The Rise of the Nation-State across the World

Independence, a written constitution, and government in the name of a country of equal citizens—these features all came to define contemporary nation-states in the wake of the French and American revolutions of the late eighteenth century. In those days, the legitimacy of all other nations' governments still rested on other factors. In dynastic states, such as the multiethnic Habsburg and Ethiopian empires, a prince was heir to the throne upon his father's death; in theocracies, religious leaders guided their flocks in worldly matters as well (such as in Tibet and Montenegro); in the global spread of the true faith, Ottoman and Spanish elites, British governors brought progress to ''backward'' peoples in far-flung lands, and, It didn't matter to monarchs, theocrats, and imperial elites whether the people they conquered were of other religions or cultures, so long as they could expand their governments' borders. Now, in contrast to pre-revolutionary France, where the king ruled in the name of God and represented the House of Bourbon rather than the French nation, empires have collapsed and theocracies have been overthrown, leaving only a small number of countries, mostly in the Middle East, governed as absolutist monarchies. Political legitimacy based on self-governance in the name of a country of equal people, which was once revolutionary, has nearly universally been embraced. To the extent that the words "nation" and "state" are commonly used interchangeably, it is because this structure is widely acknowledged as the core of contemporary statehood. As can be seen in Figure 1, the rise of nation-states throughout the world during the last two centuries has been a wavelike phenomenon, occurring in tandem with the dissolution of major empires.

study on the establishment of sovereign, territorial states in early modern Europe). After the forces of conflict, bureaucratic centralization, and rising taxes gave rise to modern states, why did these states eventually develop into nation-states? Many authors, such as Gellner, Anderson, Smith, Hechter, and Meyer, have contributed to a growing body of work that seeks to address this topic. There are primarily two flaws in this methodological approach. The first is that empirical support for generalizations is often based on examples picked selectively, sometimes merely illustratively (deplored by Breuilly 2005; Wimmer 2008), when these statements are meant to explore universal processes that could account for the rise of the modern nation-state globally. Second, empirical studies of specific paths to nation-state formation are often divided by geography and academic focus. In the postcolonial world, for instance, the literature on decolonization (Spruyt 2005; Strang 1990) and nation-building (Bendix 1964) emerged apart from discussions among historical sociologists on the genesis of the Western nation-state. Another body of research examines the events that precipitated the decline of land-based empires like the Ottoman, Habsburg, or Soviet (e.g., Barkey and von Hagen 1997; Roshwald 2001; Saideman and Ayres 2008) and the succeeding waves of nation-state formation. Given that modern nation-states include almost the whole planet, we may soon be able to get a global perspective.

