Indian National Army and the Sikh Soldiers - Forgotten Heroes or Traitors

Exploring the Motivations and Consequences of Sikh Soldiers Joining the Indian National Army

by Nishtha Tripathi*,

- Published in Journal of Advances and Scholarly Researches in Allied Education, E-ISSN: 2230-7540

Volume 20, Issue No. 4, Oct 2023, Pages 73 - 79 (7)

Published by: Ignited Minds Journals


ABSTRACT

The Indian Independence League and the Indian National Army (INA) nationalist myth (IIL). Few historians explore the motivations behind the British Indian Army troops' decision to join the INA as well as how confinement and the strains of war affected their choices. It is a whitewash of history and a disregard for the complexities of a complicated historical issue to dismiss the many reasons why people joined the INA and the IIL. Despite the Sikh community's extensive cooperation with the colonial authorities, the Shiromani Akali Dal received nothing on the eve of the British departure in 1947 whereas the All-India Muslim League and the Indian National Congress both obtained Pakistan and India. As a result of the division of the Indian subcontinent, the Sikh community's demands for a distinct Sikh state and the addition of further regions to this state were unsuccessful. The Akali leadership's choice to join India enslaved their group to a massive majority in which they made up barely 1.

KEYWORD

Indian National Army, Sikh soldiers, forgotten heroes, traitors, Indian Independence League, British Indian Army, INA, whitewash of history, complicated historical issue, Sikh community, Shiromani Akali Dal, colonial authorities, eve of British departure, All-India Muslim League, Indian National Congress, Pakistan, India, Indian subcontinent, distinct Sikh state, Akali leadership, massive majority

INTRODUCTION

The loss, scheming, nationalism, and ambition that gave birth to the Indian National Army (INA). This thesis will examine several INA historical facets and assess how they affected Indian nationalism. With the surrender of Malaya and Singapore in 1942, the Japanese created, organised, and equipped the Indian National Army, a military organisation. It was a group with multiple objectives. Its purpose was to bolster and elaborate on Japanese assertions about the establishment of a Greater Asia co-prosperity sphere.8 The INA was founded in order to support the development of armed Indian nationalism. Last but not least, the British Indian Army, the backbone of British Imperial rule in the Far East, was intended to be undermined by the INA. There were no less than 40.000 Indian troops working for the INA. Mohan Singh headed it at first, and Subhas Chandra Bose took it afterwards. The INA made a negligible military contribution. On the border between Burma and India, the army engaged in one significant combat during the Battle of Imphal-Kohima but was ultimately routed.9 However, its contribution to Indian nationalism was far from insignificant. Trials were conducted in the Red Fort to determine the fate of these soldiers after the surrender of thousands of INA troops. The trials put

8 Joyce Lebra, Jungle Alliance: Japan and the Indian National Army (Singapore: Asia Pacific Press, 1971), p.65. 9 K.K. Ghosh, The Indian National Army: Second front of the Indian independence movement (Meerut: Meenakashi Prakashan, 1969), p.177.

the British in the midst of a classic imperial conundrum. The trials also gave rise to the INA myth, which has endured and affected research in the area ever since. This essay's definition of nationalism is "an ideology movement for achieving and sustaining autonomy, unity, and identity for a people that some of its members consider to represent an actual or prospective "nation"." First off, the creation of the INA politicised and damaged British control of the Raj by weakening its grip on the institutions that backed British authority, which in turn re-energized the flagging nationalist movement after the collapse of the Quit India campaign in 1942. The Indian Navy mutinied in 1946, the British Indian Army shown symptoms of unhappiness, and the Indian civil service workers suffered from a lack of morale. The INA trials effectively compelled the British to set a deadline for achieving Indian independence. The British therefore decided against leaving India in favour of dealing with the widespread nationalist sentiment that the INA trials had sparked. The degree to which the INA was a sovereign entity that fought tenaciously to preserve its independence from the Japanese will also be examined. The INA's top officials were compelled by events to cooperate with the Japanese and acknowledge them as their benefactors. While they valued their freedom, they were compelled to weigh it against the need for ongoing Japanese material help in the battle against the British. They effect of the INA on the Indian Diaspora will also be studied. Such a study is especially important in light of the fact that the INA's first Indian subjects were members of the overseas Indian communities in Singapore and Malaya. A study of the INA with the Indian expatriate population would provide a wealth of pertinent information and aid in the assessment of the INA and its contribution to Indian nationalism.

