A study the Political Relationship between India and China
 
Gaikwad Tanuja Madhaorao1*, Dr. Sandhya Tiwari2
1 PhD Student, Kalinga University Raipur (C,G)
2 PhD Guide, Kalinga University, Raipur (CG)
Abstract - This study focuses on political dimensions of India-China relations. It starts with defining what political relationship is and how it is different from other relationships. The historical backdrop traces the evolution of India-China ties from ancient trade routes to modern geopolitical interactions. India-China relations have achieved comprehensive improvement and cooperation in the areas of politics, trade and commerce, technology and culture etc. The talks between the two leaders established the basis for the improvement of India-China relations. Both countries reached at a point where they understand their boundary issue was the only obstacle between the two countries and agreed to settle down through peacefully and friendly negotiations. Both parties examined all aspects of their bilateral ties, from the political to the strategic to the economic & cultural. India & China's bilateral, sub-regional, and regional ties present an opportunity to reorganize their collaboration, which would have positive effects on all three levels.
Keywords - Political relationship, India, China, bilateral, International
INTRODUCTION
Political aspects of the relationship between China & India are the subject of this chapter. To begin, the term "political relationship" must be defined along with its distinguishing features. Meanings of ‘political’ vary. Ancient political relationships had diverse meanings. Political comes from the Greek word ‘polis’, meaning city-state. Community decision-making is what it means. Decision-making has this implication. If one wants to be politically active or a citizen of the polis, as Hannah Arendt puts it, one must be willing to put words & persuasion ahead of physical force wherever possible’. The term ‘political’ refers to decision-making by words, not force. fortunately ‘political’ implies policy making, which affects decision-making.
POLITICAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Decisions concerning the relationship between multiple nations are referred to be "political" in the field of international relations. It entails figuring out how to consult with each other on international matters, how to reach shared opinions on these issues, and how to communicate in a wide variety of other areas. International visits by heads of state to address & settle issues of mutual interest, including but not limited to political squabbles between nations. In order to reach a consensus on matters of mutual concern, it is necessary to reduce disagreements and make compromises. As part of their radical interactions, two or more nations may create alliances, adopt a unified stance on global problems and multilateral forums, collaborate on decision-making processes, etc. Political relations between two or more nations also include the following: putting procedures in place to resolve conflicts; non-interference in each other's internal affairs; respect for each other's political and sensitive views; & practice of mutual accommodation.
Addressing security concerns in a way that is acceptable to both parties is also part of politics. When two or more nations engage in politics, preventing conflict and war is paramount. The only surefire way for nations to keep tensions, disputes, and wars at bay is to have regular consultations with one another. A system of mutual discussions is established to achieve this goal. The definition of national interests must take into account the need to prevent or at least mitigate conflicts of interest. Has either India or China conducted its relations in accordance with these principles? The purpose of this chapter is to investigate this matter.
International relations are a political process in which state & non-state entities impact each other's national interests. India & China were called Asian giants in the preceding chapter. India's independence & China's communist dictatorship in 1949 created fresh doors for both countries to reestablish their friendship. In spite of a brief era of cordial ties in the early 1950s, boundary disputes, Cold War alignments, power difference, mutual distrust, & development of nuclear missiles caused India and China's relations to decline until the 1980s. Some historians have pointed out that China's desire to stop India from becoming a powerful Asian nation is evidence of the underlying geopolitical, strategic cultural, and historical disputes between the two countries.
India & China have met as deputy foreign ministers since 1981, following a mid-1970s thaw in ambassadorial relations. India & China have improved connections in politics, trade, business, technology, and culture via collaborative efforts. Sino-Indian ties flourished in the late 1980s, when global tensions subsided and dialogue took centre stage.
