A Psychological and Social Analysis of Terrorism Vulnerability

INTRODUCTION

The focus of the current research is on the social and psychological aspects that may play a role in someone's propensity to engage in terrorist activity. The term "proneness toward terrorism" refers to a neuro-psychological preparedness towards terrorist activities, an inclination towards terrorism, as well as a favourable attitude towards murder, looting, and the slaughter of innocent people for the sake of achieving a certain objective. However, before elaborating on the goals of our research, it is vital to have a clear understanding of what we mean when we refer to terrorism, as well as what its most distinguishing characteristics are and what its most common forms are. what are the motivations behind acts of terrorism, as well as the dynamics of acts of terrorism? When it comes to their convoluted and sometimes nebulous relationship to other types of political violence and to crime, the ideas of terror and terrorism are notoriously difficult to pin down and are frequently misused. The feeling of terror is entirely personal. We all have a varying level of tolerance for intense fear, and certain events, mental pictures, and threats made by others have the tendency to terrify us more than others do. Empirical social scientists have a particularly difficult time dealing with the state of terror, extreme fear, or dread because of the interplay between these subjective factors and individual irrational responses, which are often unconscious. This makes the concept of terror a particularly challenging one. In recent years, researchers in the field of social science have shown a trend toward avoiding the study of phenomena that are highly difficult to characterise and almost impossible to quantify. This trend has become more prevalent. In addition, the ideas of fear and terrorism carry with them an abundance of evidently extremely powerful evaluative and emotional implications. Historians and political philosophers, on the other hand, have not been so quick to discount the very genuine and profound individual and social experiences of living under a state of fear. Nor have they omitted to investigate the leaders, governments, and movements responsible for creating explicit ideas and practises of terrorism, nor have they neglected to seek to evaluate the socioeconomic and political circumstances and repercussions of terror. Both of these omissions have been made. For the sake of this discussion, however, it will be helpful to draw two basic distinctions: I between terror and terrorism, and (ii) between political terrorism and other types of terrorism. A significant portion of our feelings of panic are the unplanned or epiphenomenal byproducts of other occurrences that are beyond of our ability to either foresee or control. In point of fact, being unable to comprehend what is taking place, like wars and revolutions often carry with them a great quantity of epiphenomenal horror in their aftermath. This widespread and sometimes lethal epiphenomenal fear should, of course, be separated in a clear and distinct manner from the organised regimes of terror that, for example, followed in the footsteps of the French and Russian Revolutions. E.V. Walter (1969) have demonstrated it, in a groundbreaking analysis, that regimes and processes of terror are phenomena with a fairly ancient lineage. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that these phenomena are purposefully maintained even when it can be shown that they have effects that are counter-productive on the society in question. We believe that it is important to make a distinction between the "incidental" or "epiphenomenal" forms of terror, which are the kinds of terror that frequently accompany acts of mass violence, and the "systematic" forms of terror, which are the kinds of terror that are carried out by terror groups or terror regimes and in which the use of terror as a form of psychological warfare is specifically intended and planned. It's possible that politics has nothing to do with terrorism. It has been used by criminals not just for the purpose of obtaining ransom but also for other sorts of private gain. Psychopaths are capable of terrifying others for reasons that the psychopaths themselves may not fully grasp. Terrorism is a kind of symbolic protest and retaliation against society that may be used by the bored, the cruel, and the weak-minded as an outlet for their anger, frustration, and hate. Sometimes, in order to feel more justified in their actions, psychopaths and criminals may wrap themselves in political phrases. On the other hand, the propensity toward terrorist acts that are motivated politically is the subject of this particular piece of writing. Intimidation by force may serve as a useful working definition of political terrorism. It is the deliberate and systematic use of murder and damage, as well as the threat of death and devastation, in order to terrify people, organisations, communities, or governments into capitulating to the political objectives of the terrorists. It is one of the first forms of psychological warfare that has been documented. Credibility is established by convincing the target that the actual act of terrorist violence may or may not be the primary target, and that the effects of relatively small amounts of violence will tend to be quite disproportionate in terms of the number of people who are terrorised. First, a primary target for terrorization is selected. Next, the objective, or the message that is to be conveyed, is determined. Finally, credibility is established by selecting a primary target for terrorization. The phrase "Kill one, terrify ten thousand" is a traditional Chinese adage. The terrorist is more interested in having a large number of witnesses than in killing a large number of people. Although this may be true in the comparatively uncommon instances of "pure" terrorism, such as circumstances involving a large number of hostages, repressive and revolutionary forms of terror sometimes end in the slaughter of a significant number of people. In addition, fact that this is often absent in the actual world. Terrorists are often obsessed with rage against a supposed class or racial opponent, and they frequently consciously aim to kill large numbers of people. In the 1980s, a pioneering German terrorist thinker by the name of Johnnes Most pushed for this exact position. Assuming that political terrorists would adhere to some minimal norm of reason and compassion is a grave miscalculation that should be avoided at all costs. Clause Witz previously made the observation that war has its own language but not its own logic. The same can be said about terrorism, which, when it comes down to it, is just another kind of unconventional battle. Terrorism, in other words, cannot be equated with guerrilla conflict in general, despite the fact that many guerrillas have used terrorism or have been sponsored by terrorist groups and organisations. There are at least three fundamental components that make up terrorism. These components are the terroristic goals of the perpetrators of the act, the perpetrators' mode of operation in deploying particular forms of violence upon the victims, and the target audience. Terrorism is a special form or process of violence.