Karataş, İ.H. (2022), After a long process of evolution, the nation state arrived at its present configuration. The definition and anticipated purposes of education, as well as the modalities of educational intervention, have changed as a result of the developmental and transformative process of the nation-state. Starting in the final part of the twentieth century, the pace of this shift accelerated dramatically. This shift, which originated in the context of neoliberal strategies and globalization, has now combined with the rise of digitization and the emergence of the network society. Today is the dawn of the post-national era. During the nationalization, nation-state, open-society, and connectedness stages of the evolution of the nation-state, education likewise underwent substantial changes in terms of its goal, scope, structure, and form. Expectations have shifted dramatically since the end of nation-states, prompting widespread and systemic efforts to improve education. Education reform movements aim for global standards and provide standardization and developed control mechanisms in educational systems, but they vary from country to country in terms of the domains of system, teacher, curriculum, school, environment, educational output, and lifelong learning. This chapter provides a comparative examination within a conceptual framework of the changes to the nation-state, the implications of these changes on education, educational practices in the post-nation-state era, and It is Baban (2018), As a result of the anarchy that followed the Ottoman Empire's fall at the start of the twentieth century, the Middle East eventually came under imperial authority and was fully integrated into global capitalism. All of the regional nations were founded as a result of concessions made to imperial powers save Iran, Turkey, and Israel. Arab states that had been under colonial authority acquired independence after World War II and set out to establish independent countries. Upon the fall of the Ottoman Empire, nationalism arose across the Middle East. Instead of evolving through time as part of new class relations and social formations, national identities and attempts to establish nations were entwined with industrialization, colonialism, and imperial redrawing of borders. The Ottoman Empire's provinces were able to preserve their cultural, ethnic, and religious diversity for 400 years thanks to the millet, a social and legal framework that gave non-Muslim (i.e. Christian and Jewish) religious communities legal and social autonomy within the empire. Shelley T. (2020), We may put off for a while asking and answering the big issues of where order, community, and solidarity come from, but we can't avoid them forever. Some of our reflective indifference has been exposed by recent events of the young twenty-first century, such as the Great Recession, the rise of so-called "populism," the vote for Brexit, and most recently, the Coronavirus crisis. We can no longer put off investigating the glue that binds societies together and the mechanisms that make shared political existence conceivable. The easy notion that boundaries don't matter and that cultural distinctions are diminishing has to be reevaluated. Assuming that greater degrees of global unity and integration were the most self-evident, ineluctable aspects of our political and economic existence, we have taken globalization for granted ever since the conclusion of the Cold War. Once again, we are forced to face the fact that different political groups, although experiencing significant changes over time, tend to keep the same basic form so long as they remain politically organized and vociferous. That involves having a physical form. Indeed, ancient philosophers and intellectuals freely discussed the political body. One concrete example is a nation-state. Specifically, Corner, M. (2011), In the sixteenth century, Western European nations resolved to stop interfering with one other's religious beliefs (narrowly defined in terms of alternatives) and break their religious tie with one another. As established at the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, "cuius regio, eius religio" (let the ruler select the religion) applies here. However, at first, only Catholics and Lutherans were included. It took another century for the cuius regio, eius religio concept of Augsburg to be extended to Calvinists, with the Treaty of Westphalia signing in Greenfeld, L. (2011), The state is distinct from other types of government in that its officials accept the role of representing the people and act accordingly. The ideology of nationalism implies this kind of administration. This means that every nation-state is a state. Every country is a modern nation because nationalism is the underlying cultural structure of modernity. The trajectory of nationalism is crucial to the survival of nation states. The new age of South and Southeast Asian civilizations has been ushered in by the recent globalization of nationalism into those powerful civilizations. As a result, nation-states seem to have a better future than they have in the past.

Unfortunately, there is a cost to taking a quantitative approach to historical processes. Not only are we limited by using proxy variables that inaccurately reflect the predicted processes, but we also lack the granularity to adequately answer the robust arguments presented by prior research. By examining whether or not the key conditions and outcomes are correlated, we are effectively testing the theory but not its supposed processes. As a result, we don't pretend that our empirical analysis is some kind of Popperian falsification test for whole ideas. Instead, we zero in on central ideas that can be tested across several contexts and time scales. The ideas about what, exactly? They are more concerned with the globalization of the nation-state paradigm than with its initial development in the United States, France, or even Britain. While many classical authors share this interest, it is not always clear whether their primary goal is to explain nationalism as a political movement, the growth of national consciousness among a population (nation-building), or the modification of the institutional structure of the state (the emergence of a nation-state). However, there is consensus that these three processes are interconnected, although in distinct ways. While Gellner argues that nationalists first establish nation-states before constructing their own countries, Anderson argues that it is nationalism itself that inevitably leads to the construction of such states. In contrast, world polity theorists like Meyer argue that nationalism and nations are not prerequisites for the development of nation states. Our own historical institutionalist perspective takes for granted that nationalists create nation-states regardless of whether or not such entities currently exist. The nation-state is a key component in all of these arguments, making the development of nation-state institutions a fitting dependent variable for our investigation.

Nationalism and the modern nation-state, argues Gellner (1983), are products of the historical transition from an agrarian to an industrial civilization. Many contrast, the industrial style of production necessitates a more nomadic and adaptable workforce. Workers get transferable skills and the ability to interact with complete strangers via a reasonable, standardized education in a common language. The modern, standardized, and homogenized culture that industrial societies need is finally provided by a nation-state's educational system. The functionalist analysis of Gellner (1983) is supplemented with a nuanced examination of four historical routes by which the demands of industrial society were addressed (we will cover just the two most significant here). For starters, skewed industrialisation brought rural peasants to urban areas, where their upward mobility and future prospects were severely constrained if their native language and culture did not match those of the urban elite. As in the Balkans and the outside provinces of the Habsburg Empire, resentment fueled nationalism and contributed to the establishment of independent nations. Second, anti-colonial nationalisms emerged as soon as industrialisation delegitimized the colonial order. This trend was also at work in the colonial realm, where skin color was connected with uneven authority. The arrival of industrial society at various periods in various regions of the globe is reflected in the varying paths taken to redraw international borders in accordance with cultural considerations and give rise to new nation-states. The probability of the formation of nation-states should grow with industrialization (Hypothesis 1), and this hypothesis may be stated simply by focusing on the general relationship rather than the processes that bring it about.