The two countries' relations improved during Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Beijing in December 1988. In December 1991, Chinese Premier Li Peng made his first official visit to India in 31 years. The visit of Indian President R. Venkataraman to China took place in May 1992. Makes history as first Indian president to visit China. The 1993 visit to China was made by Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao. In March 1990, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen travelled to New Delhi for a meeting with the president or prime minister, and in February 1991, Indian Foreign Minister V.C. Shukla returned to Beijing for another meeting. In July 1992, Sharad Power, the Indian Minister of Defence, visited China. Balancing and normalising India-China ties, these visits & decisions to put disagreement concerns, such as the border conflict, on hold brought political or military stability to both nations.
The significance of regional connections in global affairs has once again been highlighted by patterns that emerged after the Cold War. In this light, it is necessary to objectively assess the current state of India-China ties, which share unusual economic objectives but differ on geopolitical views. Their economic interests, among other national interests, are increasingly shaping India-China relations, which is a major concern right now. Their political ties led the two nations to affirm their backing for Asian multilateral cooperation processes and their appreciation for one another's roles in global & regional cooperation initiatives.
The aforementioned assertion is backed by the fact that political leaders from both nations have shared ideals. Many saw the December 1988 visit of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to China as a "path breaking" event that would improve ties between the two countries. His travel to China was 34 years after the first prime minister of India had done so. "Let everybody forget this difficult period in our past relationships and let us treat anything with an eye on the future," he stated to Deng Xiaoping, who was then Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the People's Republic of China (PRC).
In February 1992, in New Delhi, JWG met to address the boundary issue and establish a schedule for frequent meetings between military border officers to strengthen cooperation between the two nations. When meeting with Xu Duxin, China's vice minister of foreign affairs, in New Delhi, India's prime minister voiced his delight with the progress made in border negotiations with China. The visit of then-President R. Venkataraman of India to China in May 1992 strengthened ties between the two countries. In their joint statement following the visit, India and China reaffirmed their commitment to putting differences aside and pursuing common goals. "If India & China did not'seize the possibility' to strengthen bilateral links, they might be forced by others," the Chinese president said during the visit. President R. Venkatraman's visit was hailed by Chinese President Yang Shangkun as a "Land Mark" that would initiate a "new era in Sino-Indian relations." According to Mr. Venkatraman, the Tibetan question is a domestic Chinese concern that no outside power should meddle in. Tibet is an autonomous region of China.
Fifteen lawmakers, including Lok Sabha Speaker Shivraj Patil, travelled to Beijing in January 1993 to foster better ties. "Dalai Lama is in India," Mr. Patil informed Premier Li Peng during the delegation's meeting, and he also warned that China would "recognise if nothing is done so as to create problems with respect to Tibet." According to Mr. Patil, previous governments in India have taken a stance on Tibet, which is a part of China, and the present government would maintain that stance. Also, "the Dalai Lama is a recognised religious person & leader and we assume that nobody from Tibet in India will create problems for China," he said. The border dispute between the two nations should not impede bilateral cooperation, Mr. Li emphasised. There were little outcomes from the sixth session of the joint working group negotiations that took place in New Delhi in June 1993. The long-running border war between India & China was eased as the year went on, thanks to mutual promises to reduce troop levels and uphold the truce.
Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and Premier Li Peng inked four agreements in Beijing between September 6-9, 1993.
These Agreements are:
  1. Agreement for peace & serenity along the Sino-Indian border region's LAC;
  2. Agreement on cinema & television among the two countries' information & broadcasting ministries;
  3. Environment & cooperation agreement between India & China;
  4. Agreement on expanding trade across the border in Shipki La;
The most crucial of these four accords was preserving peace & quiet along the Sino-Indian border. Both leaders advocated peaceful, cooperative border negotiations. None party should suggest or employ force against the other.
After both countries' premiers expressed satisfaction with the JWG's progress in border negotiations, they agreed to move the process forward more quickly. In an effort to strengthen their relationship and work together more effectively, the two nations have decided to advance, promote, and exchange scientific knowledge.