 o analyse the reasons due to those children, teenagers, and young adult of the area are typically interested in terrorism.

Terrorism has been described by Paul Wilkinson (1974) which emphasize on the systematic use of death and damage, as well as the threat of murder and devastation, in order to scare people, organisations, communities, or governments into submitting to the political purposes of the terrorist. As a result of this investigation, it has become abundantly evident that the violence perpetrated by terrorists is defined by its lack of discrimination, inhumanity, arbitrariness, and barbarism. It is abundantly clear that, in the sense in which the matter is defined, the concept of terrorism is an evaluative one. As a result, it is only meaningful to perceive certain behaviours as terrorist if our conceptions of normalcy incorporate the idea of a peaceful order under the rule of law, free from terror and fear. If we perceive violence in the way of Sartre (1967) as something that is both positively desirable and liberative, then we will not, of course, consider terrorism to be a social and political issue. Ideologists of violence could even have the goal of establishing a revolutionary society in which extreme violence is elevated to a role that is more significant than that of a change agent. Carlos Marighela (1971), a Brazilian urban guerrilla thinker, envisioned that from the urban front, we would move on to the peasantry, and the student population in the context of a decentralised and mobile guerrilla war, we will be able to extend our activities in all directions throughout the interior of Brazil and, ultimately, create a revolutionary army of national liberation comparable in size to the conventional army of the military dictatorship. Marighela (1971) stresses on many occasions that the whole urban conflict ought to be seen as a war of tactics, and that the conflict that will determine the outcome on a military level will take place in rural areas. His general plan is quite similar to that of Mao in the sense that he favours a prolonged guerrilla battle coupled with a decisive military conflict that is fought in the countryside. This is something that will be observed. This revolutionary approach has been most carefully pursued and deployed in Third World nations; but, there is absolutely no reason to suppose that revolutionary thinkers would not attempt to adapt the technique for the sake of seizing power in a western liberal state. In what ways may terrorism be included into such a strategy? As Debray (1968) pointed out, it is obvious that terrorism may serve as a helpful distraction, forcing huge numbers of government personnel to do unrewarding activities such as protecting buildings, lines of communication, and so on. Terrorism is frequently used as a method of repression in the liberated areas of the country against individuals who have been singled out as enemies of the revolution. Alternatively, it can be used as a means of coercing entire districts or groups of officials into submitting to, and collaborating with, the revolutionaries. The mass revolt is another potential revolutionary tactic that might be used. It is a common misconception that this strategy was prevalent in Russia in 1917 but is no longer relevant in the modern day. Recent events in Portugal have changed this perception, as it is now clear that, in a scenario in which the authorities can no longer rely on the armed forces, the politics of the streets may still prove to be decisive in toppling a regime. This is because recent events in Portugal have shown that the armed forces can no longer be relied upon by the authorities. The potential for mass action by the working class is significantly increased when the state in question has a high level of urbanisation and industrialization. An in-depth investigation of the nature of terrorist strategy, tactics, and methods seems to lend credence to Kagan's (1971) contention that the decisive battle against terrorism must be fought in the domain of intelligence and counter-intelligence. Now is the time for us to think about the consequences for antiterrorist measures and operations in a more comprehensive manner. here are three primary categories of politically motivated systematic terrorism, according to Paul Wilkinson's (1974) classification. They are I repressive terrorism, which is used most commonly but not exclusively by the state to suppress, put down, or constrain certain groups of individuals; (ii) sub- punishment; and (iii) revolutionary terrorism, which has the long-term objective of bringing about political revolution, which is defined as a fundamental change In the words of Attar Chand (1988), "When I declare that terrorism is war against civilisation, I may be confronted with the response that terrorists are frequently idealists seeking good ultimate ideals, such as national or regional independence and so on." I ever be an idealist, nor do I believe that the ends sought can ever justify the means used to achieve them. The effect of terrorism, not only on particular states but on mankind as a whole, is inherently bad, unavoidably evil, and completely terrible, and there are a number of observable reasons why this is the case.