TRIAL OF INDIAN NATIONAL ARMY IN RED FORT

The Intelligence Bureau's (IB) Norman Smith acknowledged in a covert note dated November 20 that "there has rarely been a topic which has aroused so much Indian public attention and, it is reasonable to say, sympathy." Massive protests and a strike (hartal) were announced throughout Punjab on the first two trial days, with thousands of students participating in rallies in Lahore, Lyallpur, and Rawalpindi. "INA days" were also held in Karachi, Madras, Vellore, Salem, and other cities all across India. Two people were murdered by police in Madurai, while between November 21 and November 24, riots and three days of strikes in Calcutta resulted in 35 fatalities and many hundred injuries. Jawaharlal had provocatively travelled to Bengal and Assam and said that he would personally confront Subhas Bose even at the head of his army when the INA was engaged in combat in the trenches and jungles of Manipur and Nagaland. Jawaharlal had provocatively travelled to Bengal and Assam and said that he would personally confront Subhas Bose even at the head of his army when the INA was engaged in combat in the trenches and jungles of Manipur and Nagaland.10 If they were mentioned in news sources at all, they were scornfully dismissed as little more than a few JIF clusters (Japanese Inspired Forces). The IB was especially concerned about a growing undercurrent of anti-European sentiment present in these demonstrations, which took place in Dhaka, Patna, Benares, Allahabad, Karachi, and Bombay (with several killed in police firing). These demonstrations were held in support of the Calcutta victims. In Delhi and Calcutta, posters promising to murder 20 Englishmen for the execution of every INA hero had surfaced. British managers were shocked to hear their staff refer to Subhas Chandra Bose as "the George Washington of India," with images of him and the three INA commanders becoming well-known across the nation after he had been so demonised in the English-language press. Shops refused to service British customers, and reports of insubordination spread

10 Aldrich, Richard J. (2000), Intelligence and the War Against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0-521-64186-1.

Red Fort trials that tipped India towards complete freedom Desai said in a superb ten-hour summary that the Indian National Army, the organised army of a duly-constituted Provisional Government of India, had the right to fight war for the freedom of India, not that three people were waging war against the King. A properly declared and conducted war for the liberation of a people granted those fighting it the rights and privileges of belligerents, just as Britain had done in the past by supporting Bolivarian rebels in South America, the Confederate Army during the American Civil War, Garibaldi in Italy, Byron in Greece, or even the Dutch, Polish, and Yugoslav governments-in-exile during World War II (even while they had no territory to call their own). The INA men's "king" and "country," according to Bhulabhai, did not coincide, just as they did not for George Washington and his men in 1776, who as a result renounced their allegiance to the British crown in order to fight for the rights and independence of their country. This was despite the fact that he acknowledged that some of the INA men had previously held an allegiance. The Americans' descendants, who are now England's friends and allies as well as "their warmest and best supporters in the job of defending civilization," had done exactly the same thing as Shahnawaz, Sahgal, and Dhillon. Desai argued that the Indian soldiers' oath of allegiance to Britain was broken when Colonel Hunt turned them over to the Japanese at Singapore's Farrer Park on February 16, 1942, and that "to insist upon an everlasting allegiance on the part of a subject people would be tantamount to...perpetuating their slavery." The Provisional government had more authority to declare war than the Czech and Polish partisans that Britain had supported in World War I because it controlled territory (the Andaman and Nicobar Islands for eighteen months, the areas of Manipur and Bishnupur for four months, and the area of Ziawadi).

