State and Nation in Nineteenth Century International Political Theory

Although the terms "state" and "nation," the latter of which is perhaps less obvious, appear frequently in international political theory, they acquired new meanings between the close of the eighteenth century and the beginning of World War I. Additionally, the two meanings became intertwined, to the point where in our own century it has become common to regard them as almost synonymous, or at least both incorporated in the composite term 'nation-state' despite the fact that it is extremely challenging to arrive at a substantive definition of a nation which would allow more than a minority of the actual states of today to qualify, despite all of their membership in the United Nations. International ramifications of these semantic shifts are the focus of the writings that follow this introductory section. One may try to summarize the nature of these shifts by pointing out the rise of the concept of a "ethical" state and the notion of national sovereignty. Historically, at least throughout the Christian period, people have seen the state as something of a necessary evil, a partial remedy for human depravity, or a brilliant, if limited, answer to the issue of the egoism that characterizes the human condition in its natural habitat. However, beginning at the close of the eighteenth century and continuing into the nineteenth, a number of diverse schools of thought converged on the idea that the state might be a force for good and, furthermore, that an ethical life necessitated the presence of a specific form of state. While this school of thought owed much to and was envious of classical Greek or Roman republicanism, its most influential manifestation can be found in the works of Hegel and his followers, who came to recognize that the modern state possessed unique characteristics that made it an even more appropriate carrier of the ethical idea than had been Athens or Rome. Again, whereas in earlier times a nation was understood in rather broad terms as a 'people' (gens), or even a wider grouping (for example, at the University of Paris in Medieval times, the 'English Nation' were a body of students who incorporated a number of modern nationalities, some unconnected to England or even the British Isles), by the nineteenth century it had become widely believed that the world (or at least the 'civilized' world) was natur The symbolic shift between Louis XVI, King of France (a place), and Napoleon I, Emperor of the French (a people), was a revolutionary manifestation of the idea that sovereignty emanated from and was exercised on behalf of the nation, which ultimately meant the people. Powerful forces fought against the emergence of both the ethical state and national sovereignty in the nineteenth century. Utilitarians and 'Manchester School' liberals (see Chapter 9) rejected the notion that the state could be anything other than a neutral movements persisted throughout the twentieth century, but with less impact. Already recognized as one of international society's "settled norms," national self-determination is evidence of the success of the national ideal (Frost, 1996). Similar arguments may be made for the concept of an ethical state; although the word is seldom used today, the belief that the state should actively work to improve the quality of life for its inhabitants is more widespread now than it was a century ago. In a nutshell, learning about how these concepts took shape in the nineteenth century is a window into dynamics that are profoundly relevant to our own time period. We need to clear up one thing first. In this chapter, we'll look at the role of the state and the country in international relations throughout the nineteenth century, and we'll see how the rise of industrial society affected these exchanges. This separation is logical from a presentational standpoint, but it is artificial because new concepts of state and nation emerged alongside the rise of industrial society. Furthermore, the chain of causation went both ways, as the new national states that emerged at the time were crucial to the spread of industrialism. These two competing visions of international relations in the nineteenth century—industrialism and the nation-state—pull in different directions, as explored in this book. As we shall see, the prevailing liberal perspective of industrial society anticipated subsequent ideas of "globalization" by positing that it was reducing divisions between "insiders" and "outsiders" and laying the groundwork for a genuinely cosmopolitan international order. A more particularistic view of politics is advocated for by the state and nation theorists whose works will be addressed in this chapter, who disagree with this trend and instead point to the needs of the newly legitimized nation-state as evidence. A replacement of the particularistic community with broader, more inclusive institutions cannot be considered as problem-free if the particularistic community has moral worth. The conflict between the universal and the individual persists despite the fact that the border between the two was less clear defined for most of the authors addressed in both chapters. ought to be read as a whole, rather than as individual stories, since they each tell part of the same larger tale.