In 1988 and 1993, former Indian Prime Ministers Rajiv Gandhi and PV Narasimha Rao resided here. They shared documents with their counterparts during their stay. After the Cold War, the worldwide strategic environment shifted, accelerating India–China normalization.
According to the Chinese expert, India's warming relations with China serve a singular purpose: to marginalise Pakistan in the evolving global strategic landscape. A permanent seat for New Delhi on the UN Security Council is another source of concern for Beijing. Some in Delhi are worried that Beijing may back the exiled Dalai Lama.
Furthermore, in the 1990s and beyond, China's strategic studies saw India as a possible adversary in regional conflicts.
POLICIES BETWEEN THE INDIA AND CHINA
In the post-1993 agreement, India & China changed their policies, improving relations faster than predicted. China believed India and Pakistan should handle Kashmir bilaterally. China reportedly opposed Jammu & Kashmir independence & feared western invasion.
JWG assembled a team of military & foreign ministry specialists in December 1993 to establish the LAC in its entirety. Concepts for reducing the number of troops stationed at the border were also encouraged. To facilitate cross-border business & people-to-people exchanges, the Gunji border in Uttar Pradesh & Himachal Pradesh was opened to Tibet in 1992 & 1994, respectively, and all parties involved were obligated to make the border porous.
Visits continued to normalize relations among two countries. Indian HRD Minister Arjun Singh opened "the Festival of India" in China on May 9, 1994. Both sides' senior politicians visited each other's countries. In routine scheduled talks, the two parties discussed LAC troop drawdown, a milestone in their relationship normalization. Pei Yuan Xing became China's India ambassador in 1994. Mr. Singh stated that India supported and could pass China's Security Council membership four decades ago, and now China should reciprocate by making India a permanent member.
Then-Indian Vice-President K. R. Narayanan's three-day visit to China from 21–23 October 1994 boosted trade & economic cooperation. The leaders of two countries indicated satisfaction with border talks and hoped for friendly solutions. The presidents also praised the expanding trade among the two countries & called for more.
Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee urged Tibetan refugees to not engage in anti-China activities in India during his January 15, 1996, visit to China, following the end of the cold war. In his article "Perspectives on Indo-China Relations," which A.K. Dixit cites, John Garver examines the role of Tibet in Sino-Indian ties after the Cold War. Garver argues that Tibet provides India with the only real weapon it has against Beijing. Like the Indian-Pakistani gulf, Han-Tibetan ethnic strife is profound. Pakistan's material competency and proximity to Indian industrialists & political centers increasingly strengthen its danger to India. A hypothetical Indian-Tibetan link threatens Beijing because of Tibet's remoteness & logistical challenges. India has never supported a Tibetan insurrection against China with military forces, just as China has never entered an India-Pakistan war. Both sides know about these choices, which affect their computations.
China & India have better relations after President Jiang Zemin's visit on November 28, 1996. Since 1950, no Chinese president had visited India before him. The political and economic ties between the two nations were bolstered by this gesture of friendship, which the two nations made clear. To celebrate the new century, strengthen their connection, & encourage equality among independent nations, the two countries reaffirmed the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. In addition to resolving the border conflict, both sides emphasized commercial & trade partnerships and science and technology collaboration. Jiang Zemin's visit saw India & China sign four major accords. These Agreements are:
  1. Agreement on military confidence-building evaluates along the LAC in India-China border areas;
  2. Agreement on maintaining the Consulate General of India in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR);
  3. Agreement on combating illicit drug or psychotropic substances trafficking & other crimes; and
  4. Agreement on maritime transport. The military Confidence-Building Measures pact along the Sino-Indian LAC was most essential.
In regards to the Tibetan question, Salman Hyder, who was the foreign secretary of India at the time, stated that the Dalai Lama was welcome to remain for an extended period of time as he pleased. We let the Chinese know that he was a Tibetan spiritual leader and had no political ties to India.