There have been four distinct waves of nation-state formation, and according to Anderson's (1991) theory of nationalism, these waves may be broken down into three distinct processes. Literacy in common languages, which had previously been replaced by difficult elite languages like Latin, was facilitated and accelerated by the reformation, the bureaucratization of the state, and most critically, the advent of print capitalism. By doing so, the new reading public began to view itself as a national community with a shared history and political future. In the early stages of nation-state formation, widespread literacy was less crucial than in later stages. Anderson argues that the development of newspapers and reading publics is vital despite the fact that widespread literacy was still a problem in Latin America when the first wave hit. When dynastic rulers in Europe tried to stifle linguistic nationalism by embracing it as official ideology, mass literacy became crucial to the success of the third wave of nationalism in the nineteenth century. Decolonization after World War II was largely attributed to the persistence of mass literacy throughout the fourth of nationalism, nation-building, and eventually the transition to the nation-state. Two waves of nation-state formation, the first and the fourth, are when Anderson's second mechanism is at work. If the literacy argument is so compelling, then why did just parts of Spanish Latin America, French West Africa, and French Indochina become independent republics instead of Bolivia, the Ivory Coast, and Vietnam? Anderson claims that dissatisfaction and rising nationalist discontent stemmed from the inability of low-level colonial administrators recruited from the local people to advance to posts above the provincial levels. Having to operate within the limited framework of provincial bureaucracy encouraged a conception of the country that was based more on administrative divisions than on language. Where educational and administrative boundaries converged, as in Indonesia, the vastly expanded educational system of the European colonies not only helped fuel nationalism by spreading literacy, but it also reinforced the provincial segmentation of these nationalisms (Anderson 1991). The evidence supports Hypothesis 4: a region about the size of a province or state is more likely to experience the emergence of nationalism and to consolidate into a nation-state. For the most recent wave of nation-state development in the former colonies as well as in Japan, Thailand, and Switzerland, the third and possibly least critical mechanism in Anderson's thesis pertains to global diffusion processes. Meyer bases his theory of the global state on processes of this kind.

Meyer's idea of dissemination places more value on outside influences than on internal modernisation. Meyer and his co-authors demonstrate that the nation-state model is embedded in a global culture that has developed over the previous two centuries and was formally institutionalized in the United Nations. In order to gain legitimacy in international politics, state elites and political adversaries alike were steadily influenced by global culture to embrace nationalism and the nation-state (Meyer et al., 1997). Both a cross-sectional and a longitudinal perspective are available under world polity theory. First, according to Hypothesis 5, a territory's elites are more likely to embrace world-cultural patterns and establish a nation state if it retains closer ties to major cultural and political hubs throughout the globe. Second, the more global territories that have previously embraced the nation-state, the more likely it is that new territories will adopt the nation-state in the future (Hypothesis 6). ignore power configurational and political aspects, although historical institutionalism (Lachmann 2009; Pierson and Skocpol 2002) focuses on these issues. It is generally accepted that the transition from one kind of state structure to another is the result of a power struggle between different politically organized groups within a society. Which image of a valid political system and which institutional norms will prevail depends on the distribution of power among different individuals. According to this theory, external dissemination is more essential than internal modernization, and proximate factors, especially power arrangements between actors, trump slower moving structural forces. A common assumption of historical institutionalism is that new models of political legitimacy originate exogenously. This is a notion based on natural selection rather than genetic drift. Thus, the historical institutionalist argument we offer here does not apply to the worldwide spread of nationalism. It is sufficient to suppose that various political groups throughout the globe imitate one another in adopting nationalist ideology (Greenfeld 1992). Political movements ''pirated'' nationalism, to use Anderson's felicitous term, because the first nation-states (i.e., Great Britain, the United States, and France) happened to be the most powerful states in the world from the eighteenth century to today. They hoped to one day preside over states that matched the military glory, political might, and cultural prestige of these powerful nation-states. This process of imitation follows well-established political and cultural ties; for example, African nationalists looked to the might of France or Great Britain for inspiration, while nationalists in Turkey and Japan resented these two imperial powers and looked to their German nemesis for inspiration. The logic of a decentralized infection process is at work here, rather than the hegemonic force of a unified global culture or a home modernization process. If this is the case, then why is nationalism so popular as a political philosophy across the globe, and under what circumstances do nationalists succeed in establishing nation-states? In light of the current local and global power structure, we offer the following set of assumptions. While intellectual circles, military factions, clergymen, and colonial bureaucrats are often the first supporters of nationalist movements, a power shift in favor of nationalism is more likely if nationalists are able to convert existing elites to their cause or reach out to larger segments of the population. There are political and symbolic dimensions to this process of empowerment. Nationalists need to form coalitions of various political groups in order to successfully scandalize the current administration as an example of "alien rule" or as a rigid and disjointed "ancien re'gime" that cannot resist the dominance of strong nation-states. The ethnopolitical hierarchy typical of many empires and dynastic governments is therefore effectively and demobilization (Beissinger 2002). If nationalists are given more time to spread their ideology and build support structures, they will be more formidable than anti-nationalist forces and more likely to succeed in the long run in building a nation-state (Hypothesis 7).