Divya Gupta (2017) investigating the role of MGNREGA in national development. The MGNREGS recognizes that although economic progress is vital, so is tackling the underlying causes of poverty. MGNREGS aims to promote sustainable development in rural areas via a wide range of programs.Long-term viability depends on doing this correctly. Last but not least, MGNREGA's focus on economic growth, through a wide variety of works activities related to water harvesting, rural connectivity, irrigation, flood control, and protection works. Professor Kumbhar R. K. (2013) A research performed in Season Panchayat of Sambhalpur district indicated that the MGNREGS has failed to effectively create any sort of physical assets like pond, road, etc. to the village due to corruption and irregularities in the running of the MGNREGS and significant political intervention. The approach will not generate enough new jobs for the unemployed, in our opinion. S. Prakasam and G. Sugapriyan (2015) Here, we forecast the future performance of MGNREGA using three distinct data mining techniques and compare our results to those from the prior year's study. When it comes to promoting economic and social development, nothing compares to MGNREGA. The initiative has a strong possibility of helping rural individuals escape poverty and provide for their families, according to an evaluation of the program's effectiveness during the last three fiscal years. Problems with the competent agency's implementation of the strategy on the ground are noted. Omkar Joshi, et al (2017) examined the subject of low rates of program participation among families from socially and economically disadvantaged groups (SC/ST) and compared them to participation among families from more privileged groups (of all castes). Don't confuse current income with participation; instead, focus on the pro-poor targeted aspect of the program by considering the families' past income levels. The prevalent poverty among the SCs and STs makes study of these groups, who are underrepresented in academia, more vital. Many more individuals will enroll in the programs as a consequence of this. The research examines MGNREGA participation at the household and individual levels by considering variables such as the distribution of family income and the presence or absence of women in the workforce from the onset. Research shows that socially excluded groups, such as Dalits and Adivasi (SCs and STs), and groups like these, who are recognized as marginalized under the Act, have a higher participation rate in MGNREGS. Rajalakshmi, V., & Selvam, V. (2017) This research examines the scheme's implementation process using secondary data analysis and a descriptive study in order to uncover the genuine problem and obstacles experienced by women beneficiaries under MGNREGA in India and the effect through MGNREGA. Overall, this initiative has helped

Though post-Enlightenment philosophy ascribed positive significance to concepts like political legitimacy and the role of the state, these were central concerns of Enlightenment thought. Hume, Voltaire, and Mozart were just a few Enlightenment luminaries who held a contemptuous view of patriotism and state claims. Others, like the French Encyclopedists and revolutionaries (and maybe Rousseau himself) placed significance on these concepts by referencing ancient Greek and Roman examples. Kant's recognition of the state's possible role in overcoming humanity's 'unsocial sociability,' which would build on the contract tradition, would be the best case scenario. Unless the people were first made into excellent republican citizens, as in the revolutionary tradition, none of these thinkers were enthusiastic about the concept of popular involvement in politics, much less democracy. Politics was seen as the domain of the irrational and the unenlightened, and much of the international thinking of the time centered on ideas of 'Perpetual Peace' that sought to mitigate the effects of irrational particularistic identifications. Meanwhile, Voltaire's Candide and Kant's Cosmopolitan Ethic are two extreme interpretations of the value of a solitary, introspective lifestyle and the value of a life of the intellect, respectively. Only Rousseau, whose ideas are notoriously hard to categorize, saw happiness as participating in society as a citizen; nevertheless, the conditions under which he felt this was possible—small, autarchic face-to-face communities—were, as he admitted, gone forever. After his death, mob rule combined with elitism in revolutionary France mocked the classical legacy and showed that republicanism was impossible to sustain. A backlash against such open-mindedness was always likely. Even revolutionary anarchy looked preferable to the dry logic of the Enlightenment for many participants in the 'romantic' movement of the late eighteenth century. A strong criticism of Enlightenment was created by these authors, who found inspiration in the work of folklorists like J.G. Herder or the (perhaps fictional) Scots poet Ossian, and in their yearning for the lost warmth of the communities of the old world. Part of the issue was that, while they were critical of the Enlightenment's rationalism and individualism, they were also a product of it. They were able to criticize the former and advocate the latter because they were rational, self-determining individuals who were not defined by all-encompassing affective communities. A politics was needed that would preserve the Enlightenment's greatest achievement—the concept of the self-determining individual—while also enshrining this individual within an affective community that could provide the warmth and sense of belonging that were forbidden by Enlightenment rationalism. Hegel (1770-1831), according to his proponents (Avineri 1972; Hegel is a famously challenging author who presents an overly ambitious theory that purports to cover all of philosophy's important ground. His lectures, particularly Philosophy of History (Hegel, 1956) and Elements of the Philosophy of Right (Hegel, 1991), provide the most comprehensive overview of his political and ethical ideas. Hegel