THE INDIAN NATIONAL ARMY (INA)

The Japanese designed the INA to serve a number of purposes in their campaign against the Allies. In order to undermine and demoralise the British-Indian Army, INA formations were created. This was not unexpected given that British Indian forces tended to sustain the British military presence in Asia. Indian troops guarded Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaya, Ceylon, and India. They also made up a significant portion of the reinforcements sent to Malaya to combat the Japanese. No less than 55 000 Indian soldiers were imprisoned after the Commonwealth forces were defeated in the Malayan conflict and

11 Belle, Carl Vadivelle (2014), Tragic Orphans: Indians in Malaysia, Institute of South-East Asian Studies, ISBN 978- 981-4519-03-8

The Japanese believed that the presence of Indians supporting Indian nationalism would undermine the allegiance of the British Indian army. They weren't let down. During the Malayan campaign, Indian battalions that were part of the developing INA sometimes crossed across to Allied lines and convinced groups of Indian soldiers to turn against the Allies and join the Japanese.13 However, it is noteworthy that the British-Indian battalions that were not manned by English commanders were the focus of the INA propaganda detachments. This was expected since white officers were a shining example of leadership. Most Indian troops would have been discouraged from defecting if they had been present. The emerging INA leadership was conscious of this reality. During the Malayan campaign, Mohan Singh and Major Fujiwara devised a standard operating procedure for INA agents that included instructions to target Indian units without British officials. Even after Indian forces were defeated and their formations were in disarray, British-Indian soldiers remained, by the standards of mercenaries, wonderfully loyal. The INA's stated mission was to assist the Indians in freeing their country from British rule. The responsibility of preparation for the impending invasion of India through Burma fell to Indian soldiers under the command of Indian commanders. The creation of such a force was intended to spark domestic uprising and rally Indians all over the globe to the nationalist cause by the Japanese high command and the Indian foreign nationalist movement. The goal of the movement was for it to gain momentum as the conflict went on. Rash Behari Bose led the IIL, which ruled as the INA's political master. Its responsibility was to lead the INA and the Indian population living abroad in the Japanese-occupied regions to victory. The IIL was tasked with political mass mobilisation and gathering public support for the INA. According to Major Fuijiwara's memoirs, Japan should implement its policy toward Indians in Asia in a manner that supports the Indian struggle while preserving their autonomy. A powerful INA made up of Indian POWs and volunteers recruited from all throughout Asia should be the goal of the military strategy, which should be based on the political strategy, with the purpose of unifying the many millions of Indians living in Asia with the IIL cause. A significant nationalist movement should be created in India using the combined might of the IIL and the INA.14 However, the official Japanese stance was only a cover for the use of the INA as a means of

12 Ghosh, The Indian National Army, pp.58-59. 13 Joyce Lebra, Jungle alliance, pp.25-26. 14 Ibid.

which was vital to them. Additionally, it gave the Japanese the chance to sow discontent in the Raj in an effort to undermine British administration there. It was intended to incite the feeling of Indians residing in India and undermine British authority by forming and supporting an Indian nationalist government with an army. For instance, in 1943, the Japanese gave the Free India Provisional Government (FIPG) under Subhas Chandra Bose control of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. It was very controversial to say the least to have an Indian-run administration right on the Raj's doorstep. The INA was also intended to be a force that would aid the Japanese in acquiring information.15 INA soldiers were supposed to penetrate Indian lines in Burma in order to gather intelligence that the Japanese military forces might exploit, in addition to the propaganda purposes mentioned above. The first and second INA's organisational structures, which incorporated guerrilla units as part of their combat order, clearly reflected this goal.

Heroes Of The Indian Rebellion

His brother wrote a biography of Captain Hodson, one of Delhi's heroes, from which we might infer the following summary of his career: We could certainly apply the poet's moving farewell to the peerless knight Durandarte, stretched on the bloody sward at Eoncesvalles, to the Englishman lying in the death chamber of Lucknow: "The career of the Indian Captain of Irregulars may fairly challenge comparison with that of Fernando Perez, or any other hero of romance." " Kind in manners, fair in favor, Mild in temper, fierce in fight ; Warrior nobler, gentler, braver. Never shall behold the light." William Stephen Kaikes Hodson, the third child of the Archdeacon of Stafford, was born in March of 1821. At the age of 14, he enrolled at Eugby and stayed there for more than four years, including two in Arnold's sixth form. At school, he was a bright, likeable child who enjoyed having fun. He had talents that were definitely above average, but he didn't really stand out in any other areas, except for running, an activity in which he excelled and shown exceptional endurance. None of W's former classmates were shocked to learn of his achievement as the head of an army's intelligence division or of his amazing marches and appeals in seemingly unreachable locations as the captain of irregular horses. Siich performances only transport