A landed nobility dominated the continent's society and government. The members of this group shared a culture that transcended geographic boundaries. Both suburban mansions and urban apartments belonged to them. The French language was used for diplomatic and social reasons. Marriage was a common way for their families to get linked. Despite their influence, this aristocratic class was quite modest in size. The peasant class made up the vast bulk of the population. Landholding patterns in the West were characterized by tenants and small owners, whereas in the East and Central Europe, enormous estates were cultivated by serfs. Cities expanded and new commercial classes emerged in Western and certain areas of Central Europe as a result of the rise of industrial production and commerce. While industrialization got rolling in England during the latter half of the eighteenth century, it didn't start happening in France and certain areas of Germany until the nineteenth century. A working class populace and a middle class of industrialists, businesspeople, and professionals emerged as its byproducts. Until the late nineteenth century, the number of such communities in Central and Eastern Europe was very limited. After the aristocracy was abolished, the notion of national unity gained traction among the educated, liberal middle classes.

Liberalism and the concept of national unity were quite similar in early nineteenth-century Europe. The Latin word liber, which means "free," is whence we get the word "liberalism." Individual liberty and legal equality were cornerstones of liberalism's appeal to the rising middle class. Politically, it emphasized the idea of consent-based leadership. The abolition of autocracy and clergy privileges, a written constitution, and parliamentary democracy had all been hallmarks of liberalism ever since the French Revolution. Liberals in the 19th century also argued that private property should be protected. Equal protection under the law, however, did not always imply the right to vote for everyone. You may remember that during the French Revolution, the first political experiment in liberal democracy, property-owning males were the only ones who were eligible to vote and run for office. All women and propertyless males were denied the right to vote. All adult men were granted the right to vote for a limited time by the Jacobins. The Napoleonic Code, however, reinstated organized opposition groups throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, calling for equal political rights. When it came to the economy, liberalism was synonymous with unrestricted market access and the elimination of barriers to free trade. This was a popular need among the growing middle class in the nineteenth century. Take the first half of the nineteenth century in the German-speaking countries as an example. As a result of Napoleon's administrative reforms, several independent principalities merged into a confederation of 39 independent states. Each of them had its own unique system of measurement and money. In 1833, a trader carrying goods from Hamburg to Nuremberg faced 11 customs checkpoints, each of which required him to pay a customs charge of around 5%. Duties were often assessed based on the dimensions or weight of the merchandise. Since different regions used different weights and measures, figuring this out was a tedious process. For instance, the elle was used as a unit of measurement for fabric, and its value varied depending on location. In Frankfurt, one may purchase 54.7 cm of fabric for one elle, in Mainz, 55.1 cm, in Nuremberg, 65.6 cm, and in Freiburg, 53.5 cm.