sees the development of consciousness, or Geist, as the driving force behind historical change, with Geist best translated as Spirit (though Mind is also acceptable; the term has strong religious connotations), and history as the process by which ever more complex and ethically rich institutions and ideas emerge and reach their apogee in the rational, ethical state of the modern age. It is good that an interpretation of Hegel can be presented that does not too depend on the idea of Spirit or Mind attaining self-understanding, which has baffled many otherwise bright thinkers. Instead, we can view his work as an explanation of how and why free, self-determining people come into existence; it is this depth of thought that propelled him to prominence as a political philosopher and ensures his continued relevance today. Hegel contends that three aspects of ethical existence are required for the creation of free persons. Unconditional love is provided by the ethical family, creating an environment where a person may learn to value themselves. This lays the groundwork for independence but isn't enough on its own; people still need to go out from the safety of their own social circles and into the larger world where they must gain the respect of their peers. Hegel refers to this larger world, or 'civil society,' as a place where people meet as potential adversaries and competitors, but also as rights-holders in a framework where interactions are ordered by law. Many of the institutions that, from the viewpoint of Anglo-American liberalism, are considered to be part of the state, such as public administration and the legal system, or "the police and the corporation," as Hegel puts it, may be found in civil society. But just as the family requires civil society because it is impossible to raise children who are fully independent in a world ruled by unconditional love, so too would civil society be a sphere of struggle and tension if it were not joined by a third ethical institution, the state. As opposed to how orthodox liberalism sees the state functioning, Hegel argues that its primary purpose is to bring about peace and harmony among its citizens. Individuals in civil society compete fiercely, although under conditions defined by law, leading to inequality and some degree of civil conflict; but, when they meet as fellow citizens, they do so on equal footing and disagreements are healed, or so Hegel would have us believe. One or two things need to be made clear before we can go on to considering the ramifications of this approach for international relations. To start, the Polis was a haven of freedom in ancient Greece. While the Romans had universal legal categories, they vanished with the rise of the Empire, and the unassailable patriarchal structure of the Roman family was never really challenged. Only in the post-Reformation and post-Enlightenment era have all the necessary ingredients for freedom been brought together. At times, Hegel appears to suggest that a fully ethical state has already been achieved, and 'Right Hegelians' draw conservative lessons from this position. However, 'Left Hegelians' argue, with at least as much plausibility, that Hegel's thought offers not a defense of the status quo but a call to reform; the ethical community is a possibility towards which we should strive rather than an achievement to be defended. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the basic definition of a state is under issue. As a result of his terminology, which has caused many to accuse him of adoring the state and paving the way for totalitarianism, Hegel is often seen as someone who is predisposed to totalitarianism because of his views on the state's preeminent role in society. The rule of law and the division of powers, however, are hallmarks of Hegel's ethical state, and this must not be forgotten. Hegel supports monarchy but only in the form of a constitutional monarchy inside a Rechtstaat, or a state that is committed to law and justice. How would a world populated by Hegelian states affect the dynamics of international relations? Text 1 of this chapter gives the solution by reprinting the relevant portions of the Philosophy of Right pertaining to international law (#330–#340). It is worth noting that Hegel thinks states need other states in order to function properly; just as individuals can't develop their individuality without rubbing against other individuals (metaphorically speaking), so can't states; whether this is a helpful analogy is debatable, but for Hegel it follows that states can't surrender their sovereignty, that, therefore, war must always remain a possibility. They depend on governments imposing constraints on themselves, and any such agreement is always "tainted with contingency." Even while it should be highlighted that Hegel views war as a public act in which injury to civilian life and property is excluded, he is willing to imagine a beneficial function for war in creating a situation within which people might display self-sacrifice and the civic virtues. Is Hegel a "realist," as the field of International Relations theory has come to be known in the 20th century? One thing is certain: he is not a supporter of the "might is right" philosophy. An essential concept in this context is the idea of history as a judge, with the world's past serving as a form of global court where the fate of countries is decided in line with the principles of Geist. Forcing something to happen never results in a happy accident. Hegel is content to view war as an instrument available to states, in the never be eliminated from the system, but this is distinct from an explanation of the causes of any particular war (Clausewitz, 1976; Suganami, 1996). In another part of Philosophy of Right (#246), he talks on governments' propensity to expand their borders, but it's important to highlight that this trend originates not in the state itself but in the economy and society at large. As we will see, however, some later Hegelians, most notably the British Idealists, have fought against the view that war is an inevitable outcome of world politics.

