from the frying pan into the fire" is another one that Riehemann uses to illustrate his point. These two prepositional phrases were discovered by Riehemann to be used idiomatically as complements to a wide range of verbs (including be, go, leap, move, step, get, throw, and take). Verbs are clearly not "idiomatic material," but rather the heads of the VPs, which are the basic phrases comprising both PPs, as is evident from their use in this passage. The cat is out of the bag in a similar situation. In order for the idiomatic interpretation to be conceivable, these two elements of the idiom must cooccur, but they occur as parts of another phrase headed by something else, generally a verb. 6 Riehemann observed that 23 of the 48 instances of the phrase in the New York Times corpus did not include the word let (see, e.g., Spears, 1992). (6), of course, might be maintained in the face of such facts if the theoretical ideas of component structure and headedness were defined in ways that rendered (6) tenable. It is beyond the scope of this work to determine whether or not a plausible (6) may be salvaged. According to Koopman and Sportiche, the findings may have been more persuasive if they had evaluated utilization statistics. Intuition-based assertions about the truthfulness of a situation might be multiplied innumerably. Many extra grammatical aspects impact our first sense regarding complicated sentence patterns, which is frequently necessary to resolve theoretical issues. Conclusions based on informal

Every field of study has its own set of preconceived notions about what makes a rational explanation. "Typical of all scientific activity," general concerns of parsimony and elegance play a vital part in the discovery process. It's important to note that they don't represent scientific proof, thus their function should be limited. It's not always so in linguistics. As an example, the idea that separate principles should not overlap in coverage has been often emphasized in arguments for various formulations of grammatical hypotheses. When Chomsky modified his Subject Condition (1973: 250) to only be applied to subjacent domains, he was able to avoid the following cases from being ruled out by both the Subject Condition and the Subjacency Condition: 5) What did that John saw surprise Mary? As a practical concept, the notion that conditions with overlapping empirical coverage... are incorrectly worded was eventually made clear (Chomsky, 1995: 5). There are certain situations in which a particular rule may no longer be relevant, but that's not the case here. So it's not only Ockham's razor in action. There are occasions when both concepts are derived from different sources, yet they both apply to the same situations. According to one reading, this principle of operation is bizarre because it eliminates the possibility of overdetermination of grammaticality. Overdetermination may be seen in a wide range of non-linguistic phenomena as well. Because of the lack of oxygen and hypothermia, someone who is immersed in cold water for more than a few minutes will likely succumb to the effects of both. You may easily find language equivalents for the type of overlap in empirical coverage that Chomsky sought to ban. It is impossible to have a non-sentence like *Who did you think Pat and was talking because it contains a filler-gap dependence, in which the gap is a coordinate conjunct (see *Who did you think Pat and were talking); and (see *Did you think Pat and someone were talking). The idea that Chomsky wanted to omit this kind of overlapped coverage seems odd to me. According to Chomsky's working principle, a single phenomenon cannot be encompassed by more than one principle at the same time. Aesthetically speaking, however, the judgement that such overlap is undesirable is a subjective one. Non-empirical aspects have a role in the decision-making process of researchers in all fields, but they should not be used as evidence in favour of or against an investigation. Furthermore, determining whether or not a specific example of overlapping coverage not about its acceptability itself. Lacking a well-defined, well-justified approach to distinguishing between different types of language phenomena, allegations that principles overlap should have little, if any, weight. Secondarily, the assertion that one can discern by the degree of ill-formedness of an example what constraint it violates is another instance of utilizing a secondary intuition as an argument. from where did you meet the guy is not terrible enough to violate the Empty Category Principle and appears more like a breach of Subjacency, according to Chomsky (1986: 80). Similar arguments have been made elsewhere in the academic literature. First impressions suggest that this argument is sound. However, this is a frequent method used by scientists to arrive at a conclusion from a study's experimental results. It is important to note that in order for these arguments to be compelling, they must meet two conditions: I the difference in effect intensity must be well documented; and (ii) a theory must be developed to explain how the supposed difference in causes would produce the observed effects. (ii) may be met by the notion of barriers, while Subjacency violations' relative weakness is mostly an assertion. I is unsatisfied since judgments regarding the degree of unacceptability are always just assertions, based on casual introspection. A basic intuition, rather than the linked secondary intuition, failed to meet (I). This is of course a failure of I Rather than simple binary intuitions we addressed in the prior section, here the intuitions are fine-grained ones of relative acceptability. Thus, the conclusions are even more doubtful because of the inability to adhere to the usual scientific criteria of data collecting.

The authors of this research demonstrate that even highly qualified linguists cannot guarantee the accuracy of their findings. People's accuracy in recognizing accents varies widely, according to research on the subject. As a result of these research, it's clear you can't trust anyone's opinion just because they're an expert in the subject matter. In order to infer that a person is capable of making correct judgements, it must be shown independently, for example by testing or some other sort of verification. Fortunately, conducting this type of analysis is not difficult and only necessitates access to a few relevant speech samples. Forensic speaker identification is simpler than examining a person's cognitive abilities. applied linguistics. In A. Davies and C. Elder (eds) The Handbook of Applied Linguistics 431–450. New York: Blackwell. 2. Derwing, T. and Munro, M. J. (1997) Accent, comprehensibility and intelligibility: evidence from four L1s. Studies in Second Language Acquisition 19: pp. 1–16. 3. Eades, D. (2005) Applied linguistics and language analysis in asylum seeker cases. Applied Linguistics 26(4): pp. 503–526. 4. Eades, D., Fraser, H., Siegel, J., McNamara, T. and Baker, B. (2003) Linguistic identification in the determination of nationality: a preliminary report. Language Policy 2(2): pp. 179–199. 5. Sørensen, M. H. (2009) Voice line-ups: some voices are easier to remember than others – and some people are better at it. IAFPA 18th Annual Conference. Cambridge, UK, 2–5 August. 6. Wilson, K. (2009) Language Analysis for the Determination of Origin: native speakers vs. trained linguists. MSc dissertation, University of York. 7. Yarmey, A.D. (2001) Earwitness descriptions and speaker identification. Forensic Linguistics 8(1): pp. 113–122. 8. Foulkes, P. and Barron, A. (2000) Telephone speaker recognition amongst members of a close social network. Forensic Linguistics 7(2): pp. 180–198. 9. Fraser, H. (2009) The role of ‗educated native speakers‘ in providing language analysis for the determination of the origin of asylum seekers. International Journal of Speech, Language and the Law 16(1): pp. 113–138. 10. Language and National Origin Group (2004) Guidelines for the use of language analysis in relation to questions of national origin in refugee cases. International Journal of Speech, Language and the Law 11(2): pp. 261–266.

Research Scholar, Shri Venkateshwara University, Uttar Pradesh sumandahiya19821982@gmail.com