Many liberal-nationalists went into hiding in the years after 1815 because of fear of persecution. Many countries in Europe had secret organizations that trained revolutionaries and disseminated their ideals. Being a revolutionary at this time meant actively fighting for freedom and liberty, in opposition to the monarchical forms that had emerged in the wake of the Vienna Congress. The establishment of nation-states was seen by most revolutionaries as an integral aspect of the fight for independence. Giuseppe Mazzini, an Italian revolutionary, fits this description. He joined the underground Carbonari organization after being born in Genoa in 1807. He attempted a revolution in Liguria when he was 24 years old, leading to his exile in 1831. Following the success of Young Europe, he established Young Italy in Marseilles, a group comprised of young men from Poland, France, Italy, and Germany. According to Mazzini, countries are the fundamental components of humanity as created by God. Therefore, Italy could not remain a collection of independent principalities. A united republic within a larger coalition of countries was necessary. This consolidation has the potential to be the only foundation for Italian independence. Secret organizations in Germany, France, Switzerland, and Poland were all modeled after his. The conservatives were terrified by Mazzini's unwavering hostility to monarchy and his advocacy of democratic republics.

It was during the 19th century that the concept of the country and nation state, with its roots in Britain and France, came to be seen as the guiding principle for all contemporary civilizations. "a large population and an extensive territory endowed with manifold national resources, are essential requirements of the normal nationality," wrote Friedrich List in The National System of Political Economy (London, 1885): "A nation restricted in the number of its population and in territory, especially if it has a separate language, can only possess a crippled literature, crippled institutions for promoting art and science." It's impossible for a tiny country to have a fully functional economy because of its limited size. Since the liberal age of nationalism placed a premium on large-scale nations, the notion of nationality was limited to those of a specific size. Hobsbawm calls this liberal assumption of a minimum state size the "threshold principle" of nationalism, and it was widely supported by the liberal bourgeoisie from around 1830 to 1880. John Stuart Mill, Friedrich Engels, and even Mazzini may all be said to subscribe to the same basic notion of nationality. Mazzini, the apostle of nationalism, did not support Irish independence because of this principle. Because of this, the concept of national self-determination during the time of Mill and Mazzini was quite different from that during the presidency of Woodrow Wilson. In 1857, when Mazzini drew his map of Europe, there were just a dozen governments and federations shown on the map. After WWI, Europe was rebuilt on the principle of national self-determination, and the result was a continent with 26 independent nations. Only in Western Europe have 42 regionalist groups been documented since the end of World War I. The rise of mass political groups in the period of democratic politics brought about a sea shift in perspective on matters of nationality and nationalism in the late 19th century. After 1880, when voter mobilization and the spread of new ideas, particularly among socialists and members of marginal linguistic and national groups, become more pressing concerns, the national issue discussion takes on more significance. The state was more involved in later stages of mass politics and national movements. "It is the state which makes the nation and not the nation the state," the liberator of Poland, Colonel Pilsudski, once said. Regardless of where you stand on the country-state divide, it was electoral democracy that de-territorizes the liberal idea of the nation.

After the principles of the French Revolution and the results of Napoleonic military triumphs and the political realignments these wins caused took root in the 19th century, nationalism as an ideal started to flourish. The nationalism inspired by the French army, Napoleon's role in creating modern nation-states, and the contagiousness of revolutionary and democratic ideas all contributed to the spread of nationalism across Europe. The push for Italian and German unification was propelled by the bourgeoisie and the intellectuals, two social classes that found this appealing. Especially in Eastern Europe, mass politics of the late 19th century were meant to provide a further boost to liationalism. a backward area compared to the highly developed and industrialized Western Europe.

The shift from feudalism to capitalism was aided by the absolutist governments, notably in Western Europe. Centralized governments with substantial standing armies were established in Europe by the continent's dynastic rulers in the 16th and 17th centuries. Taxation and the right to legitimately employ force inside the state's borders were among the claims made by the ahsolutist states. The rise of state taxation was tied to the rising costs of funding absolutist rulers' wars, and the primary goal of the mercantilist policies of absolutist rulers was to increase their states' economic power and, by extension, their armed forces' ability to project force abroad. "all the Suiidamental state-making processes" were disrupted by wars in the 16th and 17th centuries. Most of the roughly 500 political units or states that existed at the time were wiped out by the economic and military conflict of the era, but it was not until the einergence of nationalist ideology in the 19th century that Italy and Germany were able to achieve political union.