Not all nations qualify as "ethical states" in Hegel's view; what matters most is the moral character of the institutions that make up a society, not its citizenship. While Hegelian concepts did have an impact on nationalist thinking in the nineteenth century, the spark for nationalism was ignited by Herder's folklorism and the political events of the Revolution and Napoleonic wars. No one expressed this kind of nationalism more passionately than the Italian revolutionary and thinker, Guiseppe Mazzini (1805 - 72), who lived during a time when Italy was divided among a number of small, generally oppressive states and dominated by the Habsburg Empire, which, post 1815, still owned Lombardy and Venice. Mack Smith shows that at one point in the nineteenth century, Mazzini was considered one of the most influential political theorists. This was due in part to the romanticization of his life as an Italian revolutionary fighting for a cause dear to right-thinking people everywhere, but also to the widespread acclaim for his writings, especially the articles compiled and published in the 1840s under the title The Duties of Man (Mazzini, 1907). Many different editions and translations of this text existed during the nineteenth century, but by the twentieth, it had all but vanished. The same factor that contributed to its heyday is also responsible for its demise now. Mazzini provides an eloquent defense of nationalism and its positive associations with belonging to a people and a land, but he shows little awareness of the concept's inherent challenges, challenges that have become all too obvious in the twentieth century. We believe therefore in the HOLY ALLIANCE OF THE PEOPLE as the broadest formula of association possible in our age - in the liberty and equality of the peoples, without which association has no true life - in Nationality. This early, messianic text, Faith and the Future (1835), captures the essence of Mazzini's thought. What we believe in is the holy Fatherland, which is the cradle of nationality, the altar and patrimony of the individuals that compose each people, and which is the conscience of the peoples, assigning to them their share of work in the association, their office in HUMANITY, and thus constituting their mission on earth, their individuality. For without Nationality, To counteract the regressive Holy Alliance of Empires, the Holy Alliance of the People must unite. All countries are capable of and should strive for peaceful coexistence, so the national ideal does not conflict with international norms. Democracy and nationalism are complementary concepts since they both promote political liberty. The Duties of Man elaborates on these ideas at detail. Although the book opens with a prayer for the Italian working class, it quickly shifts focus to God and the law. Included in this second text are excerpts from the third and fourth chapters, "Duties to Humanity" and "Duties to Country," respectively. It is worth noting that in both the text and in life, Mazzini places a higher priority on obligations to humanity than on duties to nation ('You are men before you are citizens or fathers.'), but more importantly, there seems to be no feeling that this may be in conflict with itself. It's not hard to see that there is at least some room for dispute. To construct nations based on Countries of the People, with "harmony and brotherhood" amongst them, Mazzini proposes redrawing Europe's geography along national lines. This seems unlikely, though, given his description of Italy's boundaries (which he calls "the best-defined country in Europe"). He also believes that the border that God has given Italy is a semicircle with Parma as its base and the mouths of the Var and the Isonzo as its beginning and ending points. The Gods of France, Switzerland, and Slovenia have been asked to weigh in, and the reader is encouraged to give it a go. John Stuart Mill (1806–73) provides a more nuanced defense of liberal nationalism, but in narrower terms and without resolving the central problem. Mill views the question of national identity not through the lens of an account of pre-given nationhood, but through the lens of'self-determination,' or the freedom of a people to choose their own form of government. His words of support for this freedom in Considerations on Representative Government make it very apparent that popular will is the foundation of the national concept. If a strong sense of national pride exists, then it makes sense for people of that nationality to live under the same overarching authority. This is essentially a statement that those who will be ruled should have a voice in the matter of who will govern them. If not the freedom to select which of the many human groups they identify with, it's hard to see what else any subset of humanity should be allowed to do. (Mill, 1972: 361) A more robust argument, "Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities," is added in the same paragraph. This reveals a lot about Mill, possibly accidentally, as it helps define what it means to be a national for him. This may sound like a depressing piece of advice, given that very few countries are truly "mono- does not believe that free institutions are next to impossible in, say, multi-national Great Britain. Only some 'divisions of the human race' should be allowed to make their own decisions. This is made more evident when considering Mill's thoughts on the antithesis of the concept of self-determination: the principle of non-intervention. Mill's 1859 essay, "A Few Words on Non-Intervention," from which the following passage is