15 Lebra, Jungle alliance, pp.60-67.

a young man, he was not very courageous or physically strong, and none of us could have predicted that he would go on to become one of the bravest and most successful swordsmen in the Indian army. We only bring up this information because it is crucial that as many people as possible realise the reality of this situation, which Hodson and other people's lives have shown. No man need be a coward if he does not want to be one, and a high purpose steadfastly kept in mind will ultimately help a man to the doing of nobler deeds of daring than any amount of natural combativeness. A man born without any natural defect can, in this as in other respects., make his own character. Fortunately for his nation and—let us admit it, hard though it is as yet to do so—for himself, a congenital susceptibility to headaches prompted him to chose the army rather than a scholarly profession when he graduated from Trinity, Cambridge, in 1844. Following a brief stint in the Guernsey militia, which he joined to avoid retirement, he was offered a cadetship and left for India. He received a letter for his brother from Sir William Napier, the Guernsey governor at the time. He was described by Sir Charles and himself as "I believe he will be an accession to any service." My biggest gratification came from his service in the militia because of his education, talent, and enthusiasm to learn about military topics. We might deduce from the line on page 104, where it is referenced again, that his brother's letter was never handed to Sir Charles Napier. Hodson writes in 1850, "I didn't reveal him his brother's letter so he might decide for himself and get to know me "per se," or rather "per moi." But if I ever run into him again, I will. He never saw Sir Charles again, but what a portrait of the man these few sentences paint! Hodson arrived in India on September 13th, 1845, and immediately travelled upcountry to Agra. Here, he connected with and made a family friend in the Hon. James Thomason, Lieutenant-Governor of the Northwest Provinces, with whom he remained until November 2nd, when he was assigned to the 2d Grenadiers and started his military career as a member of the Governor-escort General's travelling to the Punjaub. A dark cloud had formed in that area, and it was past time to deal with it. However, Hodson continues to march while completely unconscious, and his first letters include a beautifully vivid depiction of the life of an Indian army on the march rather than any indication of an impending fight. The unusual quality of making the most of any situation, which so strongly marked him, can be seen emerging right away in this situation as well. "There is a significant variation in temperature—from near freezing when we start to 90 or 100 degrees when we arrive. Even though 84 degrees seems warm, a tent is bearable, particularly if there is a wind. The quiet-looking and English-dressed Hindoo soldiers curiously contrasted with the wild Irregulars in all the whimsical wnuniformity of their national attire; but these last are the men /fancy for duty. He visits a big muster of Christmas Day. A sudden addition to our routinely peaceful march on the 10th, along with an order for all non-soldiers to return to Umbala, caught us off guard. The depiction of forced marches and fights that one thinks were won is followed by a statement that says it all. The same tale applies to the sepoys everywhere; at Moodkee, "our sepoys could not be brought to confront the great fire of the Sikh cannon, and, as usual, the more they quavered, the more the English commanders exposed themselves in fruitless attempts to urge them on." On the evening of the 21st, when we pushed toward the guns at Ferozeshah under an unparalleled grape bombardment and the densest dust, our Sepoys once again buckled and shattered. We were in a terrifying situation, but the English regiments' gallantry kept us alive. Thankfully, the bone was not broken when a ball impacted my leg below the knee. A magazine explosion and a shell that exploded so near to me that it killed the soldiers behind me both knocked me to the ground twice. You may conclude from the fact that I spent the whole two days after that on foot or on horseback that the wound in my leg is nothing. The Sepoys were unable to advance, or if they had advanced quickly with the bayonet, half of the casualties may have been avoided. In Rugby, just as we were about to take action, I ran across poor Carey, who you may recall from Price's. When I went over the area on the 30th, I discovered the corpse that the Sikhs had truly chopped to bits with their sharp swords; if not for his clothing, I would not have been able to identify him. He was really disturbed by the abrupt end of our rekindled friendship, so I had him hauled into camp for burial. Until we really started exchanging punches, or rather, I am now sorry to admit, until the blows were finished and I saw the horrifying images that follow a conflict, I thoroughly liked everything and got right into it. I hope I won't have to see any more of these sights as I've had enough of them now. We enjoyed a turkey for Christmas supper and are now sleeping nicely in our tents.