Furthermore, it was crucial that Chinese President Jiang Zemin either visited Pakistan immediately following his visit to India or suggested that Pakistani leaders address matters that would not impact state-to-state relations in the short term. Similarly, China wanted peaceful talks between the two Asian neighbours and did not want outside parties involved in the Kashmir conflict. When it came to Sikkim, China did not formally back India. It would appear that China has acknowledged its incorporation into India. The fact that the Chinese side chose not to reply after the Indian side declared that Sikkim's future was non-negotiable made this very apparent. Narcotics, psychotropic substances, various crimes, and maritime transport are among areas where the two nations have committed to working together. The state of relations between China and India was enhanced by the visit of Chinese President Jiang Zemin.
Following the dissolution of the Gujral ministry in March 1998, the coalition administration led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) & National Democratic Alliance (NDA) came into power under Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Nuclear tests were initiated by the Vajpayee administration. After detonating five nuclear bombs in the second week of May 1998, India declared itself a nuclear armed state. China, not Pakistan, is India's greatest danger, according to Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes.
On May 14, 1998, the New York Times published a letter written by A.B. Vajpayee, the prime minister of India, to Bill Clinton. In the letter, Vajpayee blamed China for the nuclear tests. The Chinese always place equal importance on words and deeds, according to President Jiang Zemin of China. They appeared more offended by the remarks made by the Indians than by the tests themselves. Responding to "strong condemnation" in a formal statement issued on 14 May, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs offered their thoughts. "China presented as a nuclear threat to India," the statement argued, and defended China's track record on the matter. It stated that India is making this baseless accusation against China in order to rationalise its nuclear weapons programme. Indian officials are allegedly plotting to seize power in South Asia and spark a nuclear arms race, according to China. It went on to say that everyone should immediately agree to halt India's nuclear development programme.
In September 2000, the Dalai Lama's visit to Taiwan was met with opposition from the Ministry of External Affairs, reigniting the Tibet issue. To improve ties with Tibet, India's Minister of Home Affairs, L. K. Advani, reassured the Dalai Lama in September 2000 that the government was thinking about accepting the Karmapa as a refugee. After a few days, China responded by saying that India should be careful about providing asylum to the Karmapa, especially because he is associated with anti-China forces (an apparent reference to the Dalai Lama). This may have been lessened if the first bilateral agreement on training, social security, and labour had been signed in September 2000. Following anti-dumping actions taken by India in December 2000 against Chinese manufacturers, China promised to work with India to stop smuggling.
On 14 February 2001, China voiced its alarm over a rumour suggesting that India could offer shelter to the Karmapa. At the same time that the matter was not yet resolved, the Karmapa embarked on a tour across the nation, where he was ceremoniously welcomed by Buddhists at Dharmasala in Himachal Pradesh. According to Indian intelligence sources, the Karmapa poses a "security threat to the country" since he is seen as a tool for the Chinese to further their control over the religious beliefs of the Tibetan community & entire Himalayan region.
In April 2001, as part of the normalisation process, the Chief of Staff of the PLA, General Fu Quanyou, and the Deputy Chief of the PLA, Xiong Guangkai, met with an army mission from India led by three-star General HRS Kalkat. In April 2001, China officially proclaimed its support for Indian efforts to stabilise Afghanistan and bring peace, in contrast to its loyal ally Pakistan. As a result of human rights abuses in China, the US, China, & New York have banded together to reject a US-proposed resolution at the UN. India voted for a "no action" motion in April, aligning itself with China's stance against US-drafted human rights resolutions.
BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP
In 2002, there were a number of high-level visits, agreements, and significant actions that contributed to an improvement in the bilateral relationship between China and India. Originally scheduled for November 2001, Premier Zhou Rongji's historic six-day visit to India commences on January 13, 2002. Changes in the global and regional environment, including the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre (WTC) & Pentagon on September 11, 2001 (9/11), prevented Premier Zhou Rongji from visiting India. It is highly unlikely that Zhou Rongji's journey was like any other as he did not include any of the other South Asian nations. For many reasons, the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001, & Line of Control (LOC) in Kashmir became the centre of international attention during Premier Zhou's visit. A. B. Vajpayee, prime minister of India, & Zhou Rongji, prime minister of China, signed a number of agreements that deepened the bilateral connection. In spite of these long-standing tensions, a number of agreements were reached concerning tourism, space research, science or technology, the exchange of scientific experts, & provision of hydrological information on the Brahmaputra. The Brahmaputra MoU would alleviate some of India's suspicion & concern that China would reduce the river's water flow to India, but these pacts, while important, don't amount to much. The move to enhance direct flights among New Delhi — Beijing from once per week to twice per week is anticipated to boost tourism in both nations. "We are important and friendly neighbours to each other," Zhou said when they signed the agreement along with the other party. India has never been seen as a threat by China, and we don't see any reason for them to change their minds today. The two countries have vowed to further up their combined battle against terrorism and broaden their bilateral business connections as part of their attempts to build confidence with one another.
The CEO paid a subsequent visit to the Infosys campus in Bangalore, where he spoke to the gathering, stating, "You are number one in software and we are number one in hardware, if we put hardware & software integrated we are world's number one in information technology." The two prime ministers spoke about a range of international topics, including the fact that "China opposes terrorism in all its forms, irrespective of when or where it occurred or who it is directed against," & consequent border tensions between Pakistan and India. Thanks to the November 2000 JWG Parleys & subsequent map exchange, the political relationship has been steadily improving.
The border issue, the possibility of creating a collaborative system to fight terrorism, & state of bilateral economic relations were among the topics covered by Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh during his March 28-30, 2002 visit to China, during which he met with Chinese leaders. The Indian foreign minister informed media in Beijing on 30 March 2002 that the two countries had agreed on a schedule for resolving the boundary dispute. The parties involved have acknowledged the points of contention in the centre sector, and it is anticipated that the eastern sector maps can also be published by early 2003.
During a state visit to the People's Republic of China, India's Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee arrived on June 22, 2003. It took the prime minister of India ten years, but he finally went to China. It was also the first visit by a high-ranking official since the nuclear bombings of 1998. Vajpayee was visited by high-ranking officials, including External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha, Principal Secretary Brajesh Mishra, Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal, and others. The ministers of commerce & information technology, Arun Jatily and Arun Shourie, respectively, followed the delegation later.
The leaders of the two largest economies in the world met for a week before signing "The Agreement on Principles for Relations & Comprehensive Cooperation" on 23 June 2003. Despite their differences, the two nations' interests are more closely aligned, the proclamation stated, as it detailed the amicable actions that each would take. Neither nation is a threat to the other. The parties agree that they will not engage in or threaten each other with physical violence. Political & diplomatic discussions, as well as military collaboration, have indicated a return to India-China friendship, but the two nations have failed to forge a strategic alliance as of yet. They reaffirmed their determination to resolve their disputes in a peaceful manner. The two Asian nations have come a long way from the animosity and suspicion that followed India's nuclear tests in May 1998. The Panchsheel Accord, often called the Five Principles, was the original basis for the establishment of diplomatic ties between the People's Republic of China & Republic of India.