taken (Text 3), makes the case for the general principle of non-intervention and for the necessary exceptions to the rule, using arguments that have been used again by authors such as Michael Walzer in the late 20th century. Because it is impossible for outsiders to create free states, Mill argues that non-intervention is generally the right policy. Rather than being given to them, people must fight for and seize their freedom. The few exceptions to this rule involve situations in which intervention would be, in effect, counter-intervention. But it should be highlighted that these rules only hold true when the involved countries have a similar or same degree of civilisation. Ordinary international morality necessitates reciprocity, but barbarians refuse to do so. The primitive intellect of a barbarian can't advance without help from more advanced societies. Thus, the imperialistic deeds of the British in India or the French in Algeria are justifiable, whereas the imperialist acts of the Russians on behalf of Austria against the Hungarians during the uprising of 1848–1849 are not. A substantial portion of the introduction is dedicated to demonstrating why the critics of this stance are missing the point. One hundred and fifty years after its publication, Mill's Eurocentric description is still uncomfortable reading, but many comments need to be mentioned, if not in mitigation, then at least to offer context. In the first place, Mill was only reflecting the consensus of the enlightened populace of Europe at the turn of the nineteenth century when he made these remarks. With regard to the first, the idea of the 'Standards of Civilization' codified the notion that certain kinds of socio-economic and legal norms needed to be met before membership could be granted (Gong, 1984), which effectively limited full membership of International Society to European states and ex-colonies. When it comes to the second question, it's far more challenging to identify notable nineteenth-century Europeans who did not believe in the supremacy of European civilisation. Mill was a leading liberal of his time, but conservative thinkers were even more hostile to non-European values. Moving to the left, Marx and Engels' descriptions of non-European civilizations are even more patronizing and hostile than Mill's: "barbarian egotism....undignified, stagnatory, and vegetative life." Marx's portrayal of life in India before to the influence of British rule is characterized by a culture although Mill's logic is insulting, at least he recognizes that there is a genuine problem here and that it is not feasible to embrace all nationalisms in the vein of Mazzini. From a twenty-first century vantage point, this is a breath of new air; but, Mill's effort to categorize countries into "good," "progressive," and "bad," "regressive," ones must be rejected.

As was said up above, Hegel's support of the state is framed in moral terms, and he was not a believer in "power-politics." Evidently, neither Mazzini nor Mill fit the bill here, either; Mazzini's belief in universal brotherhood and harmony connects him to later liberal internationalist thought, while Mill's dedication to a norm-governed international society is incompatible with power-politics or any other crude version of realism. To identify a genuine antecedent to the "realist paradigm" in the nineteenth century, one must go to the writings of German political scientist Heinrich Von Treitschke (1834-1896). Of Saxon descent, von Treitschke became the leading intellectual proponent of Prussian expansionism while teaching at a Berlin university. His writing had a profound impact on German culture at the turn of the twentieth century, and it also indirectly influenced various schools of thought within twentieth-century realism. Treitschke, like Mazzini (albeit for different reasons), lost most of his direct influence in the years after World War One. Treitschke's literature is more obviously nationalist, reactionary, anti-Semitic, and sexist than Mazzini's was, and this is what has made him intellectually persona non grata. We rightly condemn the junior students (and some of their senior colleagues) who produce caricatured accounts of realism, accounts which implicitly describe such profoundly moral human beings as Hans Morgenthau or George Kennan as ruthless power-worshippers, but if their fire were directed at Treitschke, it would come closer to the mark. Even though his body of work makes it clear that the shackles of any kind of morality are worn very loosely, if at all, his writings are characterized by an unpleasant moralizing: thus, his Christian principles are repeatedly invoked to explain why an immoral foreign policy is unacceptable, which is said to be in contrast with Machiavlli's instrumentalism and Hegel's supposed deification of the state. In light of these problems, you may be wondering why his works are being offered in this context at all. He is one of the clearest and most intelligent defenders of a full-blown, unapologetic account of the sovereign state as a power-based institution that is inevitably drawn into conflict with other states and which can brook no restrictions, even though he commits numerous sins we owe him gratitude; beyond this begrudging appreciation, however, his writings make plain that Treitschke was a man of nuanced knowledge and adroitness in the diplomatic realities of his day. Although we may not agree with the image he presents, it is based on actual events. "The people, legally united as an independent entity" (Treitschke, 1916: 3) is how Treitschke, the author of Politics, defines