Social And Religious Causes

The conversion of Indians to Christianity seems to have been one of the English people's main goals in India. The army and general populace both believed that the government wanted to convert every Indian to Christianity. The Englishmen expanded the spread of Christian theology and missionary operations to every region of the nation. The East India Company's Chairman of the Court of Directors, Mr. Mangles, delivered the following remarks in the House of Commons. In order for the flag of Christ to wave triumphantly from one end of India to the other, Providence has handed the vast Hindustani dominion to England. Everyone must use all of their efforts to ensure that there are no dissenters in the nation's major project to convert all Indians to Christianity. According to Vir Savarkar, the military

promotions for the sepoys who adhered to the real religion. The American Missionary Society in Agra had a large printing plant put up and provided the missionaries with plenty of facilities. As a result, the English's efforts to convert the population to Christianity were just as organised and persistent as their campaign of territorial expansion. The social behaviour of European commanders toward Indian troops also demonstrated their enmity. The authorities had a strategy of despising the Indian people, portraying the Muslims as bigots who are harsh and unfaithful and the Hindus as primitive people who had nothing in the way of culture or civilisation. Indians were referred to as "nigger" and "sugar" or "pig," which angered Muslims. On their hunting expeditions, European commanders and troops often attacked Indians without discrimination. In these instances, European juries—the only ones qualified to hear such matters—acquitted European defendants of all charges. Hindu law regarding property was altered in an effort to encourage Hindus to become Christians. A Hindu convert was not permitted to inherit his ancestors' property. But in order to make it easier for Hindus to become Christians, the Religious Disabilities Act was created in 1856. By taking this action, they proclaimed that even if Hindus converted to Christianity, he could still inherit his father's wealth. Hindus were suspicious as a result of this. The other administrative actions only strengthened that. The Indians saw the advent of the railway, telegraph, and postal systems as an effort to Europeanize them. The introduction of Bible instruction was seen by the Indians as a Christian effort to win them over to their religion. The work of Christian missionaries and Dalhousie's introduction of female education among the Indians persuaded them that the English were really attempting to eradicate Indian civilizations and culture under the guise of bringing the western educational system to India.

SIKH LEADERSHIP

The rural elite were already eager to dominate the society under the auspices of the new rulers when the British created a mechanism through which they could control the Punjab via prominent local families. The landowners received generous estates and privileges from the British, which raised their standing among the populace. Because the general populace was denied the opportunity to vote, they were unable to organise to defend their rights. The Sikh leadership initially also originated from the landed nobility, but despite their best efforts, this group was less successful for the Sikh community. As a member of the coalition administration, the Khalsa National Party16 benefited

16 Khalsa National Party emerged in the late 1930s under Sir Sunder Singh Majithia, a Sikh landlord, which served the

belligerent bent. The Akalis were anti-government, anti-Muslim League, anti-Congress, anti-Unionist,18 anti-British, anti-Khalsa National Party, anti-Communist, and anti-other Sikhs who were not their friends because they lacked political vision. In contrast, the Akalis seemed to be working in a coalition with the British, the Congress, the Muslim League in the NWFP (1943), the Punjab Unionist Party (1942), and the Muslim League in India. Rich family leadership is advantageous for a community, particularly when there is a shortage of true leadership that develops through time. On the other hand, it takes time for leadership from the lower classes to break free from the constraints of current hardship and inherent psychological difficulties. Their inherent submissiveness, economic inferiority, and political inferiority are often traits they are unable to overcome. The same influential forces also applied to the then-emerging Sikh leadership. The Sikh leadership sometimes took a tough stance, but if some British agents contacted them, they lost their zeal. The actions of Major Short and Sir Penderel Moon19 support this claim. The Sikh leadership often displayed compromise behaviour while interacting with the Congress.

