Data Security in cloud computing

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Abstract: Cloud computing sees a technical and cultural shift of computing service provision from being provided locally to being provided remotely, and en masse, by third-party service providers. Data that was once housed under the security domain of the service user has now been placed under the protection of the service provider. Users have lost control over the protection of their data: No longer is our data kept under our own watchful eyes.

This thesis investigates how Predicate Based Encryption (PBE) could be leveraged within the Cloud to protect data. PBE is a novel family of asymmetric encryption schemes in which decryption of a cipher-text is dependent upon a set of attributes satisfying a certain predicate, allowing for selective fine-grained access control to be specified over cipher-texts.

It is argued that obfuscation of one's data is not enough when seeking to protect data. The control of how one's data is used and the trust afforded to service providers is equally as important. To this end, three archetypal scenarios are described that illustrate ways in which service users could specify precisely with whom they wish to share their data, for what purpose, and for how long. Furthermore, two additional scenarios are presented that would allow a service provider to facilitate keyword search over encrypted data using expressive queries supporting conjunction and disjunction of terms.

CONCLUSION

Cloud Computing embodies the as-a-Service paradigm and allows for services to be provided en masse to consumers. The problems associated with the use of cloud based services can be summarised by the unknown risk profile (see Section 3.8) and unknown expectation of privacy—see Section 3.9.2. When service users push data to the cloud they need to rely upon Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) adhering to their remit, and doing so dutifully. However, when looking to build solutions to protect data in the cloud it is important to remember that for the service user the CSP can be trusted, albeit at arm's length—see Section 6.3. The threat models presented in Chapter 4 illustrate that threats to data occur both in the domain of the service user and the domain of the CSP. Traditional privacy models are too user-centric and CSPfearing when trying to address the problem of protecting data—see Section 6.2. A privacy model centred around Kafka's The Trial helps to address this problem, this privacy model indicates that when protecting one's data one should also have control over its use rather than solely preventing its collection: CSPs and service users need to work together.

Predicate Based Encryption (PBE) presents an interesting and also novel family of asymmetric encryption schemes. PBE combines Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) with asymmetric encryption, allowing for a single-encrypt or/multi-decrypt or environment to be realised using a

single scheme. Replicating such functionality using more traditional techniques requires a more complex approach—see Section 10.2. Even so, PBE is inherently more flexible, data can be encrypted for a decrypting entity prior to the creation of the decrypting entity's decryption key: The precise list of decrypting entities need not be known a priori. Such novelty lies with the cryptographic keys—see Section 10.1. Cryptographic keys are not just numbers, there is no one-to-one pairing of encryption and decryption keys, and encryption and decryption keys are created separately from each other.

Though understanding the operation and potential use of PBE schemes was not inherently difficult it was not trivial either. Understanding the means through which PBE schemes can be constructed also proved to be a somewhat tedious affair. Unfortunately with PBE, a disproportionate amount of time was spent searching for, and collating, information from different sources; different papers begat different schemes which in turn begat different terminology. However, these efforts were not without dividends, by learning more about PBE scheme construction, various issues surrounding cryptographic keys were identified and addressed. For instance, blinding values prevent decrypting entities from combining their decryption keys-see Section 8.6.2. The inclusion of numerical attributes also presents an underlying hidden cost (see Section 10.5.3), which together with key revocation techniques will increase the space needed to store decryption keys—see Section 10.5.6. Furthermore,

by looking at different schemes a means to categorise the different PBE schemes emerged from such schemes' emergent properties.

Similarly, describing PBE's use as part of a crypto-system was also a necessary evil, it establishednot only how PBE schemes could be deployed (see Section 9.8) but also points of contention within such deployment. Of which the most notable issues were those surrounding key manage ment such as constructing, issuing and revocation. Furthermore, the use of PBE identified three different modes of operation that describe the three different ways in which PBE schemes can be leveraged within an crpyto-system—see Section 9.8. When combined with the cloud setting, two different sets of scenarios emerged based upon whether the service user's or CSP's data was to be protected.

PBE schemes can be used to protect service user's data in three different scenarios: Scenario I saw the inclusion of PBE within a service; Scenario II saw the provision of PBE as-a-Service; and Scenario V saw PBE being deployed by the user themselves. In each of these three scenarios PBE can be used by service users to specify precisely with whom they wish to share their data, for what purpose, and for how long. Although Scenario V may be a privacy zealot's ideal choice—they are in full control—its practical feasibility has yet to be determined; the ability for service users' to act competently as a Key Authority is still unclear. The remaining two scenarios, on the other hand, do appear to be more promising. However, these scenarios in themselves do present a dilemma between usability and the guarantees made over end-to-end security-see Section 12.3.

When looking to protect CSP's data, PBE can facilitate keyword search with complex queries over encrypted data: Scenario III by the CSP; and in Scenario IV by a service user. This use of PBE is rather interesting in that the focus of these scenarios is on the CSP and not service user, and is most certainly worthy of further investigation.

The use of PBE within the cloud appears to be concentrated at both the PaaS and SaaS service layers. Though some may be surprised at PBE's lack of use at the laaS layer, this was not totally unexpected. The primary interaction between a service user and CSP at this level is over managing virtual machines: Not much else happens.