the state at the outset of his book. It is the responsibility of the state to safeguard its citizens. There must be state sovereignty. States may only be constrained by other states or by their own citizens, and even then, only rebus sic stantibus (so long as current conditions remain unchanged). Smaller nations lack "that capacity for justice which characterizes their greater neighbors," thus it's important for them to learn how to provide for themselves as much as possible if they want to be considered sovereign. What makes these viewpoints intriguing is, first, the way in which they draw on writers like Hegel and Herder while subverting their purposes, and, second, the extent to which they are devoid of the kind of theological justifications common among the 'righteous realists' of the twentieth century (Smith, 1986; Rosenthal, 1991). There is no room for human fallibility or original sin in this condition, which consists only of force and drive to win. A nation's health can only be restored by state-sponsored military action. Its destructive nature is not downplayed, and the caveats that Hegel placed on war's beneficial aspects are absent here. Treitschke's opinion on the world community and international law (Text 4) is elaborated upon in the excerpts from Book II of Politics shown below. Some procedural concepts, like diplomatic immunity, get his stamp of approval, but he has serious doubts about efforts to limit states' actions. This kind of international law, in his view, is a reflection of the desire of the powerful, an idea that would be revisited by Carr in 1939: the 'haves' establish the law, and it is pointless to blame the 'have-nots' for refusing to acknowledge its validity.

With good reason, the English translation of Treitschke's book was used to illustrate the dangers of German militarism when it was published in 1916, in the middle of World War I. Treitschke's views were consistent with those of Bethmann-Holweg, who famously said that the treaty protecting Belgian neutrality was a mere "scrap of paper" and that Britain's involvement against Germany was not warranted by its breach. But painting all German philosophy, and particularly Hegelianism, with the same, militarist brush was not quite as defensible philosophically. Such blackguarding unfortunately much more seriously than it merited (Hobhouse, 1918: 6). Although Hegel does leave himself open to misunderstanding in his enthusiasm for the ethical state and his account of the role of war, as we have seen, this was hardly a reasonable attack on Hegel, and it was especially inappropriate as a critique of the British Idealists, since each of them had rejected important aspects of Hegel's view of war. Although the Idealists put up a fight, Hegel's reputation in English-speaking nations declined after 1914 and only began to rise again in the 1960s and 1970s, and then only with the help of western Marxism. Numerous instances are included in a recent compilation of works by the British idealists (Boucher, 1997). Much of this Idealist fight back was in response to direct criticism by liberals such as Hobhouse. Although the last reading in this part was composed before the anti-Hegelian tempest, it is noticeably less contrite than the others. Bernard Bosanquet's (1848-1923) "Patriotism in the Perfect State" (Text 5) is a lecture he gave in early 1915; in it, he condemns the true power worshippers like Treitschke and gives a brief but incisive account of Hegel, pointing out the parts of Hegel's thought that have misled the unwary. However, the bulk of the essay is an explanation of how the patriotism necessary for the The legitimacy of the state is based on the will of the people, and no nation has the right to pass judgment on another or cede control of its territory without good cause; international government is impossible until a universal will emerges; however, war is not a necessary component of national health but rather a symptom of a more pervasive problem. Attempts to neatly label the ideas discussed in this rare book by a renowned philosopher fail. We are both human beings and citizens, cosmopolitans and members of a local society; the particularism linked with the Hegelian idea of an ethical state is shown to be consistent with a greater universalism. Joining a specific group allows us to feel a part of something larger than ourselves. If we want our communities to function, we need to establish a clear boundary between what happens inside and what happens outside. However, this barrier should not cut through our moral lives such that there are no responsibilities at all on the outside. As a matter of fact, our responsibilities to the rest of mankind are inextricably intertwined with our duties to our fellow citizens. In Treitschke's view, nations are only concentrations of sovereign authority; yet, in practice, the states that make up international society are far more complex than that. If we want to communicate our global ideals, we have to use the state, and the state's exterior actions cannot and should not be immune to the moral code. The idea that the universal and the particular can be reconciled in this way carries with it a strong whiff of utopianism, and if we compare Treitschke and Bosanquet, the former is the doubt, it would have been preferable if Bosanquet's futuristic outlook had been more influential and widely heard. Liberal internationalists in the years after World War I, between 1914 and 1918, should have made better use of this school of Idealism. We may, however, look to the pioneers of liberalism and internationalism for guidance.