Military Causes

It seems remarkable that the Indian sepoys, who were primarily in charge of the company's conquest of all of India, would suddenly lead a bloody uprising against it. This statistic alone illustrates the Indian Sepoys' unresolved complaints, which by 1857 had reached a boiling point. Since the British defeat in the first Afghan War, the military discipline of the British army has deteriorated. Dalhousie had made it very obvious in a letter to the English authorities that military discipline was poor and shameful from officials to troops. In the Bengali Army, the military positions were inherited. The majority of the recruits for the Bengal army came from North Eastern and Oudh provinces. Many of them were from wealthy Rajput and Brahmin backgrounds. The military discipline enforced on them by the British government in India, which treated them equally to recruits from lower

Sikh community by joining coalition ministry of the pro- British Unionist Party in the Punjab. 17 Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee and Shiromani Akali Dal were the popular religious and political platforms which were founded in 1923. 18 Punjab Unionist Party was a pro-British party which was founded in 1923 by Mian Fazl-i-Husain and Ch. Chhotu Ram. 19 Deputy Commissioner of district Amritsar was said to be the ambassador of the British who had been in touch with the top Sikh leaders.

because of this. However, it should be remembered that the Bengali army's sentiments and those of the people of Oudh were same. Maulana Azad said that after the annexation of Oudh, the whole Indian army, particularly the soldiers from Oudh, had developed a culture of disobedience and rebellion as a result of the severe beating they had received at the hands of the British of the East Indian Company. They realised all of a sudden that the Mughal Emperor was being targeted because the East India Company had used the Indians' sacrifice to achieve control in India. Because there were sepoys living in Oudh, and when it was annexed in 1856, the state army was disbanded, leaving roughly 60,000 sepoys without employment.

First Anglo-Sikh War (1845–46)

  • The first Anglo-Sikh war is said to have begun when the Sikh army crossed the Sutlej River on December 11, 1845. This was seen as an aggressive move that gave the English reason to declare war.
  • The unrest that broke out in the Lahore kingdom when Maharaja Ranjit Singh died resulted in a fight for supremacy between the Lahore court and the more local and strong army.
  • The English military's attempts to seize Gwalior and Sindh in 1841 and the conflict in Afghanistan in 1842 led to mistrust among the Sikh army.
  • An rise in the number of English soldiers stationed close to the border with the Lahore kingdom

Course of the war

  • The Sikhs were defeated five times in a row because of the treachery of Lal Singh and Teja Singh at Mudki (December 18, 1845), Ferozeshah (December 21–22, 1845), Buddelwal, Aliwal (January 28, 1846), and Sobraon. The British side had 20,000–30,000 troops when the conflict began in December 1845. (February 10, 1846).
  • On February 20, 1846, Lahore surrendered without a fight to British troops.

Result of the war

  • Treaty of Lahore - On March 8, 1846, the First Anglo-Sikh War came to an end, and the Sikhs were forced to accept a humiliating peace.
  • The Company intended to annex the Jalandhar Doab (located between the Beas and the Sutlej).
  • Henry Lawrence planned to create a British residency in Lahore. The Sikh army's might was diminished.
  • Rani Jindan served as the regent, Lal Singh as the wazir, and Daleep Singh was acknowledged as the sovereign.
  • Kashmir, including Jammu, was sold to Gulab Singh since the Sikhs were unable to pay the full war indemnity. Gulab Singh was required to pay the Company 75 lakh rupees as the purchase price.
  • A second contract that was signed on March 16th, 1846, made Gulab Singh's takeover of Kashmir official.
  • Bhairowal Treaty - The Sikhs protested against the Treaty of Lahore because it dealt with the Kashmir issue.
  • In December 1846, the Treaty of Bhairowal was ratified. Rani Jindan was removed from her position as regent in accordance with the conditions of the treaty, and a council of regency for Punjab was constituted.
  • Eight Sikh sardars made up the council, which was presided over by the English Resident, Henry Lawrence.