AND STUDY

From the above literature we analysed the factors in the way that terrorism as the systematic use of death and damage, or the threat of murder and devastation, to achieve political ends. This shows that terrorism is indiscriminate, inhumane, arbitrary, and barbaric. Determining whether specific actions are terroristic requires us to define normality in terms of a peaceful system based on the rule of law, devoid of terror and dread. If we perceive violence as Sartre (1967), it won't be a social or political issue. Extremists may even strive to construct a revolutionary society where extreme violence is more than a change agent. Carlos Marighela (1971), a Brazilian urban guerrilla thinker, proposed using rural guerrilla warfare to fight against latifundios. With the proletariat, peasants, and students in a decentralised and mobile guerrilla struggle, we will spread our operations across Brazil and develop a revolutionary army of national liberation to rival the military dictatorship's conventional army. Marighela (1971) underlines that the urban conflict is tactical and the final battle will be in the countryside. His general plan is similar to Mao's in that he promotes lengthy guerrilla war with decisive military fight in the countryside. This revolutionary tactic has been most rigorously pursued and deployed in Third World nations, but there's no reason to suppose revolutionary thinkers won't attempt to adapt it for a western liberal state. What role may terrorism play? To be sure, as Debray (1968) noted, terrorist acts might be used to distract huge numbers of government soldiers from mundane chores like securing buildings and communications. Revolutionaries often utilise terrorism as a tool of repression against identified opponents of the revolution in freed territories. Mass insurrection is another revolutionary tactic. This approach had its day in 1917 Russia, but it's now absolute. Recent events in Portugal have altered this perspective, since it is obvious that when administrations can no longer rely on the military forces, street politics may still topple a dictatorship. More urbanised and industrialised a state, the greater the potential for struggle against terrorism must be fought in intelligence and counterintelligence. Now is the moment to discuss antiterrorist measures and operations. Paul Wilkinson (1974) identifies three categories of political terrorism. They are I repressive terrorism, which is used by the state to suppress, put down, or constrain certain groups of people, (ii) sub-revolutionary terrorism, which is used for purposes short of revolutionary seizure of power such as coercion or intimidation, vengeance or punishment, and (iii) revolutionary terrorism, which aims to bring about political revolution, i.e. a fundamental change in the political system. When I argue terrorism is a battle against civilisation, I may be told that terrorists are frequently idealists seeking laudable goals, such as national or regional independence. I'm an idealist or that the goals may justify terrorism. Terrorism's effect on countries and mankind as a whole is essentially, unavoidably, and utterly wicked for many reasons.

• With the proletariat, peasants, and students in a decentralised and mobile guerrilla struggle, we will spread our operations across Brazil and develop a revolutionary army of national liberation to rival the military dictatorship's conventional army.

• the urban conflict is tactical and the final battle will be in the countryside.

• This revolutionary tactic has been most rigorously pursued and deployed in Third World nations, but there's no reason to suppose revolutionary thinkers won't attempt to adapt it for a western liberal state.

• Terrorist acts might be used to distract huge numbers of government soldiers from mundane chores like securing buildings and communications.

• Revolutionaries often utilise terrorism as a tool of repression against identified opponents of the revolution in freed territories. Mass insurrection is another revolutionary tactic.

• There are three categories of political terrorism. (1) First is used by the state to suppress, put down, or constrain certain groups of people, (ii) sub-revolutionary terrorism, which is used for purposes short of revolutionary seizure of power such as coercion or intimidation, vengeance or punishment, and (iii) revolutionary terrorism, which aims to bring about political revolution, i.e. a fundamental change in the political system.

Through a decentralised and mobile guerrilla war, we will expand our operations over the whole of Brazil to go up against the traditional army of the military dictatorship. This army will be built to compete on equal footing. The conflict in the city is one of strategy, while the battle that will decide the outcome will take place in the countryside. However, there is no reason to suppose that revolutionary intellectuals would not seek to adapt it for a liberal state in the West. This revolutionary approach has been pursued and applied to the greatest degree in the nations of the Third World. It is likely that terrorist operations will be used in order to distract the focus of huge numbers of government forces away from mundane responsibilities like defending buildings and communications. Revolutionaries in newly liberated areas may sometimes resort to the use of terrorism as a kind of repressive action against those who have been identified as being antagonistic to the revolution. Revolutionary movements may also use armed uprisings on a widespread scale as one of their strategies.

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Research Scholar, University Department of Psychology, TMBU, Bhagalpur – 812007