Focusing on how most Greens reject the state system, this chapter has generally argued for decentralizing political communities below the level of the nation-state rather than for new forms of global political power. This necessitates not only economic but also social and political decentralization. Furthermore, they advocate for shifting away from solely sovereign institutions and behaviors and toward ones that include a broader distribution of power. To this end, global ecology provides complementary insight by elaborating on the ways in which current political and economic practices impair the long-term viability of human communities and the need of challenging entrenched power structures. Their advocacy for'reclaiming the commons' is consistent with the GPT decentralization case.

1. Rajalakshmi V. and Selvam V. (2017) impact of mgnrega on women empowerment and their issues and challenges: a review of literature from 2005 to 2015. Journal of Internet Banking and CommerceAn open access Internet journal (http://www.icommercecentral.com) Journal of Internet Banking and Commerce, Jan 2017, vol. 22, no. S7 2. Divya Gupta (2017), sustainable development through instrumentality of MGNREGA, International journal of Legal Research and studies, ISSN2456-608X. 3. Omkar Joshi, Sonalde Desai, Reeve Vanne man and Amaresh Dubey (2017), Who Participates in MGNREGA? Analyses from Longitudinal Data Review of Development & Change, Madras Institute of Development Studies, Volume XXII Number 1 January-June 2017,ISSN-0972-2661 4. G. Sugapriyan and S. Prakasam (2015) Analysing the Performance of MGNREGA Scheme using Data Mining Technique,International Journal of Computer Applications (0975 – 8887) Volume 109 – No. 9, January 2015 5. Dr.Kumbhar. R.K. , Long Road to social security Assessing the Implementation of 6. Dr. K.V.S. Prasad (2012Performance of Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA): An Overview,IJMBS Vol. 2, Issue 4, Oct - Dec 2012, ISSN : 2230-9519 (Online) | ISSN : 2230-2463 (Print) 7. Esteves, Tashina, K. V. Rao, BhaskarSinha, S. S. Roy, BhaskarRao, ShashidharkumarJha, Ajay Bhan Singh et al. "Agricultural and livelihood vulnerability reduction through the MGNREGA." Economic and Political Weekly 48, no. 52 (2013): 94-103. 8. Ranaware, Krushna, Upasak Das, AshwiniKulkarni, and Sudha Narayanan. "MGNREGA Works and their impacts." Economic & Political Weekly 50, no. 13 (2015): 53-61. 9. Sameer Ahmad Shalla et al.(2015),impact of employment guarantee on livelihood security: evidence from the mgnrega in j&k.,Asia Pacific Journal of Research Vol: I. Issue XXX, August 2015 ISSN: 2320-5504, E-ISSN2347-4793 10. Navneet Seth (2015)mgnrega: its implication in india: a overview, International Journal of science Technology & Management, Volume No.04, special Issue 04, Feb. 2015, ISSN-2394-1529 (print) 2394-1537(online). 11. Raag Bhatia et al. (2016),Examining the evidence on the effectiveness of India‘s rural employment guarantee act, New Delhi International Initiatives for Impact Evaluation (3ie). 12. KoustabMajumdar (2016), Could MGNREGA Parry the Seasonal Rural Migration? Micro Evidence from West Bengal, India, Imperial Journal of Interdisciplinary Research (IJIR) Vol-2, Issue-3, 2016 ISSN: 2454- 1362,http://www.onlinejournal.in. 13. SunaramHembrom (2017)Changing Tribal Livelihood Pattern Through MGNREGA; A study of MayrubhamiDistric of Odisha, The Researcher‘s- volume III, Issue,II, December-2017, International Journal Of Research, ISSN-2455-1503. 14. Lophro Celina Sapruna(2015)Tribal Participation and Development in India: A Case Study of Manipur,Asian Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies,ISSN: 2321-8819 (Online) 2348-7186 (Print) Impact Factor: 0.92 Volume 3, Issue 9, Sept. 2015 Safety Net, Journal of Sustainable Development; Vol. 12, No. 4; 2019 ,ISSN 1913-9063 E-ISSN 1913-9071,Published by Canadian Center of Science and Education.

PhD Student, Kalinga University, Raipur (CG).