A Study on Role of Linguistic Analysis in Native Speaker’s Intuition

Exploring the philosophical and methodological implications of linguistic intuitions

Abstract

The term "linguistic intuitions" is often used by linguists to refer to these kinds of feelings. Philosophically significant concerns are raised by the use of these intuitions and the applications they are applied to. When it comes to linguistic intuitions, what kind of attitude or mental state is necessary? To what extent can their causal a etiology sustain their evidential power? As an example of how inaccessible sub personal processes give rise to conscious experiences, or as an example of cognitive penetrability, what insight may their causal origin provide on questions about cognitive architecture? Can certain subjects' intuition be more trustworthy than others? What methodological issues arise when it comes to linguistic intuitions? What influence may this have on philosophers' own appeals to intuition?? This research examines and critiques the most popular approaches to these concerns. In particular, we support a ‘mentalist' linguistics theory and the significance of linguistic intuitions.