During his visit to China, Vajpayee released a joint declaration & nine papers outlining bilateral cooperation in the areas of culture, information technology, law & justice, and economics. These records include:
• A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) describing the cooperation and exchange between the Indian Ministry of Law and Justice & Supreme People's Procuratorate of the People's Republic of China;
• The Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China & Indian MHRD for Educational Cooperation & Exchange;
• Protocol of Phytosanitary necessities for importing Mangoes from India to China across the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Evaluation or Quarantine of the PRC & Ministry of Agriculture of India;
• MoU on decreasing Visa processes between the Government of the PRC & Government of India;
• MoU for improved collaboration in the field of reused energy among the Ministry of Water Resources of the government of PRC & Government of India;
• MoU of collaboration among the growing of ocean science or technology between the state Oceanic Administration of the PRC & Department of Ocean Development of the Government of India;
• MoU between the National Science Foundation of the PRC & Department of Science and Technology of the Government of India;
• MoU between the Government of the PRC & Government of India on the receptive the development of Cultural Centres in their capitals; and
• Executives programmes of the cultural agreement in the Government of India & Government of PRC for 2003-2005.
Tang Jiaxuan claims that the relationship between China & India has entered a new phase of extensive growth and is now having a significant regional and global influence. Maintaining a policy of good neighbourliness & friendship with India is important to the Chinese government. They also want to work with India to manage friendships strategically & collaboratively in all areas, respect each other's bilateral relations, appropriately handle historical issues like the border dispute, and create a long-term, constructive or cooperative partnership.
Tang Jiaxuan also had meetings with Indian Foreign Minister Natwar Singh and Mr. J.N. Dixit, India’s National Security Advisor & Special Representative, regarding the boundary between India & China. India and China have committed to a number of measures aimed at bringing their economies closer together. These include holding more frequent high-level meetings, improving their negotiation mechanisms, increasing political trust, discussing the possibility of a China-India Free Trade Area, and fostering exchanges and cooperation in all areas, particularly in the realms of culture, science, & technology.
The parties expressed their gratitude for the three rounds of talks that took place between the two Special Representatives about the border concerns. They expressed their hope that a swift and equitable settlement to the dispute may be achieved by quickly agreeing on the principles that would be employed. The Indian side stressed that they have never changed their position on the Tibet problem with China, and that this includes their policy of not allowing the Dalai Lama to be involved in Indian politics. For Tang Jiaxuan, it was critical that India stick rigidly to the one-China policy when it came to Taiwan.
The two nations are helping to strengthen connections quickly in several areas. They maintained their tradition of sending high-ranking officials to each other's nations. Furthermore, they endeavoured to re-energize efforts to resolve the fundamental issue, the border conflict, and elevate the discourse surrounding security concerns. The vice foreign minister of China, Wu Dawei, met with the then foreign secretary of India, Shyam Saran, in Beijing in 2005. According to China's official news agency 'Xinhua,' the two countries reached a number of agreements during the meeting, which was formally titled the first "strategic dialogue" between them. These included the importance of "searching beyond bilateral disputes or upgrading ties in a global perspective," the necessity of reforming the UN, and other international issues. They also made preparations for the arrival of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to India.
During his visit to New Delhi from April 9-12, 2005, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stated that Sikkim was "no longer a problem in India-China relations" and that China "regarded Sikkim as intrinsic part of India." As part of their joint statement, India and China have made it clear that "Sikkim is a state of the Republic of India." Beijing has made public claims that the issue has been settled by providing India with a revised map that incorporates Sikkim into the Indian unity. The truth is that New Delhi felt certain the de jure recognition would come soon. On the occasion of the SAARC meeting in 2005, China was granted the status of observer. While other SAARC countries are seriously contemplating China's membership application, India seems hesitant to do the same.
In December 1988, Rajiv Gandhi visited Beijing, marking a resumption of state visits between the prime leaders of the two nations & turning point in ties, according to studies into India-China affairs. Full normalisation of political relations between the two nations may be hindered by various issues, such as the unresolved border dispute, the Tibet factor, China's claim to some Indian areas, and so forth
While visiting China, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi & President Xi Jinping reached a consensus to launch a JWG to discovery a peaceful resolution to the boundary argument. In order to pave the way for a just and satisfactory resolution of the boundary issue, it was expected that other areas would have been improved during negotiations.