As previously mentioned, comprehending the field of PBE was made more difficult due to the inherently heterogeneous nature of the schemes studied. As such this thesis also sought to provide readers with a decent starting point over PBE schemes and also their use within crypto-systems. However, towards the end of this

investigation a plethora of papers have been released addressing PBE in terms of its description and use within a cryptographic system. From Boneh, Sahai and Waters [BSW10], PBE can now be seen under the guise of Functional Based Encryption (FBE), here Boneh, Sahai and Waters provides a coherent, and authoritative, definition towards PBE together with a categorisation of the different FBE schemes. Interestingly the categorisation presented is similar to that presented within this thesissee Section 7.3. Furthermore, Akinyele, Lehmann et al. [AL+10] utilises PBE to secure medical records, and Bobba, Fatemieh et al. [BF+10] utilises PBE to for secure messaging. Both these solutions show real-life uses of PBE schemes and as part of a cryptographic system. In fact the solutions presented in Bobba, Fatemieh et al. [BF+10] and Akinyele, Lehmann et al. [AL+10] would both correspond to Scenario I.

FURTHER RESEARCH

Several avenues for further research are discussed. Addressing Predicate Based Signing, Distributed Attribute Based Encryption, Use Case development and practical feasibility.

ATTRIBUTE BASED SIGNING

schemes provide assurances towards confidentiality of data. They do not provide as surances towards the authenticity of the data. To provide such assurances digital signature schemes are required. Attribute Based Signing (ABS) is an adaptation of Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) for the purposes of providing guarantees towards the provenance of the signed data, and moreover towards the anonymity of the [MPR10]. Within ABS schemes the digital signature indicates that the signer can satisfy the given predicate and hence has attested to the message—provenance. Furthermore, the precise set of attributes used by the signer is not revealed—signer anonymity. Such a signature scheme has several practical uses. Maji, Prabhakaran and Rsulek [MPR10] discusses the use of ABS schemes for attribute-based authentication, trust negotiation, and the leaking of secrets. Future research would seek to investigate:

- The feasibility of such schemes.
- How such schemes can be leveraged in general: What do they allow for? and What do they bring? and finally
- How these schemes can be used within the Cloud.

DECENTRALIZING THE KEY AUTHORITY

The Key Authority is responsible for the management of attributes, attribute definition, and also over attribute assignment to entities. However, these attributes naturally originate from different sources and as such they will also be managed by different authorities. For example, within a university setting students, and information concerning students. are handled by various administrative departments¹. Matriculation is typically performed by a central administrative body, while more degree programme specific aspects (e.g. advising) are handled at a faculty level, and also further on a per school/department basis. There may not be one central body that collates and is able to verify the attributes/access policies that are to be assigned to the student. The ability for a single Attribute Authority and Decryption Authority to administer over a 'global' attribute universe is made more difficult. Distributed Attribute Based Encryption (DABE), also known as Multi-Authority ABE, is an adaptation of Ciphertext-Policy-ABE that delegates the management of attributes and the creation of decryption keys to other individual attribute authorities [LC+10; MKE09; Cha07]. Future work will be to investigate:

- The feasibility of such schemes.
 - How these schemes can be incorporated within the existing description for the use of PBE within a crypto-system
- Following from the previous point, how this new description of the crypto-system affects the scenarios governing its use within the Cloud.

CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS

Chapter 8 discussed the different techniques that can be used to construct a Linear Secret Sharing Scheme (LSSS) from boolean formula. These techniques fell into two categories: access tree oriented, or based upon MSPs. It is also known that these different techniques will have some affect upon the composition, namely that of efficiency, of the constructed LSSS. Future investigations should include the comparison of these different techniques looking at how the constructed LSSSs affect: storage requirements, encryption and decryption efficiency. A similar avenue for further investigation is concerned with key revocation. With Key-Policy schemes it is the Key Authority (KA) that is responsible for the specification and construction of policy rules. These policies can be combined to construct other policy rules, creating a hierarchy of policy rules. Can this be used to facilitate key revocation within Key-Policy schemes?

USE CASE DEVELOPMENT

The description of how PBE can be used within a crypto-system (given in Chapter 9) does not address fully how other security issues/guarantees such as authenticity and non-repudiation can be assured. This is necessary when discussing the distribution of cryptographic keys and the sending of messages. Area of future work can be the provision of a 'complete description' of a crypto-system that makes used of PBE. Following on from this, another area of investigation will be to look at how such a complete description affects the different scenarios given in Chapter 11. Moreover, these scenarios have been described rather generically and have used 'guiding examples' to aid in their description. An area of future work would be to develop these scenarios further providing more concrete examples of their use.

PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

This thesis has primarily been concerned with the theoretical considerations and implications over PBE and the Cloud. Following on from the future work suggested Section 14.5, an obvious next step is to investigate various practical aspects of the use of PBE such as its implementation, deployment and Quality of Service (QoS). Areas of interest that should be addressed include: • The effect that access policy composition, especially concerning numerical comparisons, has upon the performance of the encryption, decryption and key generation functions.

- The QoS measurements and guarantees that can be made, aside from function efficiency, over PBE.
- The effect that access policy composition has upon, if any, the size of cipher-text produced.
- The representation (encoding) of access policies/rules and list of attributes.
- Existing standards and technologies that should be leveraged or adhered to.
- The construction of a means through which policy rule administration, for both users and CSPs, can be achieved.

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