Second Anglo-Sikh War (1848–49)

  • The First Anglo-Sikh War's loss of the Sikhs and the terms of the Lahore and Bhairowal treaties caused the Sikhs great humiliation.
  • Rani Jindan's cruel treatment while being brought to Benares as a retiree stoked Sikh rage.
  • Mulraj, Multan's governor, revolted and killed two English officers who were travelling with the incoming governor. Mulraj was replaced by a new Sikh governor as a result of an increase in yearly income.
  • The fight may be directly attributed to Sher Singh, who was sent to put down the uprising but who instead joined Mulraj and incited a wider uprising across Multan.

 Lord Dalhousie, who was India's then-Governor General and a fervent

CONCLUSION

The INA was a force created by a particular combination of conditions that existed only during a certain time in the conflict. The British war in Malaya, which resulted in Singapore's ultimate defeat and capitulation, was the main factor that caused so many Indian troops to surrender, forcing them to join the INA. Soldiers from the Indian Army were unprepared for the Malayan campaign. They were often outflanked and outmanoeuvred by the Japanese soldiers because they lacked jungle training. In fact, they were outgunned. Since Indian soldiers lacked tanks, their primary means of armoured transportation was small armoured vehicles like Bren gun carriages. The 3rd Tank Brigade's 200 light and medium tanks made up the Japanese army's equipment, on the other hand. With the Japanese, battle after battle ended in loss, leading to Singapore's capitulation. During the withdrawal from the Malayan peninsula, Indian battalions suffered severe mauling; many of them were dispersed and essentially destroyed as combat formations. At the Battle of Jitra and Slim River, when the 11th Indian Division was destroyed, examples of these losses were seen. Just 1200 soldiers made it to Johore. Both the 12th and 28th Indian Brigades met the same demise and ceased to be active combat units. In accordance with Queen Victoria's Queen's Proclamation, Punjab and the rest of British India came under the direct rule of the British crown in 1858. The area was once known as Sapta Sindhu, the Vedic nation of the seven rivers that flowed into the ocean. One of the last areas of the Indian subcontinent to come under British control was the Punjab region, which was mostly taken over by the East India Company in 1849. In 1858, Punjab was put under direct British rule along with the rest of British India. The Anglo-Sikh fights fostered a respect for one another's fighting skills. Up to Indian independence in 1947, the Sikhs fought on the British side throughout the Revolt of 1857 and a number of other actions and battles.

REFERENCES

1. Joyce Lebra, Jungle Alliance: Japan and the Indian National Army (Singapore: Asia Pacific Press, 1971), p.65. 2. K.K. Ghosh, The Indian National Army: Second front of the Indian independence movement (Meerut: Meenakashi Prakashan, 1969), p.177. 3. Aldrich, Richard J. (2000), Intelligence and the War Against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0-521-64186-1. 4. Belle, Carl Vadivelle (2014), Tragic Orphans: Indians in Malaysia, Institute of South-East Asian Studies, ISBN 978-981-4519-03-8 5. Ghosh, The Indian National Army, pp.58-59. 9. Khalsa National Party emerged in the late 1930s under Sir Sunder Singh Majithia, a Sikh landlord, which served the Sikh community by joining coalition ministry of the pro-British Unionist Party in the Punjab. 10. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee and Shiromani Akali Dal were the popular religious and political platforms which were founded in 1923 11. Punjab Unionist Party was a pro-British party which was founded in 1923 by Mian Fazl-i-Husain and Ch. Chhotu Ram 12. Deputy Commissioner of district Amritsar was said to be the ambassador of the British who had been in touch with the top Sikh leaders.

Corresponding Author

Nishtha Tripathi*

Associate Professor Email: nishthatripathi2017@gmail.com