The two governments of China and India came to an agreement to keep the border area peaceful during the visits of President Jiang Zemin in November 1996 & Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao in September 1993, respectively. To "respecting and preserve the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between them," as both parties pledged in these contracts. It was also decided that neither party would unfairly influence the LAC's decision on the boundary dispute.
When then-Prime Minister AB Vajpayee visited China in June 2003, the border resolution effort got a major boost. The two countries' decision to designate staff to examine the matter from the political perspective of their whole bilateral relations accelerated the pace of resolution. After much deliberation, the specialist reps still haven't solved the problem. To resolve the boundary dispute, the Agreement of the Political Variables or Principles of Governance was implemented on April 28, 2005, with the approval or expression of pleasure from China's Prime Minister Wen Jiabao & India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. The two leaders were meeting as special representatives of their respective countries. Also, the two prime ministers promised to settle any future border disputes peacefully and without resorting to force or threats of force. While in China, officials from both nations vowed to put aside their differences & work together to achieve the long-term objectives of their bilateral relations while also resolving the long-standing boundary dispute between India & China. In light of their shared interests & state of their bilateral relationship, they restated their support for the special representatives system, which aims to politically resolve the boundary dispute. Both sides are committed to maintaining calm and stability along the border until a long-term resolution is reached.
There are many problems, but the Tibet issue is very important. The Tibet Autonomous Region is no longer a point of contention between China & India. This is due to India's recognition of the region's inherent Chineseness and its resolute opposition to the Dalai Lama's efforts to utilise Indian territory to launch anti-China movements. However, Beijing appears to be wary about India's genuine motives regarding the Dalai Lama. People pay close attention to the Tibet question because of the Tibetan government in exile in Dharmshala, which is led by the Dalai Lama. China believes that the Indian government must be fully involved and implicitly agreed upon before the Dalai Lama's group leaders may go on political trips abroad and then come back to India. China has long complained that the Dalai Lama is free to advance his "separatist" agenda in India. His first visit to Tawang since 1959 angered the Chinese since it reinforced the region's long-held Indian claim. The Dalai Lama was granted permission to travel to Tawang by India after the Indian government was convinced by China that the journey was solely for religious purposes. Since the Tibet problem is vital to China's national security, unity, and sovereignty, Beijing wants India to understand its concern about it. In China, the Dalai Lama is seen as more than just a religious leader; he is also the head of an underground government.
The leaders of the two nations have visited each other multiple times, which has contributed significantly to the growth of bilateral relations. India & China have apparently resolved their basic differences on the subject of sovereignty over disputed territories along their border by agreeing on a workable solution, thanks to the inventive & proactive thinking of their respective leaders. No matter what happens, the world will see that India & China are prepared to work together to build a peaceful & stable global order. This is true even if the Bhai Bhai relationship between the two countries does not return.
To rephrase, China & India face a multitude of challenges and opportunities in the post-Cold War global landscape. After resolving their differences and making the most of available opportunities, the two nations will be well-positioned to exert significant influence & stability on the global stage.
CONCLUSION
Our study of India-China relations shows that there have been many ups and downs. They have not been smooth all the time. To begin with, India and China were on very good terms and established their formal diplomatic relations on 1 April, 1950. But relations deteriorated after 1959, when China alleged that India was involved in the 1959 Tibetan revolt and the Dalai Lama took asylum in India. With the failure of the Indo-Tibetan border problem through negotiation between the two countries in 1960, forceful actions of claims by both sides followed. India and China could fail to solve their territorial dispute and become locked in an open competition for regional hegemony as they continue to grow in military and economic strength. In this context India leaned towards the US, whereas China could step up its support of Pakistan. As a result, Sino-Indian competition could spark a way for arms race in the region. India improved its economic performance in the post-Cold War period, combined with its growing importance in international affairs. China saw India as a “comprehensive international power,” acknowledging that its rise cannot be contained and is beneficial to Asia and the whole world.
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