Self-determination, the driving force behind many contemporary nationalist movements, seems to cast doubt on the state's claim to represent the public desire of the country, undermining its legitimacy. To better grasp the origins of ethno-nationalism, we shall now examine the interplay between nations and states. Different (and often overlapping) definitions are attributed to the idea of country depending on the context, which contributes to the muddle around the nature of the connection between nation and state. (1) Using "nation" interchangeably with "state". (2) According to the United Nations Charter, a "nation" includes both a state and other political institutions like trusts and non-self-governing territories. (3) Third, a "nation" stands for a collection of people that have a common ethno-linguistic or aspiration to establish a single state. (4) A culturally homogeneous people residing in an established state (such as the French nation) is what this definition of "nation" refers to. (5) A country is a group of people who share a common history and culture, as well as a unified territory and government (such as the United States or Switzerland).

Nationalism, once infused with the idealistic liberal-democratic spirit of the first half of the nineteenth century, was narrowed into a credo by the final quarter of the century. During this time, nationalist parties hardened their positions and prepared for constant conflict. In turn, the dominant European states used the imperialist ambitions of European subjects to further their own nationalist agendas. After 1871, the region known as the Balkans was the most significant contributor to nationalist unrest throughout Europe. Slavs were a group of people who lived in the Balkans, which included the countries of modern-day Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece, Macedonia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, Serbia, and Montenegro. The Ottoman Empire ruled over a significant portion of the Balkan Peninsula. The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent growth of romantic nationalism in the Balkans made for a volatile area. The Ottoman Empire spent the entire nineteenth century trying to fortify itself by modernization and internal reforms, but it never managed to do so. Its European vassal states proclaimed their freedom from it one by one. The people of the Balkans justified their demands for political autonomy by pointing to their history, which they saw as showing that their ancestors had been free before they were conquered by foreign forces. Balkan insurgent nations saw their fights as an opportunity to reclaim their former autonomy. The Balkan region descended into violence as several Slavic peoples fought for freedom and self-determination. There was intense rivalry between the Balkan republics since each one wanted to expand its territory at the cost of the others. The situation got more difficult as the Balkans became the location of major power struggle. Intense competition for commerce, colonies, and naval superiority characterized this era in Europe. The Balkan crisis clearly displayed these rivalry. Russian, German, English, and Austro-Hungarian interests in the Balkans all aligned with the goal of weakening the other great powers' foothold there and expanding their own. The result was a series of regional conflicts that culminated in World War One. century started to rebel against European imperial rule. Everywhere resistance to imperialism grew, it was accompanied by a strong feeling of national solidarity that manifested itself in the shape of a desire to establish independent nation-states. Nowhere did people adopt European concepts of nationalism wholesale; rather, they created their own distinct brand of nationalism. However, the concept that all civilizations should be structured as "nation-states" gradually became conventional wisdom.

Studies of nation-state formation in the past have looked at a wide range of scenarios, including top-down reforms, as in Japan, and gradual transitions, as in Sweden and Thailand; the violent overthrow of an ancien re'gime, as in Russia and the United States; nationalist secession, as in Yugoslavia and Mexico; and unification movements, as in Germany and Yemen. Our research reveals that the constellation of power linking nationalist movements and factions to imperial centers, ancien re'gimes, or other factions of the governing elites determines the success of nationalist programs regardless of which path a region takes. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings for the continued relevance of nationalism in modern times and the survival of nation-states. The disintegration of the Soviet, British, and Ottoman empires into a collection of independent nation-states is probably an outlier and not representative of the future of international politics. Recent examples such as Kosovo, East Timor, and Montenegro show that secessions from existing nation-states will continue to happen. And maybe someday there will be a constitutional revolution in the few non-national nations that exist in the Middle East and elsewhere. However, we do not anticipate widespread waves of new nation-state construction. Using a Gellnerian metaphor, the nationalist fantasy of dividing the globe up into a series of nations that offer a safe haven for each culturally defined group is almost a reality. However, history stubbornly defies closure. It's a symbol of a path already walked, not a tool for pointing the way forward. The world's political landscape will be reshaped by future generations using tectonic concepts that we cannot fathom now, and it will likely include communities other than the country.

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PhD Student, Kalinga University